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ABSTRACT
The fight against terrorism and organized crime require strong collaboration between
public security organizations. Public security networks include several agencies that are not
bound to each other with strong hierarchical ties. Because of a lack of the strong hierarchical
structure, managing public networks is not similar to managing a single government agency.
This study aims to examine the factors influencing network effectiveness in the public security
sector. The main research questions of the study are: Which factors are important for
effectiveness in public security networks? What is the role of inter-organizational trust among
partner agencies? Which kind of leadership style will achieve the highest performance in public
security networks? What is the relative importance of goal convergence and organizational
culture in network effectiveness? How does the relationship between inter-organizational trust,
leadership style, goal convergence and organizational culture impact network effectiveness? In
order to find these relations, a self-reported survey was sent to 2,095 current and previous
Turkish public security network managers. The study found that inter-organizational trust and
goal convergence have a positive relationship with network effectiveness. Although facilitator
leadership is found to be the most common leadership style in Turkish public security networks,
it is found as inappropriate to achieve higher network effectiveness. According to the results, the
co-producer network leadership is the most convenient leadership style in terms of network
effectiveness. While the results of the descriptive statistics confirm that six specific features of
organizational culture in public security sector have negative influence on network effectiveness,
the hypothesis testing with the covariance structure model only support the negative impact of
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competition among partner organization. This study contributes to the literature on network
effectiveness with particular proposals for the public security managers and practitioners.
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION
Because of increasing challenges of terrorism and organized crime, governments
establish various new organizations to fight against different aspects of these problems. This
enlargement generates a complex public security network system. Managing this complicated
network is different from managing and leading any single public organization. This study looks
at the network effectiveness in the public security sector. An effective collaboration is
recognized as one of the most important requirements of the successful struggle against terrorist
and organized crime networks.
The main goal of the study is to examine the impacts of latent variables, which are interorganizational trust, network leadership style, organizational culture, and goal convergence on
network effectiveness in public security networks. The study contributes to the existing literature
on network effectiveness in general, and public security networks in particular. The study uses
network theory, resource dependency, and inter-organizational social capital perspectives as
theoretical constructs and aims to create a conceptual framework among the study variables.
Local public security networks in Turkey are selected as the case of the research to analyze
relations between the variables.
This introductory section provides overall information about the statement of the research
problem and its significance, research questions, background of the study, and theoretical
concepts.
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1.1 Statement of the Problem
Terrorism and organized crime are challenging problems for governments in today’s
world. In order to overcome increasing difficulties in public security areas, governments are
trying to find alternative solutions. Numerous agencies are tasked to fight against these “wicked
problems” in different countries. In this complicated public security system, it is crucial to set a
mutual goal among responsible agencies, to make a precise evaluation of risk, to establish a
technical infrastructure, and to create organizational policies and processes that provide
flexibility and conformity to continuous incidents. It is also important to establish “a culture that
accepts inquiry and information sharing” for better coordination, and to develop “a systematic
program to increase adaptiveness and capacity for learning between governmental agencies”
(Comfort, 2002, p. 100).
Turkey has been suffering from terrorism and organized crime for the last three decades.
Because of its location, Turkey has a vital point for transnational criminal organizations. In
Turkey, five main public agencies are working to prevent and fight against terrorism and
organized crime. These are the Police Forces, the Gendarmerie, the Coast Guard, the national
intelligence, and the armed forces. In addition, many other agencies are needed to be involved in
this network at different stages. An effective resistance to these problems requires a continuous
collaboration among these intuitions.
Security has been a “problematic and contentious area in the Turkish administrative and
political system, due to the structural, functional, and organizational significance of the security
sector within this system and to the autonomous and leading role that the security sector plays”
(Akay, 2010, p. 5). When we look at the Turkish recent history, big failures, conflicts and
sometimes clashes can be seen among Turkish security organizations.
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In recent years, two significant failures can be given as examples of a lack of robust
collaboration. Two car bomb explosions killed 51 people in the Reyhanli district of Hatay
province on 11 May 2013. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan indicated the problem of
disconnection between police forces and national intelligence service Milli Istihbarat Teskilati
[MIT] as the reason of the incident three days after the explosion (Radikal, 2013). The problems
in the collaboration among security agencies have caused some tragic mistakes as well. In 2011,
a military air operation killed 34 smugglers who were allegedly mistaken for terrorist
organization the PKK members. This incident occurred across the Turkish-Iraqi border near
Uludere district in Sirnak Province. The Turkish Parliamentary Human Rights Committee report
claimed that the main reason behind the Uludere incident was the lack of coordination between
military and security officials (Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights Inquiry
Committee [TGNAHRIC], 2013).
This research aims to identify the factors that affect the success of collaboration among
agencies in local public security networks. A robust collaboration between security agencies is a
significant prerequisite of the effective struggle against terrorism and organized crime. Trust
among network partners, effective network leadership, organizational culture and goal
convergence are identified as the factors that affect the success of collaboration and network
effectiveness.
1.2 Purpose of the Study
Current public administration literature emphasizes the significance of trust in the public
sector, but there are a few empirical studies that investigate the function and conditions of trust
in collaborative public management. Trust has an important role as a cohesion element that
ensures the maintenance of a fruitful partnership among dissimilar members in a network
3

(Agranof & McGuire, 2001). Trust can reduce transaction costs and facilitates collaboration
(Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, & Mischen, 2011). Trust also increases the performance and problem
solving capacity of the public management networks (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007).
It is impossible to prevent all problems, conflicts, and clashes among such big
organizations having thousands of members that have to work together. Network leadership has
two important functions in the public security sector related to building and sustaining trust and
managing collaboration between agencies. First, leaders should facilitate sharing information and
remove barriers from information flow. They are also supposed to develop the ability of the
network to make successful joint operations against crime and terror groups. For effective
information sharing, leaders should assign what needs to be shared, because this task needs to be
accomplished by those who can see the broader picture. Leaders should be able to develop
mutually shared criteria and design process rules about information sharing and joint operations.
Healthy information flow and successful joint operations increase trust among partners, but they
also require trust among partners.
Second, leadership provides accountability and transparency. Actions and operations of
the security agencies should be monitored by the leadership. In this sensitive environment, it is
important to establish an accountable structure among and within the agencies for building and
sustaining a meaningful collaboration. Partners and their members should be sure that violation
of the rules and misconducts will be dealt with severely and penalized. Agencies should
demonstrate to each other that they will not try to cover mistakes of their members by conducting
fair and transparent investigations. Performance measurement is also another important aspect of
this function.
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Organizations are social structures pursuing specific common goals which cannot be
achieved by individual effort (Pfeffer, 1997). The open system perspective of the organizational
theory emphasizes the organizations’ interdependent structure, complexity, and environment.
Dependence on resources, labor, external knowledge and information are important points that
ensure different organizations work together (Scott & Davis, 2006).
Secrecy, self-protection, and competition among agencies are problematic features of the
organizational culture of the public security sector that complicate information sharing
(Christensen & Crank, 2001). Various studies indicate that police culture has significant impact
on both performance and information sharing in policing (Fraser, 2004; Luen & Al-Hawamdeh,
2001; Glomseth, Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2007). The general environment is important to
understand and direct organizations. The characteristics of organizations’ ecology should be
known to provide a more proper response to demands and challenges (Scott &Davis, 2006).
Without taking into account these features, it is impossible to introduce an effective network
structure.
This study examines network effectiveness in the public security sector. Assessment of a
single organization’s effectiveness is not adequate, if the results cannot be easily ascribed to the
facilities of the organization. When the outcomes are contingent on the joined and coordinated
activities of various different organizations, the effectiveness should be evaluated at network
level (Provan & Milward, 1995). Network effectiveness has come to be used to refer to the
network level achievements which cannot be accomplished easily by individual organizations
that are working alone (Provan & Kenis 2008).
An effective collaboration is recognized as one of the most important requirements of the
success in wars on terror, and organized crime networks. Inter-organizational trust, network
5

leadership, goal convergence and organizational culture are identified as the key variables of
network effectiveness. The following research questions are addressed in the study: Which
factors are important for effectiveness in public security networks? What is the role of interorganizational trust among partner agencies? Which kind of leadership style will achieve the
highest performance in public security networks? What is the relative importance of goal
convergence and organizational culture in network effectiveness? How does the relationship
between inter-organizational trust, leadership style, goal convergence and organizational culture
impact network effectiveness?
This study contributes to earlier studies on the network effectiveness in public security
networks. Although earlier studies have examined network effectiveness in public service
delivery networks, little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of networks in the public
security sector. This study addresses this issue by studying the impacts of latent variables which
are inter-organizational trust, network leadership style, organizational culture and goal
convergence on network effectiveness in public security networks. The study uses network
theory, resource dependency theory, and inter-organizational social capital perspectives as
theoretical constructs and aims to create a conceptual framework among addressed variables.
Turkish local public security networks are selected as the case of the research to analyze
relations between the variables.
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1.3 Context of the Study
In this section, some necessary information related to the Turkish administrative system,
governorship system, and public security system will be briefly presented to provide a better
understanding of the subjects and the logic of the dissertation.
1.3.1 Turkish Administrative System
Turkey is ruled by parliamentary system of government in which the government derives
its legitimacy from the parliament. The Turkish constitution is based on the principle of
separation of powers. The three branches in Turkey are legislature, executive, and judiciary.
While the legislative power is used by the elected Grand National Assembly, the judiciary power
is attributed to the independent courts, and the executive power is held by the President of the
Republic and the Cabinet. The Prime minister is the head of the cabinet and ministers in the
cabinet are accountable to the Prime Minister.
Two main principles of the administration, central administration and decentralization,
are implemented simultaneously in the Turkish Administrative system. Therefore, it is aimed to
establish a balance between powerful integral unity and meeting the specific common needs of
local inhabitants (Gözübüyük, 2005). Government institutions in Turkey can be separated into
two types which are central administration and local administration institutions.
Local Administrations can be divided into two main categories, geographical local
administrations, which are local governments, and functional local administrations. According to
article 127 of Turkish Constitution, local governments are:
Public corporate bodies established to meet the common local needs of the inhabitants of
provinces, municipal districts and villages, whose principles of constitution and decision7

making organs elected by the electorate are determined by law. The formation, duties,
and powers of the local administrations shall be regulated by law in accordance with the
principle of local administration.
Three types of local administrations are municipalities, special provincial administrations,
and villages. The decision making bodies of local administrations are elected by the people and
they have certain degree of financial and administrative autonomy. Functional local
administrations are highly specialized public institutions that deliver specific public services,
such as social security, highways or postal services outside the central administration. The
hierarchical supervision of the central government on functional local administrations is limited
(Tortop, 1994; Gunday, 2003; Keles,2000).
Public Security organizations are organized under the authority of central government.
The central administration delivers public services across the nation. The central administration,
which is also called general administration, involves the President of the Republic, the Prime
Ministry, ministries, other related government institutions and local branches of these
organizations in districts and provinces. According to the principal of central administration,
public services are provided from the capital under a hierarchical structure. The central
government makes all necessary political, administrative and economic decisions related to
public services from planning to implementation. The capital administration manages revenues
and expenditures of the public services (Kapucu & Palabiyik, 2008)
Centralization strengthens unity and integrity of public organizations, helps to deliver
equal level of public services across the entire country, provides greater opportunities to
overcome economic inequalities among different regions, and reduce the negative influence of
local pressures on public officials (Gozubuyuk, 2003). However, the principal of centralization
8

cannot be implemented strictly in such a big country. Centralization often generates unnecessary
complexity, bureaucracy, red tape, and inefficient public service. Determining local needs from
the capital may not be appropriate to identify the real situation. It is also not encouraging for
democratic participation (Gunday, 2003).
1.3.2 Governorship System
In order to moderate the negative consequences of centralization, The Turkish
Constitution embraced a specific type of centralization that is the principle of devolution of
powers (Kapucu & Palabiyik, 2008). It is described in the Article 126 as follows:
In terms of central administrative structure, Turkey is divided into provinces on the basis
of geographical situation, economic conditions, and public service requirements;
provinces are further divided into lower levels of administrative districts.
The administration of the provinces is based on the principle of devolution of Powers.
In the Turkish administrative system, there are 81 provinces in Turkey and each province
is then subdivided into smaller districts. Province governors are the head of the province
administration and responsible for the proper functioning and coordination of the public services,
security, and well-being of their jurisdiction.
The principle of devolution of powers empowers province governors to make and execute
decisions on certain issues on behalf of central government. The province governorship is the
only official position that has the privilege to take advantages of the principle of devolution of
powers. Each ministry and other public agencies in the capital administration can devolve their
authorization, tasks, financial resources and responsibilities to the province governors. Provincial
branches of each central government agency work under the direct command, supervision and
9

responsibility of the province governors. The budget of public services provided by the
governorships on behalf of central government agencies are met by the central government and
income obtained from these services goes to the central government.
The current reference law for the governorship system is “The Law on Provincial
Administration” (No. 5442). Province governors are appointed by the central government and
accepted as the central government’s highest agents in their jurisdictions. Province governors
are selected, upon a proposal from the Ministry of Interior, by a decree of the Cabinet and the
approval by the President (Article 6). The province governors are accepted as the representative
of the state and the government in the province, the agent of each minister, and their
administrative and political execution instrument. They are accountable to each minister for
organizing and supervising the general administration of the province. The ministers can give
orders and instructions to governors related to the works of their ministries. The governor has
authority to supervise and inspect all state offices, establishments and enterprises, private
businesses, special administration, municipality and village administrations with the exception of
the judicial and military organizations (Article 9).
The governors are also the superior of all general and special law enforcement agencies in
their provinces. They are supposed to take necessary steps to create a safe environment in their
jurisdictions, protect public order and security and to prevent crime. Law enforcement agencies
are obliged to immediately fulfill the orders issued by the governor (Article 10).
The provinces are subdivided into districts and district administrations are run by the
district governors. As opposed to province governorships, district governorship is a career job.
The central government can appoint anyone who is graduated from elementary school as a
province governor. On the other hand, in order to be a district governor, people are required to
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graduate from certain faculties of the universities, such as public administration, law or business
administration. Eligible applicants are chosen from a competitive elimination process that
involves written and verbal exams. Since the province governorship is recognized as a type of
exceptional public servants, the law did not seek a long list of qualifications for the province
governors. However, the province governors are usually appointed among the district governors.
A district governor can also be appointed as a province deputy governor, administrative senior
inspector and Interior Ministry high and middle level bureaucrat after working for a specific time
period as district governor.
The district governors are accepted as the representatives of the government. They are
responsible from the general administration of the district. The district governors are also the
superior of all general and special law enforcement agencies within the boundaries of the district
(Article 32).
1.3.3 Public Security System in Turkey
Turkish public security networks involve five main public agencies. Three of those
organizations are law enforcement agencies. Now we are going to look at important members of
the public security network.
1.3.3.1 Law Enforcement Structure in Turkey
There are three main public organizations: the Police Forces, the Gendarmerie and the
Coast Guard that constitutes law enforcement in Turkey. All these agencies are headquartered in
Ankara and work under responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. Law enforcement agencies are
recognized as central government bodies and receive their funding from the general budget
through the Ministry of Interior. Law enforcement agencies have two main types of duties. The
11

administrative duties involve activities to ensure and maintain the public order and security, and
prevent crime facilities. Administrative duties can be defined as proactive and preventive
measures. Governors have a strong authority to direct and supervise the administrative duties of
law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies carry out judicial duties when a crime is committed.
Judicial duties are related to execution of judicial services to investigate crimes, to collect and
keep evidences and catch offenders. Law enforcement agencies work with the public prosecutors
with regards to their judicial duties.
The Turkish Police Force (the General Directorate of Security) with more than 200,000
employees is the largest law enforcement agency that is responsible for urban areas, and
organized under the Ministry of Interior. The general director is the highest rank in the national
police and usually selected among province governors. The local branches of police forces,
which are province and districts police departments, work under direct authority of province and
district governors. The police departments work under a subordinating chain of command. There
are various functional divisions of departments such as terrorism, narcotics, organized crime,
patrol or traffic departments (Caglar, 2004).
The Gendarmerie is a military law enforcement agency and works in rural areas.
Similarly, the Coast Guard is a military law enforcement agency and responsible for maritime
security. Theoretically, the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard also perform under the control of
governors and district governors, but civilian authorities have limited power on both military
agencies. They operate under the Ministry of Interior in peace times, but in practice they operate
under the directives of the Armed Forces General Staff. Civilian oversight and control
mechanisms on the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard are weak. While governors and district
governors are authorized to discipline police officers who violated the administrative rules, they
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have limited direct authority over the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard. Civil authorities have
limited power on appointment, promotion and relocation of the Gendarmerie and the Coast
Guard officers.
1.3.3.2 The Turkish National Intelligence Organization [MIT]
The Turkish National Intelligence Organization [MIT] is Turkey’s main intelligence
agency. Differing from numerous other intelligence agencies, the MIT has authority to perform
external and internal intelligence activities. The MIT works under the direct control of the Prime
Minister and province and district governors have almost no official power on it. The MIT has
local offices in the provinces and in some big districts. In current structure Governors have
almost no formal power on the provincial offices of the National Intelligence Service. Law
enforcement agencies and military forces have their intelligence departments as well.
1.3.3.3 The Turkish Armed Forces
The Turkish Armed Forces consists of the Land Forces, Naval Forces, Air Force working
under the General Staff. The Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Command, which operate under
the Ministry of Internal Affairs in times of peace, is a part of the Turkish Armed Forces. It has
direct and indirect influence on domestic security.
The most important task of the armed forces related to terrorism and organized crime is
about border protection. Since the army is responsible for borders, military units need to inhibit
illegal entry of all kind of materials and members of crime groups. Because the Gendarmerie and
the Coast Guard are also military organizations, the army has an indirect effect on law
enforcement facilities. Military units also involve fighting against terror groups in some
mountainous regions, and also through cross border operations and air patrols.
13

Governors’ power on local armed forces units is weak. Governors do not have a
hierarchical power on military units. However, according to the Law on Provincal
Administration (No 54442), if governors see that existing law enforcement forces are not
adequate to protect public security and order and prevent crime, they can call for help from the
nearest military unit. Military units have to immediately fulfill the request from the governor.
The commander of the military unit decides the size and the placement period of the requested
force in coordination with the governor according to the characteristics of the incidents. In this
situation; governors make necessary cooperation and coordination between the law enforcement
agencies and the military units after taking the views of the commander of the supporting
military unit (Article: 11).
1.4. Terrorism and Organized Crime
Terrorism and organized crime are two significant safety problems of Turkish
Government. Turkey has been suffering from various terror groups from left wing to right wing
that have various purposes. Separatist terrorist organization, the PKK, left wing terrorist
organizations such as the DHKP/C, MLPK TIKKO, and Hezbollah –not Lebanon based but
Turkish Hezbollah- that has been exploiting religion are main terrorist organizations in Turkey.
The PKK has been the most challenging problem of Turkey for more than 30 years.
Turkey also has a critical location for organized crime groups, since it is a vital transit
line between Europe and Asia. Narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, trafficking in illicit
goods, counterfeiting, and money laundering are the main activities of organized crime groups.
Terrorist organizations also perform these illegal activities, or act together with organized crime
groups to find economic resources. The profit of these organized crime activities is the main
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financial source of the PKK and other terrorist organizations. The instability in Turkey’s
neighbor countries, Iraq and Syria, provide permanent bases for crime groups.
In order to fight these problems a strong collaboration is necessary among different
agencies in the security sector.
This chapter provided the statement of the problem, the purpose of the study and a brief
background about the Turkish security system. The following chapter examines existing
literature about the study constructs.
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CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW
This section provides a review of literature on previous research studies with regards to
the variables selected for the study. First, the concept of public security network is examined.
Second, theoretical background and relations between the study variables which are network
effectiveness, inter-organizational trust, network leadership, organizational culture and goal
convergence are summarized. Finally, network perspective, resource dependency theory and
inter-organizational social capital are introduced, since they are used as the key theories to
inform the research study. Finally a conceptual framework of the study is presented in this
section.
2.1 Public Security Networks
Terrorism and organized crime are intricate and challenging problems for governments
especially for the last three decades. Although terrorism is a concept difficult to define precisely,
it refers to “a campaign of violence designed to inspire fear, carried out by an organization, and
devoted to political ends” (Jenkins, 1974, p. 2). It is frequently considered as violence directed
against civilian targets in a method to get more attention for certain objectives (Jenkins, 1974).
Organized crime is defined in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as
“the unlawful activities of the members of a highly organized, disciplined association engaged
in supplying illegal goods and services.”
The rise of globalization, increasing information sharing, communication opportunities,
and more open borders provide crime structures to perform illegal activities in easier ways
(Cronin, 2002; Wagelly, 2006). Illegal networks have benefited from weaker government
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agencies, and the reappearance of ethnic and regional conflicts. Expanding financial markets,
rapidly advancing technology, and other improved global opportunities have also been exploited
by transnational criminal organizations (Wagley, 2006).
In addition, terror and crime groups shift their traditional frameworks into dark networks.
Some of those organizations “expanded the size and importance of networks already imbedded
in their traditional hierarchical organizations, whereas others evolved from a networked group
into a more complex horizontal design” (Dishman, 2005, p. 238). Dark networks need flexible
organizational frameworks that provide ability to adjust rapidly to altering pressures from
governments and other rivals to stay alive (Miliward & Raab, 2003; Demiroz & Kapucu, 2013).
The transformation of hierarchical organizations to illegal networks causes a special challenge
for public security agencies. Decentralized structures increase illicit organizations’
independence and complexity. Public security institutions need to follow numerous small cells of
various kinds of crime networks. Cells of these networks usually work autonomous from the core
of the network, and members do not know other cells’ members and support systems. This
sophisticated system obstructs law enforcement agencies and intelligence services to find
evidence of relations between core of the network and cells, and between different cells of the
illegal network (Dishman, 2005).
Kenney (2007) examines how drug trafficking and terrorist networks constantly adapt to
the counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism programs. Because of continuous competitive
adaptation in clandestine networks, apparent success of government forces is not usually longlived. Illicit networks improve “their activities in response to practical experience and technical
information, store this knowledge in practices and procedures, and select and retain routines that
produce satisfactory results” (p. 3). Continuous organizational learning and building skills in
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trafficking and terrorist systems make it more challenging for security organizations to
eliminate their illicit adversaries (Kenney, 2007).Terrorist and organized crime networks are also
thought to increasingly support each other for financial resources and improving activity
capability. Transnational criminals participate in a range of illegal events, such as human, drug
and arm trafficking, forgery, money laundering, and corporate fraud and other fiscal crimes
(Wagley, 2006).
Governments need to focus on many issues to deal with those complicated dark networks.
Because of increasing challenges in this sophisticated environment, governments establish
various new organizations to fight against different aspects of the problem. This challenging
struggle has caused an increase in the number of responsible public institutions and organizations
as well as international organizations. This enlargement generates a complex public safety
network system. An effective struggle with this wicked problem requires using multijurisdictional task forces from different public security organizations. Managing this complicated
network is different from managing any single public organization. Although its power and
ability is higher (Finckenauer, 2007), network structure requires special knowledge for effective
management.
In order to achieve an effective struggle in this complicated environment, it is important
to establish “a shared goal among the participating units; an accurate assessment of threats to the
system; a technical infrastructure that effectively supports system operations; organizational
policies and procedures that enable flexible adaptation to dynamic events by the participating
units; and a culture that accepts inquiry and information sharing” (Comfort, 2002, p. 100).
Without an effective collaboration, organizations in the public security sector may duplicate their
limited resources. Uncertainty may lead potentially dangerous conflicts between organizations.
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Collaboration increases organizations’ legitimacy that enables people to think that they are
entitled to be deferred to and obeyed (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). An effective struggle against
complicated dark networks necessitates promoting strong collaboration.
Collaboration among law enforcement officials and between other public security
agencies is not an easy issue. A high competition between public security organizations
negatively affects competition. Agencies and their members compete among each other to gain
credit for successful investigations. One of the leading reasons why security agencies and their
members keep information within their own jurisdiction is this competition. Another reason is
the necessity to suggest evidence of successful investigations for justifying bigger budgets for
future assignments. Differences or disputes between law enforcement, prosecutors and
investigating magistrates also take place frequently. A key factor for achievement in
investigating complex criminal cases is learning to work together in agencies’ respective spheres
of jurisdiction. Therefore, the management of every law enforcement organization and other
public security intuitions should accept the necessity of a process of collaboration with other
agencies, whether in the same country or abroad. This process is required to be established
starting from high level officials and spreading to lower levels of the agencies, as well as across
sectors (Buscaglia & González, 2006). Establishing such an effective collaboration requires a
high level of trust and intense effort for building and sustaining collaboration among these
organizations.
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2.2 Network Effectiveness
This part of the study discusses network effectiveness. It begins by providing a brief
overview of the concepts of accountability and performance evaluation in public administration.
It then focuses on performance evaluation in networks, and in particular for public security
networks.
2.2.1 Accountability and Performance Evaluation
Accountability can be “defined as the obligation to give an account of one’s action to
someone else, often balanced by a responsibility of that other to seek an account” (Scott &Davis,
2006, p. 242). The traditional model of accountability in the public sector generally focused on
bureaucratic and political accountability and is based on politics administration dichotomy.
However, the traditional model is too narrow to meet the requirements of modern public
administration and the dichotomy is usually accepted as unrealistic. Its emphasis on errors rather
than achievements has been increasingly criticized for not being very efficient and effective
(Hughes, 2012).
Behn (2001) classifies accountability based on the reasons of accountability and
identifies three types of accountability: “Accountability for finances,” accountability for
fairness,” and “accountability for performance.” Behn indicates “accountability dilemma” that
refers to a trade-off between those accountability types. Providing accountability for finance and
fairness require compliance with rules. These attempts may usually hinder accountability for
performance, or accountability for performance may lead to an omission of accountability for
fairness and finance. Therefore, it is very difficult to provide all three types of accountability
simultaneously (Hill & Lynn, 2009; Hughes, 2012).
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Romzec and Dubnic (1987) made a different classification “based on source of control
over an agency’s action: whether it originates within or outside the organization and the extent of
that control” (Hill & Lynn, 2009, p. 291). They delineated four types of accountability that are
legal, political, bureaucratic, and professional accountability. Bureaucratic accountability is
based on hierarchical relations in which expectations are built on organizational directives. Legal
accountability focuses on the rule of law and expectations are managed through obedience to
external commandments. Professional accountability promotes expertise. Expectations are based
on respect for specific judgment and expertise. Finally, responsiveness is the fundamental value
emphasized in political accountability. Expectations are required to be reactive to other
stakeholders (Romzec & Dubnic, 1987; Romzec &Wallace, 2000).
Result-oriented public service is a key issue that represents the transition from traditional
public administration to public management approach (Hughes, 2012). Today, performance
accountability and performance management are key topics for not only scholars but also for
public service practitioners. Organizations need to identify their successes and failures and
develop new ways that make public service programs perform better. The main challenge in
performance based management is performance measurement. Organizations have different
performance perspectives related to their targets and goals. Introducing a fair measurement
system that successfully measures all different aspects of public agencies, programs, or
employees is not an easy issue. Although performance evaluation is a critical concept in
administrative science, the numbers of empirical research studies related to network performance
evaluation are few in the public administration literature.
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2.2.2 Performance Evaluation in Networks
Network effectiveness can be defined “as the attainment of positive network level
outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants acting
independently” (Provan & Kenis 2008, p. 230).Managing accountability is one of the most
significant and challenging aspects of the network theory. Network management must work hard
to achieve that each partner in the network would complete their responsibilities. Otherwise, free
riders would damage the collaboration in the network (Milward & Provan, 2006).
On the other hand, performance evaluation in a network is not an easy task. There are
various challenges. Consensus among partners to decide about performance criteria may not
always be possible. Some partners may not be eager to be evaluated, since they have doubts
about their performance and their capacity. Partners may be reluctant on performance evaluation,
since they think that circumstances beyond their control may negatively affect their performance.
Focusing some specific points may lead to neglecting some other significant goals which are
more difficult to evaluate. Lastly, it is necessary to be clear about “who should be accountable to
whom and for what results” (Page, 2004, p. 592).
Provan, Fish, and Sydow (2007) argue that each network and each field in which a
network perform have exclusive performance evaluation measures. These measures differ
according to the purpose of the network. However, the network literature discusses some
significant factors that may contribute the network effectiveness. Some of those factors are goal
convergence among network partners, network structure, network resources, leadership style,
internal and external legitimacy, the strength of the ties among members, inter-organizational
trust, power differentiation, balance between stability, and flexibility (Popp et al., 2013).
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Mandell and Keast (2007) categorize networks as cooperative, coordinative, or
collaborative networks. Traditional measurement methods can be suitable to evaluate
performance of cooperative and coordinative networks, since members of those kinds of
networks preserve their independent entity. However, one of the most important characteristics
of collaborative networks is partners’ interdependence to achieve common goals. Traditional
measurement instruments are insufficient and incorrect to evaluate the collaborative activities
among partners in the network.
In the United States, intelligence activities are conducted by numerous organizations: The
Central Intelligence Agency, Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Coast Guard
Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland
Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and Navy Intelligence
consist of the intelligence community (Intelligence Community, 2012). In addition to these
agencies, local and state police departments carry out intelligence activities. As the number of
the intelligence agencies increases, the need for cooperation between these agencies also
increases (Odabasi, 2010).
The 9/11 Commission reported that the main reasons of failure on September 11 were the
lack of collaboration, “limited capacity to share information among agencies”, and “perceived
legal barriers to sharing information” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, 2004, p.18). The 9/11 Commission emphasized the need to institutionalize
information-sharing. Fusion centers were developed to ease information-sharing across agencies.
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The national government pressured agencies “within fusion centers to work together and share
information to prevent future large-scale terrorist attacks” (Lewandowski, 2012, p. 44).
Lewandowski argues that in addition to building the physical structure and placing
everyone under a new roof, establishing a new culture and environment to encourage the free
exchange of information are important for effective information- sharing in fusion centers. A
shorter distance between the employees of different agencies facilitates to share information, but
more importantly this helps to break down the wall of secrecy among agencies. Working in the
same workplace eliminates the physical separation among the employees of fusion centers. It
also helps to keep “everyone on an equal power status, regardless of the agency they represent.
By allowing all of the members of fusion centers to experience their workspace as one of
seemingly equal status for all, the flow of information becomes primarily horizontal, rather than
vertical” (Lewandowski, 2012, p. 45).
There has been no empirical assessment about the accountability and performance
assessment of fusion centers in Criminal Justice research (Carter & Carter, 2009). However,
Carter and Carter (2009) suggest four measures to evaluate the effectiveness of fusion centers.
According to them, the first measure of the achievement in fusion centers is “whether more
information is being shared among law enforcement agencies at all levels of government”
(p.1336). The second measure is “the ability to collect, retain, and disseminate information while
protecting civil rights and privacy” (p. 1336). The third measure suggested by Carter and Carter
is “whether the information and intelligence disseminated by the fusion centers have resulted in
the prevention, mitigation, and control of crime and terrorism” (p. 1337). The last measure is
“whether a fusion center is cost-effective, which is extremely difficult to measure and so
involves some value judgments” (p. 1337).
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Although it is generally accepted that traditional performance evaluation and
accountability tools are not appropriate for especially collaborative networks, there is not a
generally agreed upon method for evaluating network performance. The logic model and social
network analysis are briefly introduced in this paper. While the logic model emphasizes the
relations between network processes and outcomes, network analysis focuses on the
effectiveness of a network as a whole by examining inter-organizational relations and
networking.
2.2.3 The Logic Model for Network Performance Evaluation
Logic model can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of public security networks.
Herranz (2010) introduces a logic model framework in order to conceptualize network
coordination and performance. A logic model includes “identifying key elements and indicators
in four areas: (a) inputs (e.g., resources, investments), (b) activities (e.g., services, processes,
strategies, methods), (c) outputs (e.g., tangible products delivered by a program), and (d)
outcomes (e.g., expected changes in the short, medium, and long term)” (p. 62).
According to Herranz (2010), a logic model may be helpful to assess network
effectiveness. It conceptually simplifies complex interrelationships, develops measurable
performance indicators, and identifies the intermediate outcomes of inter-organizational
processes. By making hypothesized relations between network processes and outcomes, a logic
model may delineate how a network initiative will achieve end outcomes explicitly. He presents
the logic model framework as a stepping stone toward relating coordination and performance in
the planning, implementation, and evaluative reporting of networks.

25

Figure 1. Logic Model: Outcomes Sequence Chart with Indicators. Adapted from Herranz, 2010.
Figure 2 depicts a logic model to evaluate performance of public security networks. The
number of agencies’ employees, their equipment, the budget and other costs are indicators of
resources. The number of documented meetings among the representatives of the participant
organizations, the programs and services employed by the network, and the informal meetings
are indicators of the network activities. The short term output indicator of a public security
network is the amount of shared information among member agencies. If the network has been
successful in increasing the information being shared, the short term goals would be met. If the
expected increase is not found, the reason behind the issue should be examined. The ability to
collect and use information and the number of joint operations carried out with the cooperation
of the member agencies are intermediate outcomes of the network. The long term success
indicators of the network are the amount of terrorist attacks or criminal activities prevented as a
result of the collaboration, the number of cleared unsolved crime and terrorist cases, and the
number of terrorist or criminals captured or killed by means of the collaboration. Each step
should be separately examined, the reasons of the failure should be identified, and necessary
updates in terms of network structure, process strategies, programs or other settings should be
applied.
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Figure 2: Logic model of performance measures for the public security network

2.2.4 Inter-organizational Relationships in Networks
A collaborative network usually involves partners from different areas and different
backgrounds with various interests. Trust and relationships among partners are significant
indicators of the effectiveness of the collaborative network. Inter-organizational relations can be
used to measure network performance. Individual organizations constitute collaborative
networks, but the effectiveness of any one organization in a network cannot indicate the
effectiveness of the network. Although individual successes may be significant to the head of an
organization represented in the network, these successes do not by themselves illustrate success
of the network. Mandel and Keast (2007) emphasize distinguishing characteristics of
collaborative networks. According to them, measures of performance should involve the degree
to which linkages among members are tight or loose, the degree to which members are
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committed to the collective goals rather than to just their own organizations, the degree to which
all relevant parties are included in the network, the type of formal and informal rules agreed
upon, the degree to which participants are open in their communications with each other, and the
degree to which the network is supported by key actors both inside and outside the network
(Mandel & Keast,2007). In this perspective, they conclude that building trust and taking risk
have critical importance for effective collaborative networks. Social Network analysis can be
used to examine the inter-organizational relations in a collaborative network (Kapucu &
Demiroz, 2011; Hu, Knox & Kapucu 2014; Kapucu, & Hu, 2014; Kapucu, & Garayev, 2014)
2.3 Inter-organizational Trust
This part of the study discusses inter-organizational trust in networks. Before proceeding
to examine inter-organizational trust, it will be necessary to provide a brief overview of the
concept of trust in general.
2.3.1 Trust
Collective actions in a group create social capital that improves “the ability to work
together for mutual productive gain” (Fountain, 1998, p. 104). Inter-organizational social capital
is necessary for disparate groups to work together with sharing resources seized by individual
organizations. Trust is an important element of social capital together with “norms”, and
“operations of the network” that are closely linked to the values and purposes of the individual
members (Agranof & McGuire, 2001).
Ostrom and Ahn (2002) identify trust as an independent and non-reducible factor that
determines the achievement or failure of collective action within a community and a main tie
between social capital and collective action. It is not a type of social capital, but it is an output of
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social capital. They define trust as “a particular level of subjective probability with which an
agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action” ( p. xvi). So
it can be said that the trustor takes a risk of loss in a collective action since there is a probability
that the trustee may not perform the anticipated action. However, trust provides an enhanced
opportunity for trustor and trustee to reach their shared goals. While this is a significant incentive
for even selfish individuals, networks that have natural intentions to behave cooperatively with
others need trust as a precondition for expected outcomes (Ostrom & Ahn, 2002).
Apart from the risk, other dominant characteristics of trust are vulnerability and
expectations. When someone trusts another, “he or she is willing to assume an open and
vulnerable position. He or she expects the other actor to refrain from opportunistic behavior even
if there is the possibility to show this behavior” (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007, p. 29). The notion of
trust involves a constant expectation about others that they have coherent purposes and
motivations to his or her objectives (Lane & Bachmann, 1998). Trust diminishes volatility,
sophistication, and vagueness in teamwork, since a partner can assume the other’s conducts,
actions and performances (Zucker, 1986).
2.3.2 Inter-Organizational Trust in Networks
Networks need cohesion elements that enable separate organizations to work together,
because of the absence of direct and powerful authority and hierarchy (Agranoff, 2007). Trust is
one of the most crucial elements that hold a network together. Other cohesion factors suggested
by the literature are ‘common purpose,’ ‘mutual dependency,’ ‘resource availability,’ ‘catalytic
actors,’ and ‘managerial ability’ (Agranof & McGuire, 2001).
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Another important function of trust is reducing transaction costs and facilitating
collaboration. Informal relationships among individual organizations help to reinforce network
bonds and allow some new joint actions (Isett et al., 2011). The power of those links enables
transactions, since trustworthiness facilitates for both buyers and sellers the decision to trade.
When these links are absent, both parties would need to use complicated and costly bonding and
insurance procedures, or they will give up the transaction (Coleman, 1988).
Trust also helps to enhance the performance of collaboration via increasing innovation and
problem-solving capacity. Organizations must exchange their specialist information and
capabilities in order to learn and create new solutions for complex problems (Fukuyama, 1995).
If they have a high level of trust and confidence in each other, this situation provides a
continuous flow of information and enthusiasm to exchange knowledge. Consequently, the
performance of collaboration is enlarged (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007).
Although the significance of trust is generally accepted in constructing networks among
different actors, it is not easy to evaluate its effect on inter-organizational cooperation.
Individual trust among two boundary spanners is different from “inter-organizational trust where
a boundary spanner in one organization trusts the other organization (but not a particular
individual)” (Brass et al., 2004, p. 803). Even though ties may be initiated by interpersonal trust,
the success of collaboration depends on the inter-organizational trust (Zaheer, McEvily, &
Perrone, 1998).
Interestingly, prior networking and close ties may lead to an adverse risk. Organizations
can get excessively entrenched in a specific network they have participated in, and endure the
relation with others due to the solid links between boundary spanners. Over embedded partners
may lose fruitful opportunities with other organizations (Brass et al., 2004). Too much trust may
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lead to unhealthy situations in a network. For example partners may think that all partners
consider themselves to be similar. This leads to a kind of “blind trust” in which partners have a
lack of concentration and checks and balances. This blurred situation causes misunderstandings
about what the parties agreed on and distrust may unexpectedly flourish. Hence, a specific
amount of distrust may be better for ensuring a continuous motivation in a network environment
(Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007).
2.3.3 Building and Sustaining Trust in Networks
Trust is generally accepted as a prerequisite for productive collaboration. But in practice,
the presence of trust among partners in a network could possibly be an ideal condition. The
prevalent exercise seems to be that often partners do not have the luxury to select other partners
to collaborate with. Instead, enacted (e.g. government) policies and sometimes the pragmatics of
the conditions force partners to collaborate, even though trust is weak. Hence, trust building
between partners should be carefully taken into consideration (Huxam, 2003).
The starting point conditions of collaboration can either simplify or make difficult
cooperation among organizations in a network. For example, organizations may have an earlier
history of bitter division or damaging competition, problems of disbelief, disregard, and outright
abhorrence. These problems must be defeated for a fruitful collaboration. On the other hand, if
organizations have a history of an earlier partnership and reciprocal esteem, cooperation may still
be challenging, but it would be easier than the first case. Ansell and Gash (2008) discuss
important initial conditions: power or resource imbalances of participants, different incentives of
participants for collaboration and the past history of conflict or collaboration. If participants have
important power/resource imbalances, effective network collaboration can succeed through “a
positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders”
31

(p. 553). If participants have different alternatives to realize their goals, their perception of
interdependence is a critical condition of successful collaboration. Past history of conflict is a
significant barrier “unless (a) there is a high degree of interdependence among the stakeholders
or (b) positive steps are taken to remediate the low levels of trust and social capital among the
stakeholders” (p. 555).
Vangen and Huxham (2003) find a pragmatic way to answer the question of “how trust
can be built and sustained.” They suggest the following themes as to be the practitioners’
approach to deal with the problem: “Have clarity of purpose and objectives; deal with power
differences; have leadership but do not allow anyone to take over; allow time to build up
understanding; share workload fairly; resolve different levels of commitment; have equal
ownership and no point scoring; accept that partnerships evolve over time” (p. 15).The
significance of communication and information sharing are emphasized as core elements in
building trust (Hu & Kapucu, 2014). But these themes are not very helpful in practice, since
each of them carries its own problems in the application phase (Vangen &Huxham , 2003).
Trust has a significant relation with obligation and expectation in social capital (Coleman,
1998). Fiduciary obligations are necessary in keeping networks together since common belief is
not enough for trust. Trust requires obligation and expectation. According to Ferguson and
Stoudand (1999) such expectation is related to four trust dimensions: “participant motives, not
exploiting or betraying purposes; competency, possessing the knowledge and skills to do what is
expected; dependability, holding the necessary resources; and collegiality, showing respect and
fairness” (p. 44).
Individual organizations are held together by mutual dependence such as technical
knowledge, information, equipment, and human or financial resources. The obligations and
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expectations related to trust among partners are established after a reasonable time period. This is
even true for competitor partners (Agranof & McGuire, 2001). Vangen and Huxham (2003)
argue that trust is built through a cyclical trust-building loop. Although partners do not have a
history of ties, they need to take a risk and initiate the collaboration. Reach a sufficient level of
trust to take the act of faith requires starting the cycle. In this way, expectations about the
intended outcome are formed. After this first small step, some modest level of achievement
reinforces trust among partners. Such success becomes part of the history of the relationship and
improves the collaboration. The enhancing trust also increases a possibility that partners will
have more ambitious expectations and undertakings from the network in further steps. The
improved trust decreases a perception of risk for the next phases of the collaboration. Although
collaboration may start with the absence of trust, ultimately trust becomes an essential piece of
future achievement (Vangen & Huxham, 2003).
Similarly, Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that intermediate outcomes are important for
trust building in a network. Even if partners would not recognize themselves to be essentially
interdependent, achievement of successful intermediate outcomes encourage an effective cycle
of trust building and commitment. These small wins are crucial for constructing the motivation
that can lead to effective collaboration. However, if more ambitious goals of stakeholders are not
easily compatible with intermediate outcomes, small wins may not be an applicable policy in
trust building (Ansell & Gash, 2008).
Another problem in the small-wins approach is about time. Since election systems require
clear and quick outcomes, politicians frequently make pressure for big reforms. This pressure
forces organizations to work together, even if they had a past history of distrust or conflicts. In
this situation, organizations need to develop new ways to deal with lack of trust, because they do
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not have the sufficient pace to construct trust through the small-wins approach. Then, in
managing trust it is required to evaluate the characteristics of each collaborative network in
terms of “level of associated risk, level of trust existing between the partners, and whether trust
can be built incrementally via a small-wins approach or whether a more rapid and comprehensive
approach to trust development is required to pursue collaborative advantage. Each situation
dictates different implications for initiating and sustaining the trust-building loop” (Vangen &
Huxham, 2003, p. 16).
The practical assumption is that organizations that have intentions to make collaboration
should understand the complexity. They should be ready to nurture the process, and this
nurturing process must be constant and perpetual (Huxam, 2003). Influencing and managing trust
is a delicate job and takes time since partners have to work in an already existing established
environment that can hinder the improvement of trust. Trust may also be easily broken and can
transform into distrust. If partners are greedy for obtaining a larger portion of the profits and
escaping risks, trust may lessen in the implementation phase. Furthermore, if partners do not
have conflict rules in advance to deal with problematic circumstances and disputes, trust may
also diminish. The higher level of trust between partners necessitates reciprocity in relationships
and high density and frequency of interactions. Stabilizing interactions and expectations is
important to prevent disruptions and frequent renegotiations of contracts. Uncertainties in
cooperation and partners’ opportunistic behaviors should be regulated and limited by creating
processing rules. Network leaders have a critical role in dealing with members’ intentions, and
building trust. They should be able to facilitate and mediate conflicts for network sustainability
(Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007).
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2.4 Network Leadership
This part of the study describes and discusses collaborative leadership perspectives in
networks. Before proceeding to examine network leadership, it is necessary to review the
literature on leadership theories in general.
2.4.1 Leadership Theories
In literature, some scholars view leadership and management as different concepts.
Northouse (2007) argues that “to manage means to accomplish activities and master routines,
whereas to lead means to influence others and create visions for change” (p. 11). On the other
hand, some others reject the dichotomy. Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, and Licari (2011) argue
that “there is not much convincing evidence that there is an important distinction between
leadership and management, aside from labeling some things as leadership and therefore
important and other things as management and therefore less important” (p. 118). According to
those who do not see any difference argue that “leadership and management studies often use the
same independent variables to explain the same dependent variables. The only difference being
that the leadership scholar calls his or her variable of interest ‘leadership’, while the management
scholar calls it ‘management” (Silvia, 2010, p. 18). In this paper both terms are used as
synonyms.
Gullick’s POSDCORB principles represent the classic view of public administration
about good management. Planning, organizing, staffing directing coordinating, reporting and
budgeting are the elements of rational and scientific management (Stilman, 2008). Although,
POSTCORB has received intensive criticism and were “hardly seemed heroic, but rather full of
contradictions- unscientific, value laden, time-bound, and rigid, and hardly the best means to
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meet the needs of post-war era” by further generations, it had great impact on the development of
the study of public administration ( p. 21).
Leadership has been the subject of huge amount of studies, and a plentiful number of
leadership theories were suggested in different fields. According to Yukl (1989), leadership
theories can be classified into four main categories in terms of “whether the primary focus is on
power-influence, leader-behavior, leader traits, or situational factors that interact with behavior,
traits, or power” (p. 254)
The power- Influence approach emphasizes the amount and the type of the leader’s
power. Power is accepted as the most important element to explain the effectiveness of the
leadership. The level of power is determined by the target group’s perceptions related
“attributes, resources, and credibility” of the leader. This approach addresses some critical
questions to evaluate the effectiveness of the leadership such as “How is power acquired and
lost by leaders?”, “How is power exercised by effective leaders?”, and “How much power
should a leader have?” (Yukl, 1989)
Behavioral approach focuses on the behaviors of effective leaders that differentiate them
from other people. Although behavioral research studies emerged as a result of trait approach’s
failure, they use similar methods with trait approach (Tombul, 2011). Classification of
leadership behaviors and their impacts are the major issues for this approach (Yukl,1989).
Burke, Stagl, Klein, Goodwin, and Salas (2006) classify leadership behaviors into two
categories. The first one is task-focused leadership behavior that is characterized by
transactional, initiating structure and boundary spanning leadership behaviors. Providing praise,
rewards, and withholding punishment are typical features of transactional leadership. Initiating
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structure behaviors focus the completion of task objectives through the “minimization of role
ambiguity and conflict” (2006, p. 292). Boundary spanning behaviors emphasize facilitator role
and collaboration with others in order to increase resources and needed information of the
organization.
The second category of behaviors defined by Burke et al. (2006) is person-focused
leadership, which involves transformational, consideration, empowerment, and motivational
leadership (Burke et al., 2006). Vision driven change is the main dynamic of transformational
leadership. Group cohesion and maintaining close social relationships are the basic goals of
consideration behaviors that “reflect two-way open communication, mutual respect and trust, and
an emphasis on satisfying employee needs” (Burke et al., 2006, p. 293). Empowerment
leadership behaviors seek “the development of follower self-management or self-leadership
skills. Specifically, coaching, monitoring, and feedback behaviors are included, along with those
indicative of participative, facilitative, and consultative leadership styles” (Pearce et al., 2003 as
cited in Burke et al., 2006). Motivational behaviors promote employee’s positive actions and
efforts. This is particularly important for difficult times (Burke et al., 2006).
Transformational leadership has been the subject of many leadership studies since the end
of 1970’s. According to Burns (1978) a transformational leader motivates and encourages his
followers and enhances their morale to achieve specific goals. Transformational leadership aims
to create positive change and increases the performance of the group. In order to enhance the
motivation, a leader considers people’s interests and expectations and spends efforts to meet
them. Furthermore, transformational leader has ability to shape and change followers’
perceptions and expectations (Tombul, 2011). Bass (1985) focuses the influence of
transformational leaders on followers and argues that “leaders transform followers by making
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them more aware of the importance and values of task outcomes; by activating their higher-order
needs, and by inducing them to transcend self-interest for the sake of the organization” (Yukl,
1989, p. 272).
The trait approach focuses on the personal traits and characteristics of leaders. Early
studies about leadership in the first half of the twentieth century, tried to find common,
extraordinary, and inherited traits such as psychical appearance, intelligence, tireless energy or
tolerance to stress that guarantees to be an effective leader. The followers of trait approach also
examine the interactions, and balance means the traits for successful leadership, but they failed
to find those specific major traits of leadership and direction of the studies changed to examine
managerial motivation and skills such as technical or inter-personal skills (Yukl, 1989).
Contingency or situational approach emphasizes that there is no best way to manage an
organization (Van Wart, 2011). According to Fiedler`s contingency theory, leadership style may
vary according to situation and environment. Different “contextual factors such as the leader’s
authority and discretion, the nature of work performed by the leader’s unit, the attributes of
subordinates, and the nature of environment” may require different types of leadership (Yukl,
1989, p. 261). Ecological approach suggests similar arguments to the situational approach. Gaus
argues that general environment is important to understand and direct change in public
administration. Ecology “deals with all interrelationships of living organisms and their
environment” (Gaus, 2010, p. 80). Public administrators should know the characteristics of
institutions’ ecology to provide a more proper response to demands and challenges both within
and outside the organization (Gaus, 2010).
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2.4.2 Collaborative Leadership Perspectives
Leadership is a more challenging concept in networks compared to other single groups or
organizations. Traditional leadership theories are mainly focused on formal leaders in a team or
in an organization. In order to accomplish their goals those leaders try to be effective or
transform their organizations. However, because of networks’ peculiar structure, formal leader
models are not easily applicable to networks. Two key issues prevent the use of traditional
leadership models to the networks. The first difference is the structure of the participants. They
come from different organizations and do not have strong hierarchical relations. The second
difference is related to the vagueness of collaborative goals. Each participant has their individual
program and objectives. This situation makes it very difficult for network leaders to establish
agreed collaborative goals among network partners (Huxham & Vangen, 2000).
Authority and power distribution among network members should be analyzed in order to
get a better understanding of the network leadership. Consensus is the most important concept of
decision making in collaborative structures. Usually, administrators and members are not
superiors or subordinates to each other, but they are partners. However, networks still need a
manager who helps to provide cohesion and unity (Agranoff, 2006). Network structures must be
fully understood by the decision makers; otherwise they will have wrong outcomes and
expectations that are consistent with the traditional ways (Keast, Mandell, Brown & Woolcock,
2004; Kapucu, N. & Garayev, 2014).
Provan and Kenis (2007) identifies three basic forms of network governance. These are:
participant-governed (shared governed) networks which have a highly decentralized governance
model based on the organizational compromising, lead organization–governed networks which
are governed by a single network participant, and network administrative organization (NAO)
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governed networks which are governed externally by a specific administrative organization. One
governance form is not better than the other for the effectiveness of the network. But they
propose that four key structural and relational contingencies are important for the successful
adoption of a particular form of governance. These are trust, size (number of participants), goal
consensus, and the nature of the task.

Figure 3. Modes of Network Governance (Provan & Kenis, 2005)
Network management requires some special administrative tools and skill sets. Some of
those tools and skills are also accepted as important notions by the classical administration
paradigm. “Command” and “control” are the “main administrative dynamics” of classical public
administration, whereas new public management focuses on “competition,” “concession,” and
“compromise.” “Oversight and mandating” and “providing resources” that have significant roles
in classical paradigm are also recognized as key strategies for network management (Koliba et
al., 2010). However, varieties of governance strategies are essential for network management.
For an effective network management, network leaders should employ all kinds of administrative
strategies consisting of “command and control,” “facilitation,” “competition,” “negotiating,”
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“barraging,” “mediation,” “brokering,” “collaboration,” and “cooperation”, “participatory
governance,” “boundary spanning,” and “system thinking” (Koliba et al., 2010).
Eglene, Dawes and Schneider (2007) suggest three hypotheses about the relation between
leadership communication strategies, leadership styles, and networking success. According to
them “leadership communication strategies focused on inspirational values, consultation, and
coalition are positive associated with voluntary participation and networking success…A
consistent, charismatic leadership style is positively associated with networking success.
Adaptive leadership based on learning promotes both substantive and networking success”
(Eglene et al., 2007, p. 109).
Ansell and Gash (2008) make two assumptions about the role of leadership related to the
level of trust in a network. If there is a high conflict and low trust between partners, “but power
distribution is relatively equal and stakeholders have an incentive to participate, then
collaborative governance can successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest broker
that the respective stakeholders accept and trust” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 555). This honest
broker facilitates the collaboration through encouraging participants to listen to each other. The
honest broker remains above the disputes and sustains the transparency and integrity of the
process to improve trust among partners. However, if power distribution is not symmetric or
participant incentives are weak or asymmetric, a strong ‘‘organic’’ leader who emerges from
within the community of stakeholder is more likely to succeed. By contrast to the first
assumption, interdependence is weaker in this assumption. So building trust will be challenging.
Since “the availability of such leaders is likely to be highly contingent upon local
circumstances… the possibility for effective collaboration may be seriously constrained by a lack
of leadership in this second assumption” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 555).
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2.5 Organizational Culture
Organizational culture highlights informal aspects of organizations and institutionalized
values. Hill & Lynn (2009) explain institutionalized values as “norms, beliefs, and standards of
conduct that provide meaning, purpose, and a source of motivation to individuals working within
an organizational unit and, therefore, may contribute in both positive and negative ways to an
organization's capacity to carry out its lawful responsibilities” (p. 52). When defining
organizational culture, Schein (1992) emphasizes shared basic assumptions. Those shared basic
assumptions are thought to be useful by group members in dealing with problems related to
external adaptation and internal integration. Since those assumptions are considered as valid and
functional, they are taught to new members as the main approaches and perceptions in
addressing the problems. Trice and Beyer (1993) proposed a definition that has two parts which
are substance and forms. While substance involves shared and consistent beliefs, values, and
norms, forms are observable entities that members of an organization demonstrate the substance
of their culture.
Values, professional judgments, ethics, and motives of employees are significant
elements of an organization’s culture. These factors have also peculiar impacts on operations
and works of organizations. Organizational culture is not a static concept. Members of an
organization have important influence in a constant development of organizational culture. They
bring their unique values and beliefs (Hill & Lynn, 2009). Jorgensen & Bozemen recognize 72
public values in their meta-analysis of 230 articles of public administration (Hill & Lynn, 2009).
Culture clashes among network members and organizational goal convergence divergence
are significant determiners of network effectiveness. Network management must focus on
dealing with culture clashes and turf/ power problems (O’Leary & Bingham, 2007). Although,
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networks provide greater opportunities to deal with complex problems, the members’ different
approaches of doing things usually make effective collaboration difficult (Provan & Lemaire,
2012). Network leaders need to provide harmony among contradicting organizational cultures
and must have capability to uphold dueling cultures simultaneously (McPherson, Popp, &
Lindstrom, 2006).
2.6 Theoretical Framework
This study employs network theory perspective, resource dependency theory, and interorganizational social capital as the key theoretical framework. This part presents a brief overview
of these theories in terms of the study.
2.6.1 Network Theory Perspective
Network theory can be used to examine the relationships among participating
organizations of the public security network. It helps to understand how public networks form,
function, sustain their survival, and can be managed effectively. Network theory provides a great
deal of insight about effective collaboration in network structures, and this information can be
used to analyze public security networks.
Public management networks have been increasingly used for the last decades which are
defined as the “age of network” by Lipnack and Stamps (1994). This trend has arisen out of the
collective acknowledgement of the wickedness of prevailing social, political, and economic
problems. Networks are essential structures to cope with wicked social, political, and economic
problems that cannot be solved by any single organization by acting solely (Provan & Kenis,
2007). Wicked is a term that has been applied to various problems which are essentially unique,
lack a definitive formulation, and rarely have immediate and ultimate tests of a solution (Koliba,
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Meek, & Zia, 2010). Wicked problems do not have certain definitions. The definition chosen by
the decision maker determines the formulation of the solution. The actions to solve the wicked
problems cannot be labeled as accurate and wrong, but they can be defined as better or worse,
and cannot generally be transferred to other situations. The wicked problems are usually
symptoms of other problems and their existence can be explained in different ways (Rittell &
Webber, 1984).
Networks theory mainly examines inter-organizational relations from the individual,
group, and organization perspectives (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). While organizational
theories had great impacts on early network research in public administration, the raising trend
towards public management networks leads numerous researches on the network theory in the
last twenty years (Lecy, Mergel & Hans, 2012). Network theory literature emphasizes seven
features of networks operating across public administration.
1) Networks facilitate the coordination of actions of resources between actors with in
network. 2) Network membership can be drawn from some combination of public,
private, and nonprofit sector actors. 3) Networks may carry out one or more policy
functions. 4) Networks exit across virtually all policy domains. 5) Although networks are
mostly defined at the inter-organizational level, they also described in the context of the
individual, groups, and organizations that compromise them. 6) Networks form as the
result of the selection of particular policy tools. 7) Network structures allow for
government agencies to serve in roles other than lead organizations (Koliba et al., 2010,
p. 47).
Various purposes of inter-organizational cooperation are discussed in network theory
literature: Organizations have multiple interests to join network structures. Acquire re-sources,
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gaining legitimacy, providing more effective and efficient service, reducing the ambiguities,
achieving collective goals and addressing complex problems are the main motives for
organizations to participate in a network (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Provan &
Kenis, 2008). Networks save organizations which have similar goals to duplicate their efforts
and limited resources (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Organizations also want to share or reduce risk
through involving a network (Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011). Networks are “flexible structures that
are inclusive, information rich, and outside the scope of direct bureaucratic control. These
structures allow public agencies to manage public problems by leveraging expertise held outside
its scope of authority” (Isett et al., 2011, p. 159).
Network theory is an umbrella perspective rather than a single solid theory. Network
approach is used by a set of theories to explain interactions among different organizations. This
paper also addresses resource dependence theory and inter-organizational social capital as a
theoretical guide for this research.
2.6.2 Resource Dependency Theory
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) is an open system theory. No
organization is self-sufficient, and they have to contact, work, and exchange resources with other
organizations in their environment. This is considered as a condition of survival. The necessity to
attain resources generates dependencies for organizations. However, resource dependence theory
does not view organizations as passive entities in determining their fate. They control external
influence by mitigating their dependence to other organizations. Organizations that need
essential resources will pursue to create relations with other organizations to acquire required
assets. Creating networks not only provide alternative resources for organizations but also
reduce the number of exchange alternatives for others. Organizations aim to obtain resources
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without generating dependencies. In addition organizations try to adjust their dependence
relations. They want to diminish their own dependence and raise the dependence of others on
their organizations (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resource
dependency theory considers organizations as coalitions altering their structure and pattern of
behavior to gain and keep necessary resources. Organizations have the capability to change and
respond to their surroundings. There are three factors affecting the level of resource dependence
of organizations: first, the general significance of the resource for the organization; second,
scarcer resources increase the dependence of the organization; finally, the struggle between
organizations for control of that resource influences the level of dependency (Scott &Davis,
2006).
Organizations in public security are dependent upon their environment to fight against
terrorism and organized crime. They must realize the necessity of collaboration and understand
their interdependence to achieve their goals. They need to share resources, information, and
knowledge to deal with this big problem. Although the main goal of the organizations in the
public security network is similar, participating organizations have different priorities and
motives. The management of the public security network functions as a broker among
participating organizations. Network management coordinates the resources which are
significant motives for members to involve dynamic participation of the network activities.
2.6.3 Inter-organizational Social Capital
Social capital is defined by different researchers from different aspects. While some of
the definitions mainly focus on the general framework of relationships in a social organization
among various partners, others focus on external relationships of an entity with other entities
(Adler & Kwon, 2002). According to Fukuyama, social capital is “the ability of people to work
46

together for common purposes in groups and organizations” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 10). Putnam
addresses social capital as a characteristic of “social organization such as networks, norms, and
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p. 67).
Coleman defines social capital in terms of its function. “It is not a single entity, but a variety of
different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social
structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure” ( p. 302).
Knoke’s definition (1999) centers on external relations and accepts social capital as “the process
by which social actors create and mobilize their network connections within and between
organizations to gain access to other social actors’ resources” (p. 18). Burt (1997) also focuses
on external relations and describes it as “brokerage opportunities in a network” (p. 355)
The construct of organizational social capital is identified as “a resource reflecting the
character of social relations within the organization, realized through members' levels of
collective goal orientation and shared trust” (Leanna & van Burren, 1999, p. 540) .
Organizational social capital is not run by a single person or an actor, but rather it is collectively
controlled by all participants. Leanna and Van Burren (1999) address two key issues of
organizational social capital. The first one is associability. Associability can be explained as the
combination of sociability which refers to the ability to reach agreement about common
objectives, and enthusiasm about giving preference to these organizational goals over personal
interest. The second component is trust which will be examined in further sections in this paper.
Organizational social capital brings four main benefits to social entities. It provides a
justification for group members to subordinate their own desires in favor of organizational goals.
Social capital assists to create more flexible work practices and improve groups’ intellectual
human capacity as well. Finally, it provides a more productive instrument to manage collective
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actions compared to hierarchical tools. However, organizational social capital has several costs.
Maintaining the social capital for ongoing and new relations necessitates spending time and
resources. Long-run relations and feeling safe due to intensive trust may reduce the
organization’s risk taking willingness for innovative actions. Strong relations may also constrain
seeking alternatives for existing policies (Leanna & Van Burren, 1999).
The concept of organizational capital can be applied to network level relations. Interorganizational social capital is a significant asset for the public security networks that brings to
successful collaboration among network partners. Inter-organizational social capital is directly or
indirectly related to five variables of this research, which are inter-organizational trust, network
leadership style, goal convergence, organizational culture, and network effectiveness. As
mentioned before trust is one of the two main components of organizational social capital. The
management style of network leaders may increase or reduce the stock of organizational social
capital. Social capital can help to reduce the gap between goals of member organizations. It can
also facilitate to reduce negative effects of organizational culture that prevents healthy
information flow among participant agencies. Stated benefits of inter-organizational social
capital can improve the network effectiveness in local public security networks.
2.7 Conceptual Framework
Figure 4 demonstrates the conceptual framework of the research. The model involves
four main exogenous variables and one endogenous variable. Trust among network members, the
leadership style of the network, organizational culture and goal convergence are exogenous
variables and network effectiveness is the dependent variable. Top-down leadership
(commissioner style), co-producer style, and bottom-up leadership (facilitator style) are latent
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sub-categories for network leadership style. Populations of the jurisdictions, jurisdictions’ risk
level in terms of terrorism, and organized crime are the control variables.

Figure 4: Conceptual Framework: The Role of Trust, Network Leadership, Organizational
Culture, and Goal Convergence in Network Effectiveness
2.8 Statement of the Hypotheses
This research examines the influence of four independent variables on network
effectiveness. In accordance with the theoretical perspective, inter-organizational trust, nature of
organizational culture in public security network, and goal convergence are three latent
exogenous constructs in the framework. Network leadership style is represented by three other
latent exogenous constructs, which are commissioner style network leadership, co-producer style
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of network leadership, and facilitator style of network leadership. Network effectiveness is the
endogenous latent construct.
2.8.1 Inter-organizational Trust
Hierarchy and administration’s dominant authority are significant factors in managing
traditional public agencies. However, these factors are not valid for public management
networks. In the absence of both factors, inter-organizational trust among partner agencies is a
significant cohesion element that ensures different partners to work together (Agranoff, 2007;
Agranof & McGuire, 2001). Trust also lessens transaction costs and eases collaboration.
Informal relations between participants facilitate to strengthen network ties and enable some new
joint actions (Isett et al., 2011). A high level of trust in networks allows member organizations to
increase their information collecting and using capacity. Better flow of information enhances
participants’ innovation and problem solving capacity and increase the performance of
collaboration (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007).
This study assumes that trust has a significant impact on successful collaboration in
public security networks. Trust is considered as a factor that positively contributes network
effectiveness. Managing reciprocal trust among partner organizations is an important part of a
network managers’ job. As discussed before, communication (Vangen &Huxham, 2003), belief
in partners’ capacity (Ostrom & Ahn, 2002; Ferguson & Stoudand, 1999), mutual expectations
(Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007), commitment to the network (Ferguson & Stoudand, 1999), and a
sense of fairness (Ferguson & Stoudand, 1999) are some important indicators of trust.
In light of the literature, the study derives following hypothesis is to be tested:
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Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between inter-organizational trust and
network effectiveness in public security networks.
2.8.2 Network Leadership Styles
Three leadership styles have been discussed in the literature for network management.
These roles are top-down (the commissioner) leadership style (Hill & Lynn, 2005), bottom-up
(the facilitator) leadership style (Lee, 2006), and intermediate area (the co-producer) leadership
style (Bogason, 2000). Span, Schalk, Luijkx and Schols (2009) introduced an outline for
governance roles after examining various network researches. They explained the features of
three governance roles (the commissioner, the co-producer, and the facilitator) through nine
dimensions: “Who is the main actor, what is the steering mechanism, who sets the boundary
conditions, who is dependent, who aligns, who sets goals, who is responsible, who develops the
vision, and who monitors results?” (p. 22).
Top down leadership is characterized by hierarchy and authority. Although new
administrative tools are useful, command and control are still the primary means for network
management. The main goal for top-down leadership in a network is to control the activities of
network participants to accomplish the highest performance. As parallel to its power,
management takes the main responsibility for the activities (Span, 2012). The co-producer
leadership style has a middle position between top-down and bottom up leadership. Network
management in the co-producer style is seen as a partner. Partners identify network goals
together. Network management aims to encourage the involvement of each actor to network
activities. Agreement is the most important concept for the co-producer style. Network members
share the responsibility for network facilities. The facilitator style of leadership can be labeled as
initiator. Management does not impose any goals to the partners. Each partner identifies their
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own goals, and implements its policies. Management seeks possible collective actions and tries
to facilitate. Each partner is responsible for its own activities (Span et al., 2009).
There are conflicting views related to appropriate leadership style for effective network
management. McGuire (2006), Agranoff (2007), and Whetten (1978) found that the
commissioner style ensures better collaboration. On the other hand, Andrews, Boyne, Law, and
Walker (2009) and Korssen-van Raaij (2006) found that the facilitator style leads higher
performance. McGuire (2006) argues that top-down governance provides better results since it
ensures quick decision ability, robust management, clear goals, and less conflicts among network
members. Warren, Rose, and Bergunder (1974) found that organizations under bottom- up
governance model usually do not want to exchange information, time, and other resources. In
addition, bottom-up governance causes a constant and useless struggle for authority among
participants. However, Andrews et al., (2000) argues that top-down management may reduce
performance of the network, since hierarchical relations inhibit participants from taking
independent decisions. Top down leadership may also cause strict rules and guidelines which
decrease responsiveness to altering circumstances (Andrews et al., 2009).
Span, Luijkx, Schols, and Schalk (2012) explain this contradiction by suggesting that
each governance roles will leave different performance results in different conditions. They
examine four contingency factors which are network age, network size, network diversity, and
customization of services. They found that these contingencies have significant impact on the
relationship between governance roles and network performance. Span et al. (2012) expand their
propositions by adding two independent dimensions, stability and complexity of a public
network. They suggest that the commissioner style is more effective for simple and stable public
networks; and the facilitator style is more effective for complex and dynamic public networks,
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while the co-producer style is better for simple and dynamic public networks and complex and
stable public networks.
As a consequence, most of the research in network literature suggests that in different
contingencies, different leadership styles would be more effective. Situational approach seems to
be generally accepted as the best model for network leadership. Each network has unique
characteristics that differentiate them from other network settings. The appropriate leadership
style should be identified according to those features.
In the light of these discussions the following hypothesizes were tested in the study
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between network leadership style and network
effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 2a: Top down leadership style (the commissioner role) will achieve the highest
network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 2b: The co-producer style of leadership will achieve the highest network
effectiveness in public security networks
Hypothesis 2c: Bottom up leadership style (the facilitator role) will achieve the highest
network effectiveness in public security networks.
2.8.3 Goal Convergence
Although networks have common goals, participants usually have multiple interest and
priorities. Estimating network goals may not be always possible through watching actions of
single organizations. Similarity in goals, missions and expectations contribute to accomplish
more effective collaboration (Rivera, Soderstrom & Uzzi, 2010). Kapucu and Garayev (2012)
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found that organizational goal convergence is positively associated with network sustainability in
emergency management networks. When network members bring their own objectives to the
table with different policies, tactics, and attempts, collaboration in the network could face
conflict of interest. Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) argue that goal convergence facilitates
collaboration in network structures. To increase goal convergence planning may be helpful.
Deliberate and emergent planning increases the chance of successful collaboration. While
deliberate planning is more appropriate for mandated collaborations, emergent planning is more
suitable than non-mandated collaborations
Accordingly, the following hypothesizes are tested in this study:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the organizational goal
convergence and network effectiveness in public security networks.
2.8.4 Nature of Organizational Culture in Public Security Sector
Numerous researches argue that police culture has substantial influence on both
performance and information sharing in the public security sector (Fraser, 2004; Luen & AlHawamdeh, 2001; Glomseth, Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2007). Organizations dealing with
gathering and analysis of intelligence have some common features that differentiate them from
other private and government agencies. Although intelligence service and law enforcement
agencies have some ideological variances, they have plentiful common cultural attributes. Those
shared assumptions and values in public safety network usually may be source of security
failures and weakness (Mouton, 2002).
Different researchers found that some specific features of organizational cultures in the
public sector such as isolation, secrecy, solidarity, defensiveness, and competition often prevent
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healthy information sharing and collaboration (Fraser, 2004; Christensen & Crank, 2001; Luen &
Al-Hawamdeh, 2001; Glomseth, Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2007). Isolation is a physical and
emotional situation which inhibits employees of an agency from communicating and creating
relations with other people who are not members of their organizations. They tend to see other
people as a potential danger to their organizational missions and goals (Kappeler, Sluder, &
Alpert, 1998).
Military culture is also needed to be taken into account when assessing public security
networks. Group allegiance and small unit loyalty are significant and essential elements of
military culture. A strong tie in a military unit is a necessary feature to combat with enemy
forces. However, this loyalty may undermine the overall goal and mission cohesion of larger
units (Winslow, 1998). Similarly, law enforcement agencies and intelligence services emphasize
the significance of loyalty and solidarity. These cultural elements are beneficial, since they
increase employees’ commitment to missions of organizations and provide the basis for
teamwork (Rashid, Sambasivan & Rahman, 2004; Harrison, 1998). However, they frequently
hinder employees of the organizations from reporting the problematic conducts or poor
performance of peers (Mouton, 2002).
Another important shared characteristic of organizations in public security networks is
high level of hierarchy and authority. In hierarchy driven organizations, to act within the chain of
command is an administrative obligation as well as a cultural commitment. Subordinates are
expected to perform and follow their chiefs’ order without questioning its basis (Souryal, 1995).
According to Scott (1998), “authoritarian system is subject to abuse precisely because its
controls are internalized and individual participants are unconstrained in the demands that they
place on themselves and their colleagues” (p. 313).
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One reason that law enforcement and intelligence agencies keep information within their
jurisdiction is competition. A high competition between organizations can exist even at national
and sub-national levels. Agencies and their members compete among each other to gain credit
for successful investigations (Buscaglia & González, 2006).
It is necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant by the nature of organizational
culture in the public security sector. In this study, the term is used to refer common cultural
attributes of public security organizations such as hierarchy, isolation, secrecy, self-protection,
competition, and group loyalty.
Accordingly, the following hypothesizes are tested in this study:
Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship between the nature of organizational culture in the
public security and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4a: There is a negative relationship between the level of defensiveness in the
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks
Hypothesis 4b: There is a negative relationship between the level of perception of the
organizational secrecy in the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security
networks
Hypothesis 4c: There is a negative relationship between the level of hierarchy in the
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4d: There is a negative relationship between the level of sense of isolation
among employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security
networks.
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Hypothesis 4e: There is a negative relationship between the level of group loyalty among
employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4f: There is a negative relationship between the level of competition among
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks.
2.8.5 Control Variables
There are three control variables in the model which are population of the jurisdictions in
which public security networks perform, the risk level of jurisdictions in terms of terrorism, and
risk level of jurisdiction in terms of organized crime.
Population of the jurisdictions is selected as a control variable since it is a significant
indicator of the size of the networks, number of personnel, budget, and technical capacity of the
participating organizations. These characteristics of the networks greatly vary according to
jurisdiction population. There are significant differences between a province public security
network serving a population of more than 2,000,000 and a province public security network
serving a population of about 100,000. Size, the number of personnel, and budget are not
examined separately because the data was collected via an online survey questionnaire from
governors. Since governors have limited or no direct authority on military units and intelligence
services, they usually do not have exact information about their number of personnel, budget or
other issues. Also, some of that information is secret and they would not be enthusiastic about
sharing it in the survey. Therefore, the population of the jurisdiction is designed as a control
variable to identify the general characteristics of the local public security networks.
The jurisdictions’ risk level in terms of terrorism and organized crime are also selected as
control variables in order to recognize the environment in which public security networks
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perform. The risk levels lead different approaches and different kinds of behaviors among
partners in the network. The number of employees and the budget of the member organizations
also differ according to risk levels.
The following hypotheses are proposed to test the structural relationships between these
variables.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between high level of inter-organizational
trust and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between network leadership style and network
effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 2a: Top down leadership style (the commissioner role) will achieve the highest
network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 2b: The co-producer style of leadership will achieve the highest network
effectiveness in public security networks
Hypothesis 2c: Bottom up leadership style (the facilitator role) will achieve the highest
network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the organizational goal
convergence and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship between the nature of organizational culture in the
public security and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4a: There is a negative relationship between the level of defensiveness in the
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks
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Hypothesis 4b: There is a negative relationship between the level of perception of the
organizational secrecy in the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security
networks
Hypothesis 4c: There is a negative relationship between the level of hierarchy in the
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4d: There is a negative relationship between the level of sense of isolation
among employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security
networks.
Hypothesis 4e: There is a negative relationship between the level of group loyalty among
employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4f: There is a negative relationship between the level of competition among
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks.
This study expects to find a direct positive relationship between inter-organizational trust,
goal convergence, and network effectiveness. This study also expects to find a negative
relationship between the nature of organizational culture in public security sector and network
effectiveness. Finally, network leadership style is expected to either positively or negatively
influence the network effectiveness. The next chapter will introduce the methodology of this
research.
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CHAPTER-3 METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides the methodology of the study addressing the study design, study
samples, data collection, sampling, power analysis, sample size justification, operational
definitions of the study variables, statistical analysis, and the model validation.
3.1 Research Design
This study uses quantitative research methods (Structural Equation Model) to analyze
empirical data which was gathered by a survey. Cross-sectional surveys gather data at one point
in time and can be labeled as snapshots of the population. Non-experimental single group design
was used in this research. Random assignment was not performed since it was not possible to
control and manipulate our exogenous variables.
3.2 Subjects for the Study
Province security networks in Turkey are selected as the unit of analysis. Turkey is
administratively divided into 81 provinces. The provinces are further subdivided into districts.
There are 919 districts in Turkey. The study population consists of province and district
governors, deputy province governors, administrative senior inspectors and Interior Ministry
high and middle level bureaucrats. They are selected as the study population since province and
district governors are thought as to be the leader of the local public security networks. Province
deputy governors, administrative senior inspectors and Interior Ministry high and middle level
bureaucrats are appointed among district governors after working for a specific time period as a
district governor. Hence, they also have deep knowledge and experience related to public
security networks.
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This study used human subjects, and all human subject research must receive Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approval. Before applying the survey, survey instruments were submitted to
IRB for approval. The survey question was designed in a way that would not cause any harm to
respondents. Completing the survey was voluntary and data will be confidential. Only aggregate
data was collected, performed, and reported. Respondents might skip any question or stop taking
the survey at any time. Personal information was not asked to ensure confidentiality.
3.3 Data Collection Method
A self-administered online survey (Appendix A) was performed to collect data. The
survey was conducted to evaluate perceptions of public security network managers about
network effectiveness, network leadership style, inter-organizational trust, organizational culture
and goal convergence. The survey was built and distributed through the web-based survey tool
Qualtrics. The links of the survey questionnaire electronically mailed to all province and district
governors, deputy province governors, middle and high mangers of the Turkish Interior Ministry,
and administrative senior inspectors. In the survey, respondents were asked to identify a province
public safety network that they had the opportunity to observe closely, and evaluate the study
variables in terms of this province public safety network.
The survey questions were prepared in English, and were translated into Turkish. In order
provide reliability and validity of the measurement, the Turkish version of the survey was
reviewed by Sedat Eliuz, Yusuf Ustun, and Mehmet Yesilbas who are native speakers of Turkish
and administrative senior inspectors of the Turkish Interior Ministry as well as Ph.D. candidates
in the Public Affairs Doctoral Program at the University of Central Florida.
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3.4 Sampling
The study population of the research is province and district public security networks in
Turkey and their governors. Surveys were sent online to all province and district governors,
deputy province governors, administrative senior inspectors, and the Interior Ministry middle
and high level bureaucrats. Thus, any sampling method was not performed. According to the
Turkish Interior Ministry data, total number of province governors, district governors, deputy
district governors, administrative senior inspectors and, Interior Ministry high and middle level
bureaucrats is 2,095.
The frequency distribution of this study population with regards to their professional
positions indicates that district governors are the largest group with 866 people (41.3%). The
second largest group is deputy province governors with 498 people (11. %). 236 candidate
district governors constitute 11.2 % of study population. The number of administrative senior
inspectors is 191 (9.2%). There are 171 province governors (8.2 %) and 134 Interior Ministry
high or middle level bureaucrats (6.4%)
The first indicator is about periodical contacts among network members to discuss public
security issues. Seven out of ten respondents either agreed (63.4%) or strongly agreed (7.0%)
with the statements. While the number of respondents who did not support the statement was 37
(12.7%), 48 respondents (16.7 %) specified that they were not sure about this indicator. The
second indicator asked respondents whether “the organizations constantly develop long-term
relationships among each other”. A majority of respondents reported disagreement (disagree,
58.7%; strongly disagree, 9.0%) with the statement. Only 27 (9.0%) people supported, whereas
66 respondents (22.9) were not sure. The third indicator is designed to evaluate the constant
exchange of information among member organizations. Almost 4 out of 10 respondents (38.9%)
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did not agree with the statement, while around a quarter of the respondents support the indicator.
34.4 % of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the constant exchange of
information.
The following two indicators were designed to evaluate whether the network provides
member organizations to improve the ability of collecting and using information against terrorist
and criminal activities. For both indicators, respondents mostly supported (59.3 % and 64.7%
respectively) the statements. Again for both questions, almost equal numbers of the respondents
stated that the network does not provide organizations to improve their information collecting
capacity (11.3%), information using capacity (10.4%). The sixth indicator asked respondents
whether the public security network is successful in carrying out joint operations. While 36.3%
of respondents found the network successful, 27.1% of the respondents stated that it is not
successful in joint operations. Almost four out of ten respondents (38.5%) are not sure about this
indicator. The next two indicators ask respondents whether the public security network is
successful in preventing terrorist attacks and organized crime activities. Both questions had
similar results. 33.2% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the network is
successful in preventing terrorist attacks and 34.4% of them accepted the network is successful
in preventing organized crime activities. The percentage of respondents who do not find the
network successful in preventing terrorist attack was 25.2%, while disagreement responses
accounted for 23.2% in preventing organized crime activities. An almost equal percentage of
respondents (41.6% and 42.5% respectively) in both questions neither agreed nor disagreed with
the statement.
The tenth and eleventh indicators aim to measure the success of the network in solving
terror and organized crime cases.102 respondents (35.2%) found their network successful in
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solving terror case and 111 respondents (39.4%) found their network successful in solving
organized crime cases. The same numbers of respondents (58) in both questions did not support
the statements. The last two questions in this section were designed to evaluate the success of the
network in capturing or eliminating the terrorists and members of organized crime groups. 92
respondents either agreed (31.2%) or strongly agreed (1.1%) while 70 respondents either
disagreed (22.5%) or strongly disagreed (2.1%) with the statement related to capturing or
eliminating the terrorists. The statement related to capturing or eliminating members of
organized crime groups was either agreed (34.3%) or strongly agreed (1%) by 92 respondents,
whereas 66 respondents either disagreed (20.6%) or strongly disagreed (2.4%). More than four
out of ten respondents were not sure about the indicators in the last four questions (44.3%,
40.1%, 43.2 and 41.6 respectively).
3.5 Power Analysis and Sample Size Justification
Before performing to statistical analysis, power analysis is necessary to determine the
highest possibility to reject the null hypothesis when it is false (Zhang & Wang, 2009).
Researchers determine confidence level according to their judgments about the level of
preciseness. This study uses the alpha level of 0.05 which ensures a confidence interval of 95%.
Thus, the results are 95% confident that any sample drawn from the target population will give
the same result.
Sample size is also important for the power of the study. This study use structural
equation modeling (SEM) to analyze the data. There are different arguments related to required
sample sizes for SEM. Kline (2005) argues that the minimum 10 case is necessary for each
unknown parameter in the covariance structure model. Bentler and Chou (1987) propose rule of
thumb which argues that 5 observations are adequate for each parameter when the unit of the
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analysis is organizations. The final revised covariance structure model of the study has 86
unknown parameters. Hence, 430 respondents would provide a perfect sample size for the study.
On the other hand, Boomsma and Hoogland (2001) suggest that 200 cases are enough to make a
reliable SEM analysis. This means that just about a 9.5 % response rate would be adequate for
the study.
3.6 Measurement
This research aims to find relations between endogenous variables of network
effectiveness and five latent exogenous variables (inter-organizational trust, 3 network leadership
styles, and goal convergence), and six observable exogenous variables in public security
networks. Population of the jurisdictions, the risk level of the jurisdiction in terms of terrorism,
and risk level of the jurisdiction in terms of organized crime are used as control variables. These
three factors are indicators of jurisdictions’ characteristic that affect the organizational
environment of public security networks. In order to find real impact of independent variables on
the network effectiveness, these factors were controlled.
The survey questionnaire (Appendix A) was created based on previously performed
surveys by Wang and Kapucu (2006), Kapucu (2008), Kapucu (2012), Garayev and Kapucu
(2013), Garayev (2011), and Demiroz (2012). Some of these research studies were federally
funded. The lowest Cronbach’s Alpha reliability coefficient for latent constructs in these studies
was .709, which shows the reliability of the survey questionnaire. The entire inter-organizational
trust and the goal convergence sections and some questions of the network effectiveness section
of the survey questionnaire were directly taken from these surveys with small changes. The
network leadership, the organizational culture sections and most of the questions in the network
effectiveness section were built through network theory literature. In accordance with the
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literature, Table 1 is generated to illustrate latent exogenous and endogenous variables and their
indicators. The table also consists of the control variables of the study.
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Table 1 Operational Definition of Variables

(Latent Exogenous)

Commissioner
Style of Network
Leadership
(Latent
Exogenous)

Inter-Organizational Trust

Variable

Indicator

Type of Data
Variable Source

The organizations involving the public security network have open communication

Ordinal

Survey

The organizations in the public security network are reliable partners

Ordinal

Survey

Honesty is the basis of inter-organizational collaboration in the public security network

Ordinal

Survey

Inter-organizational relations in the network are characterized by mutual understanding

Ordinal

Survey

Organizations in the network keep their commitment

Ordinal

Survey

Mutual acceptance is the important part of inter-organizational collaboration in the network

Ordinal

Survey

There is a common belief across the network that each actor is capable of contributing to the Ordinal
overall picture

Survey

Inter-organizational collaboration is characterized by mutual respect in the network

Ordinal

Survey

Organizations in the network collaborate with a sense of fairness towards each other

Ordinal

Survey

Public security network goals are formulated solely by the governors

Ordinal

Survey

Ordinal

Survey

Ordinal

Survey

Public security network vision is formulated solely by the governors

Governors act as executors
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Variable

Indicator

Type of Data
Variable Source

Network activities are steered by the governors

Ordinal

Survey

Ordinal

Survey

Network goals are formulated by all partners jointly

Ordinal

Survey

Network vision is formulated by all partners jointly

Ordinal

Survey

Governors act as a partners

Ordinal

Survey

Network activities are steered jointly

Ordinal

Survey

Decisions in the network are made jointly

Ordinal

Survey

All partners are jointly responsible for network activities

Ordinal

Survey

Each organization formulates their own goals separately in the network

Ordinal

Survey

Each organization formulates their vision separately in the network

Ordinal

Survey

Governors act as an initiators to facilitate the collaboration

Ordinal

Survey

Network activities are steered by each organization

Ordinal

Survey

Decisions in the network are made by each organization

Ordinal

Survey

Ordinal

Survey

Decisions in the network are made solely by the governors

Facilitator Style of Network
Leadership
(Latent Exogenous)

Co-producer Style of
Network Leadership
(Latent Exogenous)

Governors take full responsibility for the public security network

Each partners is responsible for their own activities
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Organizational Goal
Convergence
(Latent Exogenous)

Organizational
Culture

Variable

Indicator

Type of Data
Variable Source

Organizations in the public security network do not confront problems without becoming
defensive (REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to the organizational
secrecy perceptions (REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to high level of hierarchy in
the organizations (REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

When an employee of an organization in the network make a mistake, fellows feel
responsibility to protect him/her (REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to competition among
organizations (REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to a sense of isolation among Ordinal
employees of the member organizations (REVERSED)

Survey

Organizations in the public security network have different organizational priorities
(REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

There is a gap between organizational goals in the network (REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

Organizations working together have little in common (REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

Collaboration in the public security is challenging due to multiplicity of differing
organizational backgrounds (REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

Diverging organizational expectations is the reality of public security networks

Ordinal

Survey
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Variable

Type of Data
Variable Source

Indicator

Network Effectiveness
(Latent Endogenous

(REVERSED)
Organizations are hardly related in terms of their organizational missions (REVERSED)

Ordinal

Survey

Organizations in the network periodically contact each other to discuss issues pertaining to
public security

Ordinal

Survey

Organizations constantly develop long-term relationships among each other

Ordinal

Survey

Organizations in the network constantly communicate and exchange information

Ordinal

Survey

The public security network provide organizations to improve the ability of collecting and
using information against terrorist and organized crime activities

Ordinal

Survey

The public security network is successful in carrying out joint operations

Ordinal

Survey

The public security network is successful in preventing terrorist attacks

Ordinal

Survey

Ordinal

Survey

Ordinal

Survey

The public security network is successful in preventing organized crime activities
The public security network is successful in solving organized crime cases
The public security network is successful in solving terror cases
The public security network is successful in capturing or eliminating the criminals
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Variable

Type of Data
Variable Source

Indicator
The public security network is successful in capturing or eliminating members of organized
crime gangs

Population of
Jurisdictions
(Control)

The population of the network jurisdiction

Ordinal

Survey

Risk Level of
Terrorism
(Control)

The risk level of the network jurisdiction in terms of terrorism

Ordinal

Survey

Risk Level of
Organized Crime
(Control)

The risk level of the network jurisdiction in terms of organized crime

Ordinal

Survey
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3.7 Statistical Analysis
This research uses three main statistical analysis methods to evaluate the relationships
between independent and dependent variables. Those analyses are descriptive statistics,
confirmatory factor analysis, and covariance structure modeling.
3.7.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics were performed through SPSS to understand general characteristics
of the data, and evaluate the general picture. Frequency tables and distribution of exogenous,
endogenous and control variables were presented in the descriptive analysis. Correlation analysis
were used to detect relations among study variables and the possible multicollinearity problem
between indicators of each latent construct. Multicollinearity is a common problem, which
occurs when two or more variables are highly correlated.
3.7.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
The study used confirmatory factor analysis to confirm the validity of measurement
models and validate the model fit of collected data. Building measurement models are necessary,
since latent constructs cannot be directly observed. Confirmatory factor analysis is used to decide
the capability of a hypothesized model based on the obtained data. It seeks to determine if the
number of factors and their regression weights are suitable to indicate latent constructs. It is a
significant method to test construct validity of the study variables (Wan, 2002).
AMOS software was used to perform confirmatory factor analysis. Indicators of each
latent variable constitute the generic measurement model of each single factor. Wan’s (2002)
three step method used for the confirmatory factor analysis. First, p value and critical ratio were
examined to determine if the specific indicator has a statistically significant effect on the latent
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construct. If the critical value is equal or greater than 1.96, it can be considered that influence of
a particular indicator on the latent variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. If the
factor loading is not statistically significant, it shows that this indicator is not a suitable measure
for the latent construct. The factor loadings among the indicators and the latent construct can be
between 0 and 1. While 1 indicates the highest correlation, 0 means that the indicator is not
relevant to the latent construct. The stronger factor loading means the stronger influence of that
indicator on the latent construct (Byrne, 2010; Wan, 2002; Bickel, 2007).
In the second step, several statistical indexes are used to assess how well over all model
fits the data. AMOS software produces those indexes that include chi-square value (χ 2), degrees
of freedom (df), the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the adjusted GFI (AGFI), the Tucker-Lewis
index (TLI), the normed fit index (NFI), and root mean squared error of approximation
(RMSEA), comparative fit Index, and Hoelter's critical N. At the final stage, modification index
are checked to detect the possible causes of the lack of fit. Modification indices help to
determine which correlated measurement errors should be freely estimated to reduce the chisquare value and fit the model better. Nested measurement models of latent constructs were
developed according to modification indices figures,
3.7.2.1 Measurement Model for Network Effectiveness in Public Security Networks
Network effectiveness in public security networks is the endogenous variable of the
study. Network effectiveness can be defined as the accomplishments which could not be realized
by a single organization without participating in a network (Provan & Kenis 2008). Various
indicators suggested to measure effectiveness of public security networks. This paper used 12
indicators: Regular communication among participants; long term relations, the amount of shared
information, information using and collecting capacity, success in joint operations, success in
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preventing terror and organized crime cases, success in solving terror and organized crime cases,
and success in capturing and eliminating terrorists and members of organized crime gangs
(Demirhan, 2013). Figure 5 demonstrates the measurement model of network effectiveness.

Figure 5. Measurement Model for Network Effectiveness
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3.7.2.2 Measurement Model for Inter-organizational Trust in Public Security Networks
The first exogenous variable of the study is inter-organizational trust. Trust can be
examined under three main heading. First, companion trust is based on mutual communication
and friendship. The main focus of competence trust is reciprocal opinions about other partners’
capability in collaborative activities. Lastly, commitment trust is based on expectations from
other parties to commit contract conditions (Newell & Swan, 2000). Various studies (Wang &
Kapucu; 2006; Kapucu, 2008; Garayev, 2011; Kapucu, Garayev & Wang, 2013) used open
communication among partner agencies, perception about reliability, honesty, mutual
understanding, keeping commitment in collaborative process, mutual acceptance, perceptions
about commitment, mutual respect among members, and sense of fairness as the indicators of
trust. This study also used those items to measure the level of trust among member agencies.
Figure 6 depicts measurement model for trust.

Figure 6. Measurement Model for Inter-organizational Trust
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3.7.2.3 Measurement Model for Network Leadership Styles in Public Security Networks
Network leadership style is represented by three latent exogenous constructs, which are
the commissioner style network leadership, the co-producer style of network leadership, and the
facilitator style of network leadership. This study compares impacts of these three leadership
styles on network effectiveness. In the commissioner role; network leader acts as an executer;
network vision, goals and decisions made by solely network leader; leader steers network
activities; and they undertakes full responsibility. The co-producer style network leader act as a
network partner; network members jointly made network decisions, vision and goals; network
responsibility is shared by all members. The facilitator network leader acts as an initiator.
Network vision, goals and decisions are made by each partner solely; each partner is responsible
for their own activities (Span, Schalk, Luijkx & Schols, 2009). Each first order latent indicator
was measured by six indicators. Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 demonstrates measurement
model for those three types of network leadership styles.

Figure 7. Measurement Model for Commissioner Style of Network Leadership
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Figure 8. Measurement Model for Co-producer Style of Network Leadership

Figure 9. Measurement Model for Facilitator Style of Network Leadership
3.7.2.4 Measurement Model for Goal Convergence in Public Security Networks
Another exogenous variable of the study is goal convergence, which can be defined as
“the extent to which organizations have common goals and mission” (Kapucu, Garayev & Wang,
77

2013, p. 106). Difference in organizational priorities, organizational goals, expectations and
mission, diverging goals, and common points were used to measure goal convergence among
member organizations in public security networks (Wang & Kapucu; 2006; Kapucu, 2008;
Garayev, 2011). Figure-10 demonstrates the measurement model for goal convergence.

Figure 10. Measurement Model for Goal Convergence
3.7.2.5 Measurement Model for Organizational Culture in Public Security Networks
Organizational culture is defined as institutionalized values that “refer to those norms,
beliefs, and standards of conduct that provide meaning, purpose, and a source of motivation to
individuals working within an organizational unit and, therefore, may contribute in both positive
and negative ways to an organization's capacity to carry out its lawful responsibilities” (Hill &
Lynn, 2009, p. 52). Public security organizations have some unique cultural characteristics that
differentiate them from other public organizations. Various specific features are argued in the
literature (Mouton, 2002; Kappeler, Sluder & Alpert, 1998; Fraser, 2004; Christensen & Crank,
2001; Luen & Al-Hawamdeh, 2001). Confronting problems without becoming defensive,
78

organizational secrecy, organizational isolation, and the level of hierarchy, organizational
solidarity, and competition among agencies were measured by single questions in the survey as
separate characteristics of organizational culture in public security networks.
3.7.3 Covariance Structure Model
Covariance structure model were used to assess relations between our latent constructs
and confounding factors. The model includes both exogenous and endogenous latent variables.
CSM can also simultaneously estimate latent variables from observed variables. CSM combines
confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling into one method. Covariance
structure analysis or model offers a simple way to portray the complex relationships among the
study variables with latent variables (Wan, 2002). Figure 11 demonstrates covariance structure
model of network effectiveness, trust, network leadership, goal convergence, and organizational
culture.
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Figure 11. Generic Covariance Structure Model
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3.8 Model Validation
This study uses various criteria to reach a valid model for the hypotheses. These criteria
are reliability threshold, multicollinearity threshold, statistical significance level, criteria for
factor loadings, and goodness of fit statistics.
Reliability of measures, which is related to internal consistency and reproducibility, is an
important criterion for a good research. In order to evaluate internal consistency, Cronbach’s
alpha score was used. George and Mallery (2006) suggest that an excellent study must have
alpha coefficient above .90, while above .80 is good and above .70 is acceptable. Kline (2005)
discusses that an alpha coefficient above .70 is satisfactory for the internal consistency. This
study uses .70 as an acceptable threshold for the Cronbach’s alpha score of the measures
There are different arguments related to thresholds for multicollinearity. Kline (2005)
suggests that below .90 is an acceptable threshold for the multicollinearity while Garson (2012)
argues that multicollinearity is a problem when correlation is higher than .85, and Meyers, Gamst
and Guarino (2006) accept a stricter threshold of .70. This study uses .85 for the multicollinearity
threshold.
In order to check the fitness of indicators in CFA, the critical ratio of factor loadings are
examined. If factor loading of an indicator is higher than +1.96 or lower than -1.96, it can be
regarded as statistically significant at the .05 confidence level (Byrne, 2006). Then, insignificant
indicators are excluded from the model.
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Another criterion is the threshold for factor loadings in confirmatory factor analysis (Hoe,
2008). The literature argues different standardized regression weights for this criterion. Chin
(1998) suggests that standardized regression weight of .30 is adequate to consider a meaningful
indicator for a latent construct. Hair et al. (1998) argues that very important indicators should
have greater than .50 factor loading, above .40 indicates important indicators and .30 is an
acceptable threshold. This study uses .40 as the threshold for factor loadings; therefore indicators
having standardized weights lower than .40 are removed from the measurement models.
In order to validate measurement models, goodness of fit statistics (which can be
obtained through AMOS software) are used. Goodness of fit statistics describes whether the
measurement models represent the observed values in the data set. There are various tests to
evaluate consistency of the obtained data with a measurement model and there is not a consensus
in literature about which goodness of fit statistics should be utilized (Schermelleh-Engel et al.
2003; Garson 2012).
Kline (1998) suggests chi-square, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR),
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and one of the following fit index: Normed Fit Index (NFI) or
Comparative Fit Index (CFI). Garson (2012) offers three goodness of fit statistics that are chisquare, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and one of the following criteria:
NFI, Relative Fit Index (RFI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) and
Comparative Fit Index (CFI). Garver and Mentzer (1999) suggest Tucker-Lewis index (TLI),
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA).
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Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), and Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) are no longer
considered to evaluate model fit, because they are not suitable for complicated models with
smaller sample size (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Garson, 2012). In addition to these indexes, Hoelter's
Index is used to assess the sufficiency of the sample size for the model fit (Wan, 2002; Garson,
2012)
This study uses chi square, chi-square / degree of freedom, Tucker Lewis Index,
Comparative Fit Index (CFA), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and
Hoelter's Critical N value to evaluate model fit. Table 2 indicates the expected values of
goodness of statistics to consider that the model fits reasonably well.
If an acceptable goodness of fit statistics results cannot be achieved, some revisions
would be necessary to find a better fitting model. In order to improve the model by decreasing
chi square value, modification index should be examined. Modification indices are utilized to
add correlation paths among measurement errors of indicators that provide better improvement in
the measurement model. Similar to confirmatory factor analysis, overall goodness of fit of
covariance structure model is analyzed through goodness of fit statistics.
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Table 2 Goodness of Fit Statistics Thresholds. Adapted from Kula (2011).
Fit Index

Shorthand

Criteria

Source
Schermelleh-Engel et al.

Chi-Square

χ2

Smaller the better

(2003); Wan (2002);
Garson (2012); Kline
(2005)

for moderate <.05
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom

χ2/df

for conservative <.03
for more conservative <.02

Ullman (2001);
Kline (1998);
Wan (2002); Kline
(2005)
Hoe (2003);

Tucker Lewis Index

.90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable

Hu & Bentler (1999);

≥ .95 ; good

Schumacker & Lomax

TLI

(2004)
Browne & Cudeck
(1993);
Root Mean Square Error of

05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable

Wan (2002);

≤ .05; good

Schumacker & Lomax

RMSEA
Approximation

(2004); Garson (2012);
Schermelleh-Engel et al.
(2003)
Comparative Fit Index

CFI

90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable

Hu & Bentler (1999);

≥ .95 ; good

Schreiber et al. (2006)

Hoelter 75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable
Hoelter's Critical N

≥ 200 ; good

Index

84

Wan (2002); Garson
(2012)

CHAPTER 4- FINDINGS
This chapter introduces the data analysis of the study. The data analysis methods include
descriptive analysis of each study variable; correlation analysis of the latent constructs to detect
relationships between indicators of latent variables and multicollinearity; confirmatory factor
analysis of measurement models to validate measurement models of each latent variable;
reliability analysis to evaluate the internal consistency of the measurement before and after the
revision of measurement models; and covariance structure analysis to test study hypotheses.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The email with the survey link was sent to 2,095 province governors, district governors,
deputy province governors, administrative senior inspectors, and the Interior Ministry high and
middle level bureaucrats. In total, 335 people responded to the survey, but thirty respondents did
not answer more than 50% of the survey questions. These responses are removed from the
dataset. The final data set for the statistical analysis comprised of 305 responses. As mentioned
in the previous section, this is an adequate sample size for analysis.
The frequency distribution of respondents in terms of their professional positions
indicates that % 44 of respondents are district governors. Administrative senior inspectors
represent 25 % of respondents and deputy province governors constitute 14 % of total
respondents. 12 % of respondents are Interior Ministry high or middle level bureaucrats and 5%
of respondents are candidate district governors. The province governors represent only 1 % of
total responses.
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Some respondents replied to the majority of the survey questions but had some answers
missing. Their missing responses were imputed by obtaining maximum likelihood estimators
which is named as Expectation-Maximization in SPSS (Statistic Pack for Social science). This
section presents descriptive analyses of endogenous latent variable, exogenous variables and
control variables.
4.1.1 Endogenous Variable (Network Effectiveness)
The only endogenous variable of the study is network effectiveness. Network
effectiveness was measured by a five-point Likert response scale ranging from 1 (Strongly
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The survey used twelve items to measure the level of network
effectiveness in a province public security network. These items indicate different attributes of
network effectiveness. Respondents were asked to evaluate statements related to: periodical
contacts, developing long-term relationship, exchanging information, ability of collecting and
using information against terrorist and criminal activities, joint operations, success in preventing
terrorist attacks and organized crime activities, success in solving terror and organized crime
cases, and success in capturing or eliminating the terrorists and members of organized crime
gangs.
Indicators of network effectiveness have a relatively diverse distribution of responses.
Agreement responses exceed disagreement responses for 10 indicators, and vice versa for other
two indicators. For the last 7 items, neither agree nor disagree responses had the highest share.
Table 3 summarizes the answers of the indicators of network effectiveness in the form of
frequency distributions. Missing values were not replaced to illustrate the raw format of the
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dataset. The items have around 6% missing values. The categories were provided in ascending
order from highest to lowest.
Table 3 Frequency Distribution of Items for Network Effectiveness
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
The organizations in
the network
periodically contact
each other to discuss
issues pertaining to
public security

Agree

182

59.7

63.4

63.4

Neither Disagree or
Agree

48

15.7

16.7

80.1

Disagree

32

10.5

11.1

91.3

Strongly Agree

20

6.6

7.0

98.3

5

1.6

1.7

100.0

287

94.1

100.0

18

5.9

305

100.0

169

55.4

58.7

58.7

Neither Disagree or
Agree

66

21.6

22.9

81.6

Strongly Disagree

26

8.5

9.0

90.6

Agree

26

8.5

9.0

99.7

1

.3

.3

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

305

100.0

Disagree

99

32.5

34.4

34.4

Neither Disagree or
Agree

99

32.5

34.4

68.8

Strongly Disagree

(NE1)
Total
Missing
Total
Valid
The organizations
constantly develop
long-term
relationships among
each other.
(NE2)

Disagree

Strongly Agree
Total
Missing
Total

The organizations in Valid
the network
constantly exchange
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
information
(NE3)

Agree

72

23.6

25.0

93.8

Strongly Disagree

13

4.3

4.5

98.3

5

1.6

1.7

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

305

100.0

149

48.9

51.7

51.7

Neither Disagree or
Agree

84

27.5

29.2

80.9

Disagree

28

9.2

9.7

90.6

Strongly Agree

22

7.2

7.6

98.3

5

1.6

1.7

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

305

100.0

165

54.1

57.7

57.7

Neither Disagree or
Agree

71

23.3

24.8

82.5

Disagree

27

8.9

9.4

92.0

Strongly Agree

20

6.6

7.0

99.0

3

1.0

1.0

100.0

286

93.8

100.0

19

6.2

305

100.0

Strongly Agree
Total
Missing
Total
Valid
The public security
network provides
participant
organizations to
improve the ability of
collecting
information against
terrorist and criminal
activities (NE4)

Agree

Strongly Disagree
Total
Missing
Total
Valid

The public security
network provides
participant
organizations to
improve the ability of
using information
against terrorist and
criminal activities

Agree

Strongly Disagree
Total

(NE5)
Missing
Total
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid

The public security
network is successful
in carrying out joint
operations
(NE6)

Neither Disagree or
Agree

111

36.4

38.5

38.5

Agree

90

29.5

31.3

69.8

Disagree

69

22.6

24.0

93.8

Strongly Disagree

9

3.0

3.1

96.9

Strongly Agree

9

3.0

3.1

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

305

100.0

119

39.0

41.6

41.6

Agree

90

29.5

31.5

73.1

Disagree

64

21.0

22.4

95.5

Strongly Disagree

8

2.6

2.8

98.3

Strongly Agree

5

1.6

1.7

100.0

286

93.8

100.0

19

6.2

305

100.0

121

39.7

42.5

42.5

95

31.1

33.3

75.8

58

19.0

20.4

96.1

8

2.6

2.8

98.9

3

1.0

1.1

100.0

Total
Missing
Total
Valid
The public security
network is successful
in preventing terrorist
attacks

Neither Disagree or
Agree

(NE7)
Total
Missing
Total
Valid Neither Disagree or
Agree
The public security
network is successful
Agree
in preventing
organized crime
Disagree
activities
Strongly Disagree
(NE8)
Strongly Agree
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Total

285

93.4

20

6.6

305

100.0

Neither Disagree or
Agree

127

41.6

44.3

44.3

Agree

100

32.8

34.8

79.1

51

16.7

17.8

96.9

Strongly Disagree

7

2.3

2.4

99.3

Strongly Agree

2

.7

.7

100.0

287

94.1

100.0

18

5.9

305

100.0

Neither Disagree or
Agree

113

37.0

40.1

40.1

Agree

109

35.7

38.7

78.7

52

17.0

18.4

97.2

Strongly Disagree

6

2.0

2.1

99.3

Strongly Agree

2

.7

.7

100.0

282

92.5

100.0

23

7.5

305

100.0

123

40.3

43.2

43.2

89

29.2

31.2

74.4

Missing
Total
Valid

The public security
network is successful
in solving terror cases

Disagree

(NE9)

Total
Missing
Total
Valid

The public security
network is successful
in solving organized
crime cases

Disagree

(NE10)

Total
Missing
Total
Valid
The public security
network is successful

Neither Disagree or
Agree
Agree

90

100.0

Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
in capturing or
eliminating the
terrorists

Disagree

(NE11)

64

21.0

22.5

96.8

Strongly Disagree

6

2.0

2.1

98.9

Strongly Agree

3

1.0

1.1

100.0

285

93.4

100.0

20

6.6

305

100.0

119

39.0

41.6

41.6

Agree

98

32.1

34.3

75.9

Disagree

59

19.3

20.6

96.5

Strongly Disagree

7

2.3

2.4

99.0

Strongly Agree

3

1.0

1.0

100.0

286

93.8

100.0

19

6.2

305

100.0

Total
Missing
Total
Valid
The public security
network is successful
in capturing or
eliminating members
of organized crime
gangs
(NE12)

Neither Disagree or
Agree

Total
Missing
Total

The first indicator is about periodical contacts among network members to discuss
public security issues. Seven out of ten respondents either agreed (63.4%) or strongly agreed
(7.0%) with the statements. While the number of respondents who did not support the statement
was 37 (12.7%), 48 respondents (16.7 %) specified that they were not sure about this indicator.
The second indicator asked respondents whether “the organizations constantly develop long-term
relationships among each other”. A majority of respondents reported disagreement (disagree,
58.7%; strongly disagree, 9.0%) with the statement. Only 27 (9.0%) people supported, whereas
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66 respondents (22.9) were not sure. The third indicator is designed to evaluate the constant
exchange of information among member organizations. Almost 4 out of 10 respondents (38.9%)
did not agree with the statement, while around a quarter of the respondents support the indicator.
34.4 % of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the constant exchange of
information.
The following two indicators were designed to evaluate whether the network provides
member organizations to improve the ability of collecting and using information against terrorist
and criminal activities. For both indicators, respondents mostly supported (59.3 % and 64.7%
respectively) the statements. Again for both questions, almost equal numbers of the respondents
stated that the network does not provide organizations to improve their information collecting
capacity (11.3%), information using capacity (10.4%). The sixth indicator asked respondents
whether the public security network is successful in carrying out joint operations. While 36.3%
of respondents found the network successful, 27.1% of the respondents stated that it is not
successful in joint operations. Almost four out of ten respondents (38.5%) are not sure about this
indicator. The next two indicators ask respondents whether the public security network is
successful in preventing terrorist attacks and organized crime activities. Both questions had
similar results. 33.2% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the network is
successful in preventing terrorist attacks and 34.4% of them accepted the network is successful
in preventing organized crime activities. The percentage of respondents who do not find the
network successful in preventing terrorist attack was 25.2%, while disagreement responses
accounted for 23.2% in preventing organized crime activities. An almost equal percentage of
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respondents (41.6% and 42.5% respectively) in both questions neither agreed nor disagreed with
the statement.
The tenth and eleventh indicators aim to measure the success of the network in solving
terror and organized crime cases.102 respondents (35.2%) found their network successful in
solving terror case and 111 respondents (39.4%) found their network successful in solving
organized crime cases. The same numbers of respondents (58) in both questions did not support
the statements. The last two questions in this section were designed to evaluate the success of the
network in capturing or eliminating the terrorists and members of organized crime groups. 92
respondents either agreed (31.2%) or strongly agreed (1.1%) while 70 respondents either
disagreed (22.5%) or strongly disagreed (2.1%) with the statement related to capturing or
eliminating the terrorists. The statement related to capturing or eliminating members of
organized crime groups was either agreed (34.3%) or strongly agreed (1%) by 92 respondents,
whereas 66 respondents either disagreed (20.6%) or strongly disagreed (2.4%). More than four
out of ten respondents were not sure about the indicators in the last four questions (44.3%,
40.1%, 43.2 and 41.6 respectively).
4.1.2 Exogenous Variables
The study analyzed the effects of inter-organizational trust, three network leadership
styles (commissioner, co-producer, and facilitator), goal convergence, and 6 unique
characteristics of security agencies’ organizational culture on network effectiveness. Since each
of these characteristics of organizational culture was measured by one separate question in the
survey, organizational culture is not a latent variable. Therefore, there are 5 latent and 6
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observable exogenous variables. Indicators of each of the five latent constructs and 6 observable
variables’ frequency analysis were conducted separately to understand the general characteristics
of the dataset and evaluate the general picture. All of the exogenous variables were measured by
a five-point Likert response scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).
Respondents were asked to identify a province public security network that they had an
opportunity to observe closely, and rate each of the statements in regard to this province’s public
security network.
4.1.2.1 Inter-organizational Trust
The survey used nine items to measure the level of trust among member agencies in a
province public security network. These nine items indicate different attributes of interorganizational trust. Respondents were asked to evaluate the level of open communication
among member agencies, perception about reliability, honesty, mutual understanding, mutual
acceptance, perceptions about keeping commitment in the collaborative process, perceptions
about other actors’ capability, mutual respect among members, and sense of fairness in the
selected province security network. Indicators of inter-organizational trust have the most diverse
distribution of responses in the entire survey. The results indicate a relatively variant distribution
compared to the other latent constructs. Table 4 summarizes answers of the indicators of interorganizational trust in the form of frequency distributions. Missing values were not replaced to
illustrate the raw format of the dataset. The items have around 1% missing values. The
categories were provided in ascending order from highest to lowest.
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Table 4 Frequency Distribution of Items for Inter-organizational Trust
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Indicator
Valid
Organizations
involving the
province public
security network
have an open
communication

Disagree

108

35.4

35.5

35.5

Neither Disagree or
Agree

91

29.8

29.9

65.5

Agree

78

25.6

25.7

91.1

Strongly Disagree

22

7.2

7.2

98.4

5

1.6

1.6

100.0

304

99.7

100.0

1

.3

Strongly Agree

(T1)

Total
Missing
Total
Valid

Organizations in
this public
security network
are reliable
partners

305 100.0
Agree

116

38.0

38.2

38.2

Neither Disagree or
Agree

99

32.5

32.6

70.7

Disagree

72

23.6

23.7

94.4

Strongly Disagree

10

3.3

3.3

97.7

7

2.3

2.3

100.0

304

99.7

100.0

1

.3

Strongly Agree

(T2)

Total
Missing
Total

Honesty is the
basis of interorganizational
collaboration in
the public security
network
(T3)

Valid

305 100.0
Neither Disagree or
Agree

109

35.7

36.1

36.1

Agree

92

30.2

30.5

66.6

Disagree

68

22.3

22.5

89.1

Strongly Agree

17

5.6

5.6

94.7

Strongly Disagree

16

5.2

5.3

100.0
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Indicator
Total
Missing
Total
Valid

Interorganizational
relations in the
network are
characterized by
mutual
understanding
(T4)

Neither Disagree or
Agree

34.7

34.7

Agree

92

30.2

30.4

65.0

Disagree

90

29.5

29.7

94.7

Strongly Disagree

8

2.6

2.6

97.4

Strongly Agree

8

2.6

2.6

100.0

303

99.3

100.0

2

.7

305 100.0
Agree

146

47.9

48.3

48.3

Neither Disagree or
Agree

63

20.7

20.9

69.2

Disagree

45

14.8

14.9

84.1

Strongly Agree

42

13.8

13.9

98.0

6

2.0

2.0

100.0

302

99.0

100.0

3

1.0

Strongly Disagree
Total
Missing
Total

The organizations Valid
in the network
keep their

1.0

34.4

Total

(T5)

3

100.0

105

Missing

Mutual acceptance
is the important
part of interorganizational
collaboration in
the network

99.0

305 100.0

Total

Valid

302

305 100.0
Neither Disagree or
Agree

121

39.7

40.2

40.2

Agree

115

37.7

38.2

78.4
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Indicator
commitment
(T6)

Disagree

48

15.7

15.9

94.4

Strongly Disagree

10

3.3

3.3

97.7

7

2.3

2.3

100.0

301

98.7

100.0

4

1.3

Strongly Agree
Total
Missing
Total
Valid
There is a
common belief
across the network
that each actor is
capable of
contributing to the
overall picture

305 100.0
Agree

141

46.2

46.8

46.8

Neither Disagree or
Agree

80

26.2

26.6

73.4

Disagree

63

20.7

20.9

94.4

Strongly Agree

10

3.3

3.3

97.7

7

2.3

2.3

100.0

301

98.7

100.0

4

1.3

Strongly Disagree
Total

(T7)
Missing
Total
Valid

Interorganizational
collaboration is
characterized by
mutual respect in
the network
(T8)

305 100.0
Agree

141

46.2

46.5

46.5

Neither Disagree or
Agree

92

30.2

30.4

76.9

Disagree

57

18.7

18.8

95.7

Strongly Disagree

7

2.3

2.3

98.0

Strongly Agree

6

2.0

2.0

100.0

303

99.3

100.0

2

.7

Total
Missing
Total

305 100.0
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Indicator
Valid

The organizations
in the network
collaborate with a
sense of fairness
towards each other

Neither Disagree or
Agree

122

40.0

40.7

40.7

Disagree

98

32.1

32.7

73.3

Agree

64

21.0

21.3

94.7

Strongly Disagree

14

4.6

4.7

99.3

2

.7

.7

100.0

300

98.4

100.0

5

1.6

Strongly Agree

(T9)

Total
Missing
Total

305 100.0

The first indicator of inter-organizational trust is related to open communication. Most
of the respondents stated that they either disagree (35.5%) or strongly disagree (7.2%) that
organizations in their security network have an open communication. Open communication was
either agreed or strongly agreed with by 83 respondents, with a cumulative percentage of 27.2%.
Ninety-one respondents (29.8%) neither disagree nor agree about this indicator. The second
indicator asked the reliability of partner agencies. Reliability was either agreed or strongly
agreed with by 123 respondents. Thus, 40.3% of the cumulative percentage of the respondents
either agreed or strongly agreed with the indicator. 99 respondents (32.5%) were not sure about
this indicator, while 82 respondents either disagree (23.6) or strongly disagree (3.3) about the
reliability of partners. A great number of respondents (35.7%) were not sure that honesty is the
basis of the collaboration in the network. Honesty was either agreed (30.2%) or strongly agreed
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(5.6%) with by 109 respondents, with a cumulative percentage of 35.8%. 84 respondents either
disagreed (22.3%) or strongly disagreed (5.2%) with the statement.
The fourth question reflected the mutual understanding in the network. 100 respondents
either agreed (30.2%) or strongly agreed (2.6%) with the statement. An almost equal number of
respondents stated that they either disagree (29.55) or strongly disagree (2.6%) with the
statement in this is question. 34.4% of respondents neither disagree nor agree with the statement
of the fourth indicator. The following indicator addressed mutual acceptance in the network. The
majority of the respondents agreed (47.9%) or strongly agreed (13.8%) with the statement. While
20.7% of the respondents were not sure, only 16.8% disagree or strongly disagree with the
indicator. The sixth indicator was designed to evaluate organizations’ keeping commitment to
the network. Most of the respondents (39.7%) were not sure or clear about the item. The
cumulative percentage of the respondents who either reported agreement or strong agreement
was 40%, while only 19% of the respondents either disagreed (15.7%) or strongly disagreed
(3.3%) with the statement.
The following indicator is designed to evaluate the actors’ capability in the network.
Respondents mostly stated that they either agree (46.2%) or strongly agree (3.3 %) with the
statement that there is a common belief across the network about each actors’ capability of
contributing to the overall picture. Only 23% of the respondents did not support the statement.
The remaining 80 respondents (26.2 %) were not sure about the indicator. The next indicator is
about mutual respect in the network. Frequency distribution of answers to mutual respect
indicator is on similar lines with the previous indicator. While 48.2% of the respondents reported
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agreement (46.2%) or strong agreement (2.0%), 20.7% did not support the statement. The last
indicator addressed sense of fairness. The great number of respondents neither disagreed nor
agreed (40.0%) with the statement. Respondents who either disagreed (32.1%) or strongly
disagreed (4.6%) account for 36.7% of total responses. Only 68 people responded that they agree
(21.0%) or strongly agree (0.7%) with the statement.
4.1.2.2 Network Leadership Styles
Three types of leadership styles, which are commissioner, co-producer, and facilitator
leadership styles, represent the network leadership in this study. The survey used 18 items to
evaluate the existing situation with regards to the leadership styles. For each three leadership
styles six items were used. These six items indicate different attributes leadership styles.
Respondents were asked to evaluate; who formulates network goals and visions; what is the role
of the governor in the network; who steers the network activities; who makes the decisions; and
who takes responsibility from the network activities.
4.1.2.2.1 Commissioner Style of Leadership
A great majority of the respondents did not support the statements related to the
commissioner leadership style. More than half of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed
with all of the statements of this latent construct. Table 5 summarizes answers of the indicators
of commissioner style of leadership in the form of frequency distributions. Missing values were
not replaced to illustrate the raw format of the dataset. Most of the indicators have less than 1%
missing values. The categories were provided in ascending order from highest to lowest.
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Table 5 Frequency Distribution of Items for Commissioner Style of Leadership
Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent Percent

Frequency
Valid

Disagree

Network goals
are formulated
solely by the
governor in the
network.

151

49.5

49.7

49.7

Agree

52

17.0

17.1

66.8

Neither Disagree or
Agree

49

16.1

16.1

82.9

Strongly Disagree

44

14.4

14.5

97.4

8

2.6

2.6

100.0

304

99.7

100.0

1

.3

305

100.0

Strongly Agree

(NL1)

Total
Missing
Total
Valid Disagree

Network vision is
formulated solely
by the governor
in the network.

153

50.2

50.2

50.2

Neither Disagree
or Agree

64

21.0

21.0

71.1

Strongly Disagree

45

14.8

14.8

85.9

Agree

37

12.1

12.1

98.0

6

2.0

2.0

100.0

305

100.0

100.0

(NL2)
Strongly Agree
Total
Missing

1

.3

305

100.0

134

43.9

44.1

44.1

Neither Disagree or
Agree

74

24.3

24.3

68.4

Agree

65

21.3

21.4

89.8

Strongly Disagree

28

9.2

9.2

99.0

Total
Valid
The governor acts
as an executor
(NL3)

Disagree
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Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent Percent

Frequency
Strongly Agree

3

1.0

1.0

304

99.7

100.0

1

.3

305

100.0

141

46.2

46.5

46.5

Neither Disagree or
Agree

87

28.5

28.7

75.2

Agree

44

14.4

14.5

89.8

Strongly Disagree

28

9.2

9.2

99.0

3

1.0

1.0

100.0

303

99.3

100.0

2

.7

305

100.0

155

50.8

51.2

51.2

Neither Disagree or
Agree

72

23.6

23.8

74.9

Strongly Disagree

55

18.0

18.2

93.1

Agree

20

6.6

6.6

99.7

1

.3

.3

100.0

303

99.3

100.0

2

.7

305

100.0

123

40.3

Total
Missing
Total
Valid

Network activities
are steered by the
governor
(NL4)

Disagree

Strongly Agree
Total
Missing
Total
Valid

Decisions in the
network are
made solely
by the
governor

Disagree

Strongly Agree
Total

(NL5)
Missing
Total
Valid

Disagree

102

40.7

100.0

40.7

Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent Percent

Frequency
The governor
takes full
responsibility for
the public security
network activities
(NL6)

Neither Disagree or
Agree

71

23.3

23.5

64.2

Agree

67

22.0

22.2

86.4

Strongly Disagree

36

11.8

11.9

98.3

5

1.6

1.7

100.0

302

99.0

100.0

3

1.0

305

100.0

Strongly Agree
Total
Missing
Total

The first two items asked to evaluate the statement that network goals and vision are
formulated solely by the governor in the network. Of the total 305 respondents, 195 respondents
reported disagreement (49.5%) or strong disagreement (14.4%) with the first statement, for a
cumulative percentage of 63.9 %. Only 19.6% of the respondents agreed or disagreed with the
first statement. Similarly, 65% of the respondents either disagreed (50.2%) or strongly disagreed
(14.4%) for the second statement which was related to the vision of the network. Only 43
respondents (16.9%) reported agreement or strong agreement about the fact that network vision
is formulated solely by the governor. The third item asked to evaluate the statement that
“network activities are steered by the governor.” While 198 respondents either disagreed (43.9%)
or strongly disagreed (14.8%), only 68 respondents (22.3%) supported the statement. Almost a
quarter of respondents (24.3%) neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.
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The fourth item asked to assess the sentences that “network activities are steered by the
governor.” The total number of people who either agreed (14.4%) or strongly agreed (1.0%) with
the fourth item was 47. On the other hand, the total number of respondents who either disagreed
(46.2%) or strongly disagreed (9.2%) with the statement is 196 at the cumulative percentage of
55.4%. 87 people (28.8%) stated that they neither agree nor disagree, and 210 respondents out of
303 either disagreed (50.8%) or strongly disagreed (18%) with the statement that “decisions in
the network are made solely by the governor”, whereas only 6.9% reported agreement. 72
respondents neither disagreed nor agreed (23.6%) with the indicator. According to the results of
the sixth indicator, 52.1% of respondents did not think that the governor takes full responsibility
for network activities. Instead, 23.6 % of the responses either agree strongly agree with the
statement. 23.3% of the responses account for neither agree nor disagree choice.
4.1.2.2.2 Co-producer Style of Leadership
The responses to the statements in the survey related to the co-producer leadership style
presents a relatively variant distribution compared to commissioner leadership style. However,
most answers to the indicators accumulate in disagree responses. Except the fourth item (NL10),
the numbers of disagreements are more than agreements responses. Table 6 summarizes answers
of the indicators of co-producer style of leadership in the form of frequency distributions. Most
of the indicators have less than 1% missing values. They were not replaced to illustrate the raw
format of the dataset. The categories were provided in ascending order from highest to lowest.
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Table 6 Frequency Distribution of Items for Co-producer Style of Leadership
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid

Goals are
Formulated by all
partners jointly
(NL7)

Disagree

115

37.7

38.0

38.0

Neither Disagree or
Agree

85

27.9

28.1

66.0

Agree

74

24.3

24.4

90.4

Strongly Disagree

26

8.5

8.6

99.0

3

1.0

1.0 100.0

303

99.3

2

.7

305

100.0

112

36.7

37.3

37.3

Neither Disagree or
Agree

96

31.5

32.0

69.3

Agree

66

21.6

22.0

91.3

Strongly Disagree

24

7.9

8.0

99.3

2

.7

300

98.4

5

1.6

305

100.0

131

43.0

43.2

43.2

Agree

75

24.6

24.8

68.0

Neither Disagree or
Agree

66

21.6

21.8

89.8

Strongly Disagree

25

8.2

8.3

98.0

6

2.0

2.0 100.0

Strongly Agree
Total
Missing
Total
Valid
Network vision is
formulated by all
partners jointly
(NL8)

Disagree

Strongly Agree
Total
Missing
Total
The Governor acts
as a partner in the
network instead of
a hierarchical
superior
(NL9)

Valid

Disagree

Strongly Agree
105

100.0

.7 100.0
100.0

Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Total

303

99.3

2

.7

305

100.0

111

36.4

36.6

36.6

Disagree

88

28.9

29.0

65.7

Neither Disagree or
Agree

86

28.2

28.4

94.1

Strongly Disagree

15

4.9

5.0

99.0

3

1.0

1.0 100.0

303

99.3

2

.7

305

100.0

111

36.4

36.8

36.8

Neither Disagree or
Agree

92

30.2

30.5

67.2

Agree

78

25.6

25.8

93.0

Strongly Disagree

20

6.6

6.6

99.7

1

.3

302

99.0

3

1.0

305

100.0

130

42.6

42.9

42.9

Agree

79

25.9

26.1

69.0

Neither Disagree or
Agree

68

22.3

22.4

91.4

Missing
Total
Valid

Network activities
are steered jointly
(NL10)

Agree

Strongly Agree
Total
Missing
Total
Valid

Decisions in the
network are made
by all partners
jointly

Disagree

Strongly Agree

(NL11)

Total
Missing
Total
All partners are Valid
jointly responsible
from network
activities
(NL12)

Disagree

106

100.0

100.0

.3 100.0
100.0

Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
Total
Missing
Total

22

7.2

7.3

98.7

4

1.3

1.3 100.0

303

99.3

2

.7

305

100.0

100.0

A majority of the respondents did not support that network goals and vision are
formulated by all partners jointly. The number of respondents who either disagreed (38 %) or
strongly disagreed (8.6 %) with the first statement is 141 out of 303. The numbers of people who
think the goals are formulated by all partners jointly are 77 (Agree, 24.4%; Strongly Agree,
1.0%). 85 respondents (28.1 %) indicated that they were not sure or clear about this indicator.
The cumulative percentage of those who either disagreed or strongly agreed that network vision
is formulated by all partners jointly is 45.3 (37.3 % and 8.0% respectively). 96 respondents
(32%) neither disagreed nor agreed with the indicator, while the number of people who
supported was 68 (22.7%). For the third indicator respondents were asked to evaluate to the
statement that ‘the governor acts as a partner in the network instead of a hierarchical superior.”
131 respondents disagreed (43.2) and 25 respondents strongly disagreed (8.2%). The cumulative
percentage of those who reported agreement for this item is 26.8%. Around one fifth of the
respondents (21.6%) were not sure about this statement.
The fourth indicator is the only item that the agreement responses exceed the
disagreement responses in co-producer style of leadership indicators. This item asks respondents
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to evaluate the statement that “network activities are steered jointly.” For this statement, 114
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed, constituting a cumulative percentage of 37.6%, and
34.0% percent of the respondents indicated disagreement with this item. The number of people
who were not sure or clear about this item is 86 (28.4 %). The last statement in this latent
construct was related to joint decisions and joint responsibilities. While the statement related to
joint decisions was either disagreed (36.4) or strongly disagreed (6.6%) with by 131 people, for a
cumulative percentage of 43.4%, the cumulative number of people who either disagreed (42.9%)
or strongly disagreed (7.3%) with the statement is 152.The number of people who either agreed
or strongly agreed with the joint decisions statement is 80 (26.1%), and the number of people
who supported the joint responsibility statement is 83 (27.4%).
4.1.2.2.3 Facilitator Style of Leadership
Overall responses to the indicators of facilitator style of leadership accumulate within
strongly agree and agree responses. The results clearly indicate that that facilitator leadership
style is the most common leadership style in Turkish province public security networks,
compared to commissioner and co-producer leadership styles. Table 7 summarizes answers of
the indicators of facilitator style of leadership in the form of frequency distributions. Similar to
previous constructs, the indicators have a very low number of missing values. The categories
were provided in ascending order from highest to lowest.
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Table 7 Frequency Distribution of Items for Facilitator Style of Leadership
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid

Each organization is
formulating their
own goals
separately

Agree

155

50.8

51.5

51.5

Disagree

62

20.3

20.6

72.1

Neither Disagree or
Agree

52

17.0

17.3

89.4

Strongly Agree

26

8.5

8.6

98.0

6

2.0

2.0

100.0

301

98.7

100.0

4

1.3

305

100.0

172

56.4

56.6

56.6

Neither Disagree or
Agree

54

17.7

17.8

74.3

Disagree

51

16.7

16.8

91.1

Strongly Agree

24

7.9

7.9

99.0

3

1.0

1.0

100.0

304

99.7

100.0

1

.3

305

100.0

209

68.5

69.0

69.0

Neither Disagree or
Agree

48

15.7

15.8

84.8

Disagree

28

9.2

9.2

94.1

Strongly Agree

18

5.9

5.9

100.0

303

99.3

100.0

Strongly Disagree

(NL13)

Total
Missing
Total
Valid

Each organization is
formulating their
own visions
separately in the
network.

Agree

Strongly Disagree

(NL14)

Total
Missing
Total
Valid

The governor acts
as an initiator to
facilitate the
collaboration
(NL15)

Agree

Total
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Missing

2

.7

305

100.0

182

59.7

60.5

60.5

Disagree

54

17.7

17.9

78.4

Neither Disagree or
Agree

50

16.4

16.6

95.0

Strongly Agree

14

4.6

4.7

99.7

1

.3

.3

100.0

301

98.7

100.0

4

1.3

305

100.0

131

43.0

43.5

43.5

Disagree

84

27.5

27.9

71.4

Neither Disagree or
Agree

78

25.6

25.9

97.3

Strongly Agree

6

2.0

2.0

99.3

Strongly Disagree

2

.7

.7

100.0

301

98.7

100.0

4

1.3

305

100.0

224

73.4

74.2

74.2

Neither Disagree or
Agree

40

13.1

13.2

87.4

Disagree

22

7.2

7.3

94.7

Total
Valid

Network activities
are steered by each
organization
(NL16)

Agree

Strongly Disagree
Total
Missing
Total
Valid
Decisions in the
network are made
by each
organization

Agree

(NL17)
Total
Missing
Total
Each partner is
responsible for their
own activities
(NL18)

Valid

Agree
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Strongly Agree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Missing
Total

13

4.3

4.3

99.0

3

1.0

1.0

100.0

302

99.0

100.0

3

1.0

305

100.0

Slightly more than half of the respondents (51.5%) agreed and 8.5% strongly agreed
with the first statement of “each organization is formulating their own goals separately in the
network.” While 22.6 percent did not support, a total of 17.3% have stated that they are not sure
about this statement. The second item evaluates the statement of “each organization is
formulating their own visions separately in the network.” Of the total 304 respondents, 196 (64.5
%) agreed or agreed strongly and only 54 respondents (17.8 %) either disagreed or strongly
disagreed with this statement. 17.7% share belongs to respondents that neither agreed nor
disagreed with the item. More than seven out of ten respondents stated that they either agreed
(69.0%) or strongly agreed (5.9%) with the statement that the governor acts as an initiator to
facilitate the collaboration. There are only 28 respondents (9.2 %) who reported disagreement
and 48 respondents who were not sure about the statement.
For the fourth indicator, which is “network activities are steered by each organization,”
196 respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with a cumulative percentage of 65.2. 55
respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with this, for a cumulative percentage of 18.2.
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The fifth item stating that “decisions in the network are made by each organization” has the
lowest percentage of agreement responses in this latent construct (Agree, 43.5%; Strongly Agree,
2.0%). While 28.9% percent of respondents reported disagreement, 25.9 percent of the
respondents were not sure or clear about the statement. The last item stating that “each partner is
responsible for their own activities” has the highest number (224) and percentage of agreement
responses (74.2 %) among all other questions in this construct. The respondents who agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement account for 78.5% of total responses while neither agree nor
disagree responses have 13.1 % share and disagreement responses have only 5.3% share.
4.1.2.3 Goal Convergence
The survey used six items to measure the level of organizational goal convergence in a
province public security network. These six items indicate different attributes of goal
convergence. Respondents were asked to evaluate the difference in organizational priorities,
organizational goals, expectations and mission, diverging goals, and common points among
member organizations in an identified public security network. As opposed to the previous
constructs, statements in the goal convergence section of the survey were reversed. Therefore,
agreement responses represent goal divergence and disagreement responses represent goal
convergence. Overall responses to the statements of organizational goal convergence except the
GC4 accumulate within agree and strongly agree choices. The results indicate that respondents
think there is a low level of organizational goal convergence in province public security
networks. Table 8 summarizes answers of the indicators of organizational goal convergence in
the form of frequency distributions. Missing values were not replaced to illustrate the raw
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format of the dataset. The items have around 5% missing values. The categories were provided
in ascending order from highest to lowest.
Table 8 Frequency Distribution of Items for Goal Convergence
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Organizations in the
public security
network have
different
organizational
priorities

Agree

191

62.6

66.1

66.1

Strongly Agree

56

18.4

19.4

85.5

Neither Disagree or
Agree

25

8.2

8.7

94.1

Disagree

15

4.9

5.2

99.3

2

.7

.7

100.0

289

94.8

100.0

16

5.2

305

100.0

197

64.6

68.4

68.4

Strongly Agree

56

18.4

19.4

87.8

Neither Disagree or
Agree

25

8.2

8.7

96.5

Disagree

7

2.3

2.4

99.0

Strongly Disagree

3

1.0

1.0

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

305

100.0

142

46.6

49.7

49.7

64

21.0

22.4

72.0

Strongly Disagree

(GC1)
Total
Missing
Total
Valid
Collaboration in the
public security is
challenging due to a
multiplicity of
differing
organizational
backgrounds
(GC2)

Agree

Total
Missing
Total
Valid
There is a gap
between
organizational goals

Agree
Neither Disagree or
Agree
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
in the network
(GC3)

Disagree

52

17.0

18.2

90.2

Strongly Agree

22

7.2

7.7

97.9

6

2.0

2.1

100.0

286

93.8

100.0

19

6.2

305

100.0

136

44.6

46.9

46.9

Agree

81

26.6

27.9

74.8

Neither Disagree or
Agree

61

20.0

21.0

95.9

Strongly Agree

7

2.3

2.4

98.3

Strongly Disagree

5

1.6

1.7

100.0

290

95.1

100.0

15

4.9

305

100.0

188

61.6

65.3

65.3

Neither Disagree or
Agree

51

16.7

17.7

83.0

Disagree

31

10.2

10.8

93.8

Strongly Agree

17

5.6

5.9

99.7

1

.3

.3

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

305

100.0

Strongly Disagree
Total
Missing
Total
Valid

Organizations
working together
have little in common
(GC4)

Disagree

Total
Missing
Total
Valid
Diverging
organizational
expectations is the
reality of public
security networks
(GC5)

Agree

Strongly Disagree
Total
Missing
Total
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
Organizations are
hardly related in
terms of their
organizational
missions
(GC6)

Agree

142

46.6

49.3

49.3

Neither Disagree or
Agree

71

23.3

24.7

74.0

Disagree

64

21.0

22.2

96.2

Strongly Agree

9

3.0

3.1

99.3

Strongly Disagree

2

.7

.7

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

305

100.0

Total
Missing
Total

The first indicator was developed to assess the difference in organizational priorities.
A great majority of the respondents (247 out of 289) selected that they either agree (66.1%) or
strongly agree (18.4%) that organizations in the network have different organizational priorities.
Only seventeen respondents (5.9%) stated that he/she disagrees with the statement, whereas
8.7% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with it . The second item reflected the
difference in organizational backgrounds. This indicator has the highest percentage of agreement
responses in this latent construct. 253 out of 288 respondents (87.8%) either agreed (68.4%) or
strongly agreed (19.4%) with that collaboration is challenging due to a multiplicity of differing
organizational backgrounds. Only ten respondents (3.4%) stated that they either disagree or
strongly disagree with the statement. The frequency distribution of answers for organizational
goals is more diverse than the previous two items. More than half of the respondents either
agreed (49.7%) or strongly agreed (7.7 %) with the statement. 58 respondents either disagreed
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(18.2%) or strongly disagreed (2.1%) and 64 of them neither agreed nor disagreed (22.4%) with
this question.
The fourth statement is the only indicator that reported disagreement reports exceed
agreement responses in this latent construct. 141 respondents either disagreed (46.9%) or
strongly disagreed (1.7%) that organizations working together have little in common. 88
respondents either agreed (27.9%) or strongly agreed (2.4%) and 61 respondents (21%) were not
sure with the statement. The total number of respondents who either agreed (65.3%) or strongly
agreed (5.9) with the fifth item that states diverging organizational expectations is the reality of
the network was 205. While 51 respondents (17.7%) were not sure about this statement, 32
people responded (11.2%) that they do not agree with the statement. The last indicator of goal
convergence asks to evaluate the statement of “organizations are hardly related in terms of their
organizational missions.” This statement was either agreed or strongly agreed with by 151
respondents. Thus, 52.4% of the cumulative percentage of the respondents either agreed or
strongly agreed with the indicator. 71 respondents (24.7%) were not sure about this indicator,
while 66 respondents (22.9) either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement.
4.1.2.4 Organizational Culture
Organizational culture refers to common cultural attributes of public security
organizations. The study focused on six unique characteristics of security organizations, which
are defensiveness, secrecy, hierarchy, isolation, group loyalty, and competition. Organizational
culture is not designed as a latent construct in this study. The survey used a single specific item
to measure for each six characteristic of security organizations. Respondents were asked to
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evaluate a specific statement for each variable. Thus, variables of organizational culture were
designed as observable variables. Similar to organizational goal convergence, statements in
organizational culture of the survey were reversed. Therefore, agreement responses represent a
problematic situation for collaboration in the network. Overall responses to the statements of
organizational culture intensively accumulate within agree and strongly agree choices. The
results indicate that respondents think attributes of organizational culture in public security lead
to difficulties for collaboration in local public security networks. Table 9 summarizes responses
of the statements related to organizational culture in the form of frequency distributions.
Missing values were not replaced to illustrate the raw format of the dataset. The items have
around 5% missing values. The categories were provided in ascending order from highest to
lowest.
Table 9 Frequency Distribution of Items for Organizational Culture
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid
The organizations
involving the public
security network do
not confront
problems without
becoming defensive
(OC1)

Agree

168

55.1

58.3

58.3

Neither Disagree or
Agree

45

14.8

15.6

74.0

Strongly Agree

44

14.4

15.3

89.2

Disagree

26

8.5

9.0

98.3

5

1.6

1.7

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

305

100.0

174

57.0

Strongly Disagree
Total
Missing
Total

Collaboration in the Valid

Agree
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60.4

60.4

Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
public security
network is
challenging due to
organizational
secrecy
perceptions of the
network members
(OC2)

Strongly Agree

90

29.5

31.3

91.7

Disagree

12

3.9

4.2

95.8

Neither Disagree or
Agree

10

3.3

3.5

99.3

2

.7

.7

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

305

100.0

180

59.0

62.9

62.9

Strongly Agree

64

21.0

22.4

85.3

Neither Disagree or
Agree

21

6.9

7.3

92.7

Disagree

19

6.2

6.6

99.3

2

.7

.7

100.0

286

93.8

100.0

19

6.2

305

100.0

182

59.7

63.2

63.2

Strongly Agree

55

18.0

19.1

82.3

Neither Disagree or
Agree

40

13.1

13.9

96.2

Disagree

10

3.3

3.5

99.7

1

.3

.3

100.0

288

94.4

100.0

17

5.6

Strongly Disagree
Total
Missing
Total
Valid

Collaboration in the
public security
network is
challenging due to a
strict hierarchy in the
organizations.

Agree

Strongly Disagree

(OC3)

Total
Missing
Total
Valid
Collaboration in the
public security
network is
challenging due to a
sense of isolation
among employees of
the member
organizations
(OC4)

Agree

Strongly Disagree
Total
Missing
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Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Total
Valid
When an employee
of an organization in
the network makes a
mistake, fellows feel
responsibility to
protect him/her.

305

100.0

167

54.8

57.8

57.8

Strongly Agree

53

17.4

18.3

76.1

Neither Disagree or
Agree

45

14.8

15.6

91.7

Disagree

23

7.5

8.0

99.7

1

.3

.3

100.0

289

94.8

100.0

16

5.2

305

100.0

170

55.7

58.6

58.6

Strongly Agree

63

20.7

21.7

80.3

Neither Disagree or
Agree

36

11.8

12.4

92.8

Disagree

20

6.6

6.9

99.7

1

.3

.3

100.0

290

95.1

100.0

15

4.9

305

100.0

Agree

Strongly Disagree

(OC5)

Total
Missing
Total
Valid
Collaboration in the
public security is
challenging due to
competition among
organizations

Agree

Strongly Disagree

(OC6)

Total
Missing
Total

The first question in this section is designed to evaluate the characteristics of
defensiveness in member organizations in the network. Respondents mostly stated that they
either agree (58.3%) or strongly agree (31.3 %) with the statement that organizations involving
the network do not confront problems without becoming defensive. Only 31 (10.7%) respondents
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did not support the statement. The remaining 45 respondents (15.6 %) were not sure about the
item. The next indicator is about organizational secrecy. This statement had the highest
agreement responses of the entire survey. Of the total 288 responses, 264 respondents (91.7%)
either agreed (60.4%) or strongly agreed (31.3%) with that “collaboration in the public security
network is challenging due to organizational secrecy perceptions of the network members.” Only
14 respondents (4.9%) stated that they either disagree or strongly disagree, and 10 respondents
(3.5%) were not sure about the statement. The third statement is related to hierarchy. Most of the
respondents (83.3%) stated that they either agree (62.9%) or strongly agree (22.4%) with that
collaboration in the network is challenging due to a strict hierarchy in the organizations. The
statement was either disagreed or strongly disagreed with by 21 respondents, with a cumulative
percentage of 7.3%. Similarly, 21 respondents neither disagree nor agree with this statement.
Frequency distribution of answers to the statement about the sense of isolation among
employees of the member organizations is on similar lines with previous statements. While
82.3% of the respondents reported agreement (63.2%) or strong agreement (19.1%), 8.3% did
not support the statement. The fifth indicator addressed group loyalty. A great number of
respondents either agreed (57.8) or strongly agreed (18.3%) with the statement of, “when an
employee of an organization in the network makes a mistake, fellows feel responsibility to
protect him/her”. Respondents who either disagreed or strongly disagreed account for 8.3% of
total responses. The last items asked respondents to evaluate the statement of “collaboration in
the public security is challenging due to competition among organizations.” Again respondents
mostly stated that they either agree (58.6%) or strongly agree (21.7%) with the statement. Only
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7.2% of the respondents did not support the statement. The remaining 36 respondents (12.4 %)
were not sure about the indicator.
4.1.3 Control Variables
The study has three control variables: The population of the jurisdictions in which public
security networks perform, the risk level of jurisdictions in terms of terrorism, and risk level of
jurisdiction in terms of organized crime were selected as control variables. All of these three
variables were grouped as ordinal level variables. Table 10 presents frequency distribution of the
control variables of the study.
Table 10 Frequency Distribution of Control Variables

Frequency Percent
Valid

Population

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Over 2.000.000

31

10.2

10.8

100.0

1.000,000- 2.000.000

44

14.4

15.4

89.2

500.000-1.000.000

66

21.6

23.1

73.8

250.000- 500.000

79

25.9

27.6

27.6

Under 250.000

66

21.6

23.1

50.7

Total

286

93.8

100.0

Missing

19

6.2

Total

305

100.0

Very High

56

18.4

19.6

High

53

17.4

18.6

Medium

78

25.6

27.4

27.4

Risk

Low

47

15.4

16.5

100.0

Level

Very Low

51

16.7

17.9

83.5

POP

Valid

Terror
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47.0
65.6

Frequency Percent
(TRL)

Total

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

285

93.4

Missing

20

6.6

Total

305

100.0

Very High

33

10.8

11.7

95.4

High

79

25.9

28.0

66.3

Medium

108

35.4

38.3

38.3

Low

49

16.1

17.4

83.7

Very Low

13

4.3

4.6

100.0

Total

282

92.5

100.0

Missing

23

7.5

Total

305

100.0

Valid

Organized
Crime Risk
Level

100.0

According to Table 10, 79 respondents selected provinces serving a population between
250,000 and 500,000; 66 respondents selected provinces serving a population less than 250,000 ;
Again 66 respondents evaluated provinces serving a population between 500,000 and 1,000,000;
44 respondents selected provinces serving a population between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000; and
31 respondents evaluated provinces serving a population more than 2,000,000.
With regards to the jurisdictions’ risk level in terms of terrorism: 78 respondents think
that his/her province is in medium risk category; 56 respondents think that his/her province is in
very high risk category; 53 respondents think that his/her province is in high risk category; 51
respondents think that his/her province is in low risk category, and 47 respondents think that
his/her province is in a very low risk category.
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With regards to the jurisdictions’ risk level in terms of organized crime: 108 respondents
think that his/her province is in a medium risk category; 79 respondents think that his/her
province is in high risk category; 49 respondents think that his/her province is in low risk
category; 33 respondents think that his/her province is in very high risk category, and 13
respondents think that his/her province is in very low risk category.
In general, the descriptive statistics analysis results show that the indicators of network
effectiveness and inter-organizational trust have relatively diverse distribution of responses. The
most common leadership style is facilitator leadership style, whereas commissioner leadership
style is not usually preferred by Turkish province governors for public security networks. A great
majority of responses indicate that inter-organizational goal convergence is not high, and specific
characteristics of organizational culture in the public security sector make collaboration difficult
in public security networks. The numbers of missing responses are in acceptable ranges to be
handled by expectation maximization method.
4.2 Correlation Analyses
After examining the frequency distributions of the latent construct, correlation analysis
was performed to identify relationships among study variables and the possible multicollinearity
problem. Multicollinearity is a common problem, which occurs when two or more variables are
highly correlated. Multicollinearity “generates biased estimates of the parameters” (Wan, 2002,
p. 76). There are different arguments related to the threshold for multicollinearity. Kline (2005)
suggests that below .90 is an acceptable threshold for the multicollinearity while Garson (2012)
argues that multicollinearity is a problem when correlation is higher than .85, and Meyers, Gamst
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and Guarino (2006) accept a stricter threshold of .70. This study uses .85 for the multicollinearity
threshold.
Table 11 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of the only endogenous variable of
network effectiveness. The table shows that all 12 indicators of network effectiveness are
correlated with each other at .01significance level. There are several correlations having the
value of greater than .85, which are between: NE7 and NE8 (.861); NE9 and NE10 (.859); NE10
and NE12 (.877); and final NE11 and NE12 (.860). In confirmatory factor analysis, the
multicollinearity among these indicators will be dealt with by removing NE8, NE10 and NE11
from the measurement model.
Table 11 Correlation Matrix for Network Effectiveness
NE1 NE2 NE3 NE4 NE5 NE6 NE7 NE8 NE9 NE10 NE11 NE12
NE1 Corr. C.
Sig. (2-T)
N
NE2 Corr. C.

1.000
.
305
.183** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.001

.

N

305

305

NE3 Corr. C.

.454** .403** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.000 .000

N

305

NE4 Corr. C.

305

.
305

.230** .244** .307** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.000 .000 .000

N

305

NE5 Corr. C.

305

305

.
305

.159** .171** .295** .753** 1.000
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NE1 NE2 NE3 NE4 NE5 NE6 NE7 NE8 NE9 NE10 NE11 NE12
Sig. (2-T)

.005 .003 .000 .000

N

305

NE6 Corr. C.

305

305

305

.
305

.163** .374** .297** .444** .425** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.004 .000 .000 .000 .000

N

305

NE7 Corr. C.

305

305

305

305

.
305

.150** .383** .291** .399** .410** .706** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

N

305

NE8 Corr. C.

305

305

305

305

305

.
305

.168** .333** .302** .388** .419** .689** .861** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

N

305

NE9 Corr. C.

305

305

305

305

305

305

.
305

.211** .355** .310** .366** .382** .614** .756** .700** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

N

305

NE10 Corr. C.

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

.
305

.202** .333** .332** .352** .355** .625** .694** .742** .859** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

N

305

NE11 Corr. C.

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

.
305

.185** .350** .288** .351** .362** .620** .709** .685** .851** .823** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

N

305

NE12 Corr. C.

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

.
305

.199** .363** .333** .310** .354** .628** .725** .754** .782** .877** .860** 1.000

Sig. (2-T)

.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

N

305

305

305

305

305

305

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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305

305

305

305

305

.
305

Table 12 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of inter-organizational trust. The
table indicates that all indicators of inter-organizational trust are correlated with each other at the
.01significance level. The correlations between the indicators vary between .237 (T1/T5) and
.733(T2/T3). Therefore, any multicollinearity problem is not detected, and all indicators of interorganizational trust will be kept in the measurement model.

Table 12 Correlation Matrix for Inter-organizational Trust
T1
T1

N

T3

T4

T5

T3

T4

T5

T6

Correlation Coefficient 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

T2

T2

.
305

Correlation Coefficient .563** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.

N

305

305

Correlation Coefficient .558** .733** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient .528** .605** .698** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient .237** .357** .501** .432** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305
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T7

T8

T9

T1
T6

T7

T8

T9

T2

T3

T4

T5

T6

T7

T8

T9

Correlation Coefficient .427** .465** .502** .527** .346** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient .365** .395** .356** .335** .299** .316** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient .478** .489** .486** .548** .295** .515** .440** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient .509** .496** .573** .645** .357** .539** .459** .594** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

305

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 13 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of commissioner leadership style.
According to the table, all indicators of this latent contract are also correlated with each other at
the .01significance level. The highest correlation is between NL1 and NL2 with the score of.851.
This indicates a multicollinearity problem, which will be handled in confirmatory analysis by
either excluding one of those highly correlated indicators from the measurement model or
combining those indicators. There is not any other high correlation, which is greater than .85,
between indicators.
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Table 13 Correlation Matrix for Commissioner Leadership Style
NL1

NL2

NL3

NL4

NL5

NL6

NL1 Correlation Coefficient 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.
305

NL2 Correlation Coefficient .851** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.

N

305

305

NL3 Correlation Coefficient .494** .498** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

NL4 Correlation Coefficient .543** .565** .593** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

NL5 Correlation Coefficient .551** .571** .505** .661** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

NL6 Correlation Coefficient .342** .333** .361** .427** .411** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

305

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 14 Correlation Matrix for Co-producer Leadership Style
NL7
NL7 Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
NL8 Correlation Coefficient

NL8

NL9 NL10 NL11 NL12

1.000
.
305
.865** 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.

N

305

305

NL9 Correlation Coefficient

-.064 -.098 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.265

.088

.

N

305

305

305

NL10 Correlation Coefficient

.532** .542** -.113* 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.049

.

N

305

305

305

305

NL11 Correlation Coefficient

.627** .643**

.014 .610** 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.811

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

NL12 Correlation Coefficient

.360** .443** -.081 .454** .509** 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.156

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

305

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 14 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of co-producer leadership style. The
table shows that all indicators of this latent contract except NL9 are correlated with each other at
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.01significance level. NL9 has only one significant correlation (-.113) with NL10 among other
indicators. This is a signal of low factor loadings in confirmatory factor analysis. The highest
correlation among indicators of co-producer leadership model is between NL7 and NL8 with a
score of .865. In confirmatory factor analysis, the multicollinearity among these indicators will
be dealt with by dropping one of these indicators or combining them.

Table 15 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of facilitator leadership style. The
table shows that all indicators of this latent contract are correlated with each other at least at .05
significance level. The lowest correlation score is .131, which is between NL17 and NL 18. The
highest correlation in this latent construct is between NL13 and NL14 with the value of .818.This
score does not indicate a multicollinearity threat, being lower than .85. Thus, no indicator will be
removed from the measurement model because of the multicollinearity in confirmatory factor
analysis.
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Table 15 Correlation Matrix for Facilitator Leadership Style
NL13 NL14 NL15 NL16 NL17 NL18
NL13 Correlation Coefficient 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.
305

NL14 Correlation Coefficient .818** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.

N

305

305

NL15 Correlation Coefficient .234** .278** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

NL16 Correlation Coefficient .465** .501** .281** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

NL17 Correlation Coefficient .395** .459** .132* .538** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.021

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

.097

.096 .196** .203** .131* 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.091

.093

.001

.000

.022

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

305

NL18 Correlation Coefficient

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Tables 16 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of organizational goal convergence.
The table indicates that all indicators are correlated with each other at the .01 significance level.
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The correlations between these indicators vary between .216 (GC1/GC6) and .487(GC1/GC2).
Since the values are below .85, there is no sign of multicollinearity and no indicator will be
removed from the generic measurement model in confirmatory factor analysis.

Table 16 Correlation Matrix for Organizational Goal Convergence
GC1

GC2

GC3

GC4

GC5

GC6

GC1 Correlation Coefficient 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.
305

GC2 Correlation Coefficient .487** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.

N

305

305

GC3 Correlation Coefficient .423** .438** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

GC4 Correlation Coefficient .284** .253** .513** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

GC5 Correlation Coefficient .426** .348** .405** .256** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

GC6 Correlation Coefficient .216** .214** .307** .415** .289** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

305
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Table 17 Correlation Matrix for Organizational Culture
OC1
OC1

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

OC2

OC3

OC4

OC5

OC6

Correlation Coefficient

OC2

OC3

305
.268** 1.000
.

N

305

305

.334** .521** 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

.340** .499** .675** 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

OC6

.

.000

Correlation Coefficient

OC5

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

Correlation Coefficient

OC4

.317** .329** .370** .474** 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.387** .418** .559** .595** .445**

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

305

305

305

305

305

305

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
The values of inter-item correlations for organizational culture are shown in Table 17.
The variables are significantly correlated with each other at the .01 level. The highest correlation

133

appears to be between GC3 and GC4 with the score of .513, indicating no concern of
multicollinearity. Table 34 in Appendix D shows the correlation matrix for exogenous and
endogenous variables with control variables. The control variable of population of the
jurisdictions failed to demonstrate any significant relationship with network effectiveness. The
control variable of risk level of terrorism has very low but statistically significant negative
correlation with three indicators of network effectiveness (NE 10, NE 11 and NE 12), while risk
level of organized crime has also statistically significant but a low negative correlation with 7
indicators (NE5,NE6, NE7, NE8, NE9, NE10, NE 11, NE12). According to the Table, five
indicators of inter-organizational trust (T1, T2, T3, T5, and T6) and control variable of organized
crime risk level have statistically significant and negative correlations. The control variable of
terrorism risk level was negatively correlated with only two indicators (T2, and T5). No
significant correlation was detected between population and indicators of inter organizational
trust.
Similar to previous constructs, organized crime risk level was negatively correlated with
four indicators of commissioner leadership style (NL1, NL2, NL3, and NL5). Three indicators
(NL1, NL2, and NL5) were negatively correlated with terror risk level and no correlation was
found between population and the indicators of commissioner leadership style. Five indicators of
co-producer leadership style (NL7, NL8, NL10, NL11 and NL12) had a statistically significant
negative correlation with organized crime risk level. The results did not find any significant
correlation between indicators of co-producer leadership style and the control variables of
population and terror risk level. The last leadership style of facilitator leadership did not have
any statistically significant correlation between the three control variables of the study.
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In terms of goal convergence, three indicators (GC1, GC3 and GC5) were negatively
correlated with control variable of the population, whereas just one indicator (GC6) was
negatively correlated with terror risk level. Any other statistically significant correlation was
detected between indicators of goal convergence and control variables. The table shows that
among the six variables of organizational culture, three of them (OC1, OC3, and OC6) had
statistically significant negative correlation with the control variable of population. The analyses
did not find any other significant correlation between the variables of organizational culture and
control variables.
In sum, almost all of the indicators in each constructs are correlated with each other at
least .05 significance level. Six multicollinearity problems were detected. In order to handle
these problems, five indicators will be removed from the measurement models. Among the three
control variables, population of jurisdiction does not have any statistically significant correlation
with indicators of endogenous and exogenous variables, whereas risk level of terrorism and risk
level of organized crime demonstrate some low negative correlations with some indicators of
those variables.
4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis confirms measurement models of latent constructs’ validity
(Byrne, 2010) and validate the model fit of collected data. Confirmatory factor analysis is used to
decide the capability of a hypothesized model based on obtained data (Wan, 2002) and to find
shared common variance of indicators of latent constructs (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). It is a
helpful tool to decide if the number of factors and their regression weights are suitable to define

135

latent variables. It is an important technique to evaluate construct validity of the study variables
(Wan, 2002).
Confirmatory factor analyses were performed through AMOS (Analysis of Moment
Structures) software. The study used Wan’s (2002) three stage approach to determine the finest
measurement model for each latent variable in terms of obtained data. In the first step, the
appropriateness of indicators in a generic measurement model was tested by examining the factor
loading of indicators. P value and critical ratio were used to determine if a specific indicator has
a statistically significant effect on the latent construct. If the critical value is either: equal or
greater than 1.96; or equal and lower than -1.96 it can be considered that influence of a particular
indicator on the latent variable is statistically significant at the .05 level. If the factor loading is
not statistically significant, it shows that this indicator is not a suitable measure for the latent
construct. The stronger factor loading means the stronger influence of that indicator on the latent
construct (Byrne, 2010; Wan, 2002; Bickel, 2007).
In the second step, various statistical indexes, produced by AMOS software were used to
evaluate how well over all model fits the data. At the final stage, model respecification is made
by examining modification index. Modification index is used to detect the possible causes of the
lack of fit. Modification indices determine which correlated measurement errors should be freely
estimated to reduce the chi-square value and fit the model better. Nested measurement models of
latent constructs were developed according to these modification indices values.
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4.3.1 Network Effectiveness
Network effectiveness is the only endogenous latent construct in the study. The generic
measurement model consists of 12 indicators. The Figure 12 shows the initial CFA analysis
results for the generic measurement model of network effectiveness.
For the first step of CFA, critical ratios and p values were checked to identify whether the
indicators are statistically significant predictors. Table 18 indicates the parameter estimates of
network effectiveness. The table shows that all items are statically significant even at .01 level.
Then factor loadings of indicators were examined to identify the strength of indicators in
predicting the latent construct of network effectiveness. The coefficient values were between
lowest .304 (NE1) and highest .930 (NE10). Therefore, NE1 should be removed from the model
because of having low factor loading.
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Figure 12. Generic Measurement Model for Network Effectiveness
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Table 18 Parameter Estimates of Network Effectiveness
Generic Model
Indicator

U.R.W.

R.W.

NE1

1.000

.304

NE 2

1.234

NE 3

Revised Model

SE

C.R.

P

U.RW. R.W.

S.E.

C.R.

P.

.405

.278

4.439

***

.442

.435 .057 7.715

***

1.421

.399

.322

4.415

***

.483

.407 .067 7.161

***

NE 4

1.586

.483

.335

4.737

***

.577

.528 .060 9.700

***

NE 5

1.454

.467

.310

4.686

***

.535

.516 .057 9.440

***

NE 6

2.516

.718

.481

5.231

***

.915

.784 .055 16.768 ***

NE 7

2.754

.827

.515

5.352

***

1.000 .902

NE 8

2.716

.840

.506

5.363

***

NE 9

2.850

.905

.526

5.415

***

NE 10

2.974

.930

.547

5.433

***

NE 11

2.887

.910

.533

5.419

***

NE12

2.987

.924

.550

5.429

***

.856

.816 .049 17.476 ***

.873

.811 .051 17.263 ***

e3<-->e4

.309

.679 .033

9.342 ***

e1<-->e2

.184

.338 .034

5.421 ***

e7<-->e8

.087

.411 .019

4.591 ***

Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio
For the second step of the CFA, the appropriateness of the generic measurement model
was checked by examining the goodness of fit statistics (Table 19). The selected goodness of fit
statistics criteria indicated a very poor model fit for the generic measurement model. All selected
criteria were far from the accepted limits. Some revisions are necessary to increase model fit of
the measurement model of network effectiveness.
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Table 19 Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for the Network Effectiveness

Fit Index

Shorthand

Criteria

Generic
Model

Revised
Model

χ2

Smaller the better

699.297

27.333

Chi-square / Degree of Freedom

χ2/df

≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4

12.950

1.608

Tucker Lewis Index

TLI

.90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable

.745

.987

.198

.045

.791

.992

32

307

Chi-Square

≥ .95 ; good
Root Mean Square Error of

RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable
≤ .05; good

Approximation
Comparative Fit Index

CFI

90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable
≥ .95 ; good

Hoelter's Critical N

Hoelter 75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable
≥ 200 ; good

Index

The third step is model respecifiation. Correlation analysis indicated some
multicollinearity among the indicators. NE8, NE10 and NE11 were excluded from the
measurement model to eliminate multicollinearity. Then NE1 was dropped from the
measurement model, since its factor loading was lower than the selected threshold of .40.
Although dropping these indicators improved goodness of fit statistics, this revision was not
enough get a good model fit. Then modification index was examined to reduce the chi-square
value and fit the model. According to the modification indices, 4 error terms which are: e1 and
e2; e3 and e4; and e7 and e8 were correlated with each other. This revision increased the model
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fit to recommended level. All selected goodness of fit statistic criteria were met to consider a
perfect measurement model. After the respecifiation, NE7, NE9 and NE12 became the indicators
in the network effectiveness measurement model having the highest coefficient values with
scores of .902, .816, and .811 respectively.

Figure 13. Revised Measurement Model for Network Effectiveness

4.3.2 Inter-Organizational Trust
Inter-organizational trust is the first exogenous latent variable of the study. Interorganizational trust has 9 indicators. In the first step, the initial confirmatory factor analysis is
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performed to the generic measurement model of inter-organizational trust to test the validity of
the model. The results are indicated in Figure l4.

Figure 14. Generic Measurement Model for Inter-organizational Trust
Table 20 presents parameter estimates for both generic and revised models. The critical
values of all the nine indicators are greater than 1.96, and the p values are lower than .05.
Therefore, all indicators are statistically significant at the .05 level. In order to determine the
strength of an indicator in the model, standardized regression weights should be examined. T3 is
the strongest indicator with the standardized regression weight of .826. Other indicators in the
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model are also very strong predictors. The weakest indicator in the generic model is T7 with the
value of .524.
Table 20 Parameter Estimates of Inter-organizational Trust
Generic Model
Indicator

URW

RW

SE

T9

1.000

.765

T8

.939

.700

.075

T7

.736

.524

T6

.918

T5

Revised Model
CR

P

URW RW

SE

CR

P

1.000

.825

12.458 ***

.879

.706

.066 13.299

***

.081

9.044 ***

.695

.533

.073

9.535

***

.696

.074

12.373 ***

.848

.692

.065 12.976

***

.820

.548

.086

9.498 ***

.748

.538

.078

9.639

***

T4

1.145

.822

.076

14.987 ***

1.051

.813

.066 15.890

***

T3

1.256

.826

.083

15.057 ***

1.154

.818

.081 14.244

***

T2

1.064

.756

.078

13.603 ***

.972

.744

.078 12.433

***

T1

.997

.670

.084

11.859 ***

.915

.663

.074 12.298

***

d3<-->d2

.098

.286

.028

3.467

***

d9<-->d3

-.084

-.311

.022 -3.843

***

d9<-->d2

-.090

-.313

.022 -4.107

***

Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio
For the second step, selected goodness of fit statistics, which were discussed in the
methodology section, were used. Table 21 demonstrates goodness of fit statistics of both generic
and revised measurement model of inter-organizational trust. Even though TLI , CFI and
Hoelter's Critical N were in acceptable limits, other goodness of fit statistics does not indicate a
valid measurement model.
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Table 21 Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Inter-Organizational Trust

Fit Index

Shorthand

Criteria

χ2

Smaller the better

Chi-square / Degree of Freedom

χ2/df

≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4

Tucker Lewis Index

TLI

.90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable

Chi-Square

Generic
Model

Revised
Model

119.880

69.644

4.440

2.902

.908

.949

.106

.079

.931

.966

102

159

≥ .95 ; good
Root Mean Square Error of

RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable
≤ .05; good

Approximation
Comparative Fit Index

CFI

90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable
≥ .95 ; good

Hoelter's Critical N

Hoelter 75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable
≥ 200 ; good

Index

Therefore, specification search was performed to increase the model fit of the
measurement model. Since there is not any concern of multicollinearity as discussed in the
correlation analysis and all factor loadings are statistically significant, no indicators were
removed from the measurement model. The only way to revise the measurement model is
examining the modification index. Based on the modification indices, d2 and d3, d2 and d9, and
d3 and d9 were correlated. Figure 15 illustrates the revised measurement model of interorganizational trust. The results of goodness of statistics of the revised measurement model
indicate a valid model for this latent construct. The lowest standardized regression weight in the
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revised model is .533 that shows all indicators are powerful predictors of the inter-organizational
trust. T9, T3 and T4 have the strongest factor loadings on inter-organizational trust, with
standardized regression weights of .825, .818, and .813 respectively.

Figure 15. Revised Measurement Model for Inter-organizational Trust

4.3.3 Commissioner Style of Network Leadership
Commissioner Style of Network Leadership is the second exogenous latent variable of
the study. It was measured by six indicators. The results of initial confirmatory analysis for the
generic measurement model of the commissioner style of leadership are presented in Figure 16.
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Figure 16. Generic Measurement Model for Commissioner Style of Network Leadership

Parameter estimates for the hypothesized model of the commissioner leadership style is
shown in Table 21. All critical ratios of the indicators of the model were higher than 1.96 and p
values are lower than .05 which shows statistically significant relationships at .05 level. All
factor loadings of indicators (Table 22) in the generic measurement model are high enough to
predict the latent construct varying from the lowest .403 to the highest .914.
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Table 22 Parameter Estimates of Commissioner Style of Network Leadership
Generic Model
Indicator

U.R.W.

R.W.

S.E.

Revised Model
C.R.

P

U.R.W.

S.E. C.R.

P

R.W.
NL1

1.581

.901

.121

13.075 ***

1.061

.659

.096 11.004

***

NL2

1.488

.914

.113

13.165 ***

NL3

960

.583

.104

9.193 ***

1.027

.681

.090 11.387

***

NL4

1.000

.653

1.182

.842

.087 13.658

***

NL5

902

.638

.107

6.547 ***

1.000

.771

NL6

.701

.403

.091

9.939 ***

.827

.518

.097

***

8.548

Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio

Analysis of goodness-of-fit statistics (Table 23) indicated a poor model fit for the initial
run of CFA analysis. The model did not meet any criteria of goodness of fit statistics. Therefore,
model respecification is necessary to get better model fit. According to the correlation analysis
results, NL2 was removed because of the high correlation between NL1.
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Table 23 Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Commissioner Style of Network Leadership

Fit Index

Shorthand

Criteria

Generic
Model

Revised
Model

χ2

Smaller the better

150.384

5.706

Chi-square / Degree of Freedom

χ2/df

≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4

16.709

1.141

Tucker Lewis Index

TLI

.90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable

.747

.997

.227

.022

.848

.999

35

590

Chi-Square

≥ .95 ; good
Root Mean Square Error of

RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable
≤ .05; good

Approximation
Comparative Fit Index

CFI

90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable
≥ .95 ; good

Hoelter's Critical N

Hoelter 75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable
≥ 200 ; good

Index

After excluding NL2 from the model, the revised model had a perfect model fit. Since all
goodness of fit statistics were within the recommended limits, examining the modification
indices were not necessary. A significant improvement in goodness of fit statistics can be seen
from the generic measurement model to the revised model at Table 23. The figure 17 presents
the revised measurement model of commissioner leadership style. The lowest factor loading in
the revised model increased from .403 to .518. The high factor loading values show strength of
indicators in predicting this latent construct. NL4 and NL5 have the highest factor loadings on
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the construct of commissioner leadership style, with standardized coefficient values of .841 and
.771 respectively.

Figure 17. Revised Measurement Model for Commissioner Style of Network Leadership

4.3.4 Co-producer Style of Network Leadership
The generic measurement model of co-producer style of network leadership style had six
indicators. Figure 18 demonstrates factor loadings of coproduce style leadership measurement
model.
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Figure 18. Generic Measurement Model for Co-producer Style of Network Leadership
Critical rate scores and p values shown in the Table 24 indicate that all of the factor
loadings except NL9 were statistically significant. Standardized regression weights demonstrate
the relative significance of the factor loadings. The lowest factor loading score after NL9 is
NL12 with a score of .475.
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Table 24 Parameter Estimates of Co-producer Style of Network Leadership
Generic Model
Indicator URW

RW

SE

Revised Model
CR

P

NL7

1.518

.914

.123

12.290 ***

NL8

1.505

.945

.121

12.432 ***

NL9

-.165

-.096

.102

-1.619 .106

NL10

1.000

.613

NL11

1.139

.713

.110

NL12

.799

.475

.107

URW

RW

SE

CR

P

1.203

.716 .129

9.351 ***

1.203

729 .127

9.456 ***

10.394 ***

1.415

.876 .140 10.084 ***

7.479 ***

1.000

.588

Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio

Table 25 shows the goodness of fit statistics of both generic and revised measurement
model of the co-producer network leadership style. Only TLI is within the acceptable limits for a
valid measurement model. Because the generic model did not meet other criteria based on the
goodness of fit values, some revision was required.
First NL8 was excluded from the model due to high correlation between NL7.
Multicollinearity is a significant problem which reduces the model fit. Then NL9 was excluded
from the model since its critical rate (-1619) is lower than 1.96 and p value (.106) is greater than
.05. These scores indicate that NL9 is an insignificant predictor of co-producer style of network
leadership. Figure 19 depicts the revised measurement model of the latent variable. After those
necessary revisions, the goodness of fit statistics shows substantial improvement. All selected
criteria were met to conclude a valid measurement model. Regression weight scores of items in
the revised measurement model vary from the lowest .588 (NL12) to the highest .876 (NL11).
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These values mean that all indicators are strong predictors of the latent construct of co-producer
style of network leadership style.
Table 25 Goodness of Fit Statistics of Co-producer Style of Network Leadership

Fit Index

Shorthand

Criteria

Generic
Model

Revised
Model

χ2

Smaller the better

102.554

5.588

Chi-square / Degree of Freedom

χ2/df

≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4

11.395

2.794

Tucker Lewis Index

TLI

.90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable

.952

.975

.083

.077

.185

.992

51

326

Chi-Square

≥ .95 ; good
Root Mean Square Error of

RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable
≤ .05; good

Approximation
Comparative Fit Index

CFI

90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable
≥ .95 ; good

Hoelter's Critical N

Hoelter 75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable
≥ 200 ; good

Index
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Figure 19. Revised Measurement Model for Co-producer Style of Network Leadership
4.3.5 Facilitator Style of Network Leadership
Facilitator Leadership style is the last latent construct related to network leadership styles.
The generic measurement model of facilitator leadership style consisted of 6 indicators. The
Figure 20 shows the generic measurement of this latent construct.
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Figure 20. Generic Measurement Model for Facilitator Style of Network Leadership
Table 26 presents parameter estimates of facilitator style of network leadership style.
Critical ratios of six indicators and p values were examined to determine the significance of the
indicators in the measurement model. The only indicator, having a p value greater than .05 and
critical rate lower than 1.96, is NL 18. Other five indicators are statistically significant predictors
at .05 level. Their standardized regression weights were varying from lowest .330 to the highest
.937.
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Table 26 Parameter Estimates of Facilitator Style of Network Leadership
Generic Model
Indicator

URW

SRW

NL13

1.752

862

NL14

1.756

NL15

SE

Revised Model
CR

P

.167

10.465

***

1.815 .850 .183 9.934 ***

.937

.167

10.484

***

1.886 .958 .195 9.672 ***

.491

.330

.095

5.195

***

.507

.324 .100 5.088 ***

NL16

1.000

.565

1.000

.538

NL17

.921

.497

.126

7.310

***

.913

. 469 .103 8.887 ***

NL18

.113

.078

.087

1.294

.196
.227

.408

d5<-->d4

URW

SRW SE

CR

P

.036 6.310 ***

Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio
Goodness-of-fit statistics for both the generic and the revised models of facilitator style of
network leadership were demonstrated in Table 27. Goodness-of-fit statistics indicate that the
final generic model of the latent variable has not a good fit to the gathered data. All scores of
selected goodness of fit statistics were found out of the acceptable limits. Therefore, a revision in
the model is necessary to get better model fit.
In the revision phase, first the insignificant indicator NL18 was dropped from the model.
Then NL 15 was excluded from the model because its regression weight is lower than the
threshold of .40. However, these modifications were not enough to obtain acceptable goodness of
fit values. Then modification index was examined to make necessary revision. Modification
indices provide to find which correlated measurement errors should be freely estimated in order
to decrease the chi-square value and fit the model better. According to the modification error
terms of NL16 and NL17 were correlated with each other. However, this revision decreased the

155

chi square valueless less than 1.00 (.220) that indicates poor model fit (Garson, 2012).In order to
obtain a valid model, factor loading threshold was omitted for this model, and NL 15 was kept in
the model.
Table 27 Goodness of Fit Statistics of Facilitator Style of Network Leadership
Criteria

Generic
Model

Revised
Model

χ2

Smaller the better

74.932

8.372

Chi-square / Degree of Freedom

χ2/df

≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4

8.372

2.093

Tucker Lewis Index

TLI

.90 ≤ value < .95;
acceptable

.816

.981

.155

.060

.890

993

69

345

Fit Index
Chi-Square

Shorthand

≥ .95 ; good
Root Mean Square Error of

RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable
≤ .05; good

Approximation
Comparative Fit Index

CFI

90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable
≥ .95 ; good

Hoelter's Critical N

75 ≤ value < 200;
acceptable

Hoelter
Index

≥ 200 ; good
The final-revised measurement model is presented in Figure 21. A substantial
improvement is observed in goodness of fit statistics (Table 27) of the final-revised measurement
model. All selected criteria were met that indicates the appropriateness of the revised
measurement model of facilitator style of network leadership. Factor loading of indicators in the
revised model varies from .324 to .957 indicating strong predicting capability. NL14 and NL13
are the strongest predictors having the coefficient values of .957 and .852 respectively.
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Figure 21. Revised Measurement Model for Facilitator Style of Network Leadership
4.3.6 Organizational Goal Convergence
Organizational goal convergence is the last exogenous latent construct in the study. Six
indicators represent the generic measurement model of goal convergence. Figure 22 shows the
generic measurement model.
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Figure 22. Generic Measurement Model for Organizational Goal Convergence
Table 28 demonstrates the parameter estimates for the generic model. All factor loadings
of indicators were found to be significant at .05 level (CR > 1.96). The coefficient estimates of
indicators in the generic measurement model vary from lowest .394 to highest .789.
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Table 28 Parameter Estimates of Organizational Goal Convergence
Generic Model
Indicator

URW

RW

SE

CR

Revised Model
P

URW RW

SE

CR

P

GC1

1.000 .775

1.000 .775

GC2

.971 .789

.082

11.812 ***

1.010 .847 .086 11.807

***

GC3

1.141 .676

.108

10.557 ***

.997 .611 .101 9.852

***

GC4

.848 .502

.107

7.915 ***

.618 .378 .103 6.000

***

GC5

.710 .520

.087

8.199 ***

.650 .492 .082 7.914

***

GC6

.619 .394

.099

6.231 ***
.234 .381 .042 5.611

***

d4<-->d3

Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio
After examining the appropriateness of indicators, goodness-of-fit statistics was
performed to check the validity of the generic measurement model. The goodness of fit statics in
Table 29 indicated a poor model for the initial run of CFA analysis. No criteria were met to
consider a valid measurement model for obtained data. The model should be respecified to
achieve good model fit.
All indicators were statistically significant predictors of goal convergence and no
multicollinearity was detected in the correlation analysis, but factor loading of GC6 is lower than
our threshold of .40. Therefore GC6 is removed from the model. Since this change was not
enough to get required model fit, modification index was examined. Based on suggestions by
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modification index scores, two pairs of measurement errors which are d3 and d4 were correlated
to increase the model fit. After making this revision, the goodness of fit statistics greatly
improved compared to generic model and all selected criteria were met. Figure 23 shows the
revised measurement model of goal convergence. GC2 and GC1 are the strongest predictors of
goal convergence in the revised model having coefficient values of .847 and .775.
Table 29 Goodness of Fit Statistics of Organizational Goal Convergence

Fit Index

Shorthand

Criteria

χ2

Smaller the better

Chi-square / Degree of Freedom

χ2/df

≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4

Tucker Lewis Index

TLI

.90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable

Chi-Square

Generic
Model

Revised
Model

85.480

7.860

9.498

1.965

.751

.978

.167

.056

.850

.991

61

367

≥ .95 ; good
Root Mean Square Error of

RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable
≤ .05; good

Approximation
Comparative Fit Index

CFI

90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable
≥ .95 ; good

Hoelter's Critical N

Hoelter 75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable
≥ 200 ; good

Index
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Figure 22. Revised Measurement Model for Organizational Goal Convergence

After validating measurement models of latent constructs through CFA, reliability of
measurement were examined. The following section is focused to evaluate the internal
consistency of each latent construct.
4.4 Reliability
Reliability or internal consistency of a measurement is a significant indicator of the
quality of survey instruments for survey studies. This study evaluated internal consistency by
using Cronbach’s Alpha score which is one of the most extensively used analyses for the
reliability. As discussed in the methodology section, there are different arguments related to the
threshold for Cronbach’s Alpha score. This study used .70 as an acceptable threshold for the
Cronbach’s alpha score of the measures.
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Some items of constructs were removed from the measurement model in confirmatory
factor analysis because of multicollinearity and low factor loadings. Cronbach’s Alpha was
performed before and after confirmatory factor analysis for endogenous and exogenous variables
by using SPSS. The Table demonstrates the Cronbach’s Alpha scores of measurement models of
the latent constructs. Organizational goal convergence has the lowest score with the value of
.771. Having greater than .70, the results indicate that all measurement models have good
internal consistency before and after confirmatory factor analysis.
Table 30 Cronbach's Alphas Scores of Measurement Models
Number of Items

Cronbach’s Alpha
Score

Before

After

Before

After

Measurement Model

Inter-organizational Trust

9

9

.896

.896

Commissioner Leadership Style

6

5

.856

.815

Co-produce Leadership Style

6

4

.760

.814

Facilitator Leadership Style

6

4

.752

.819

Organizational Goal Convergence

6

5

.777

.771

Organizational Culture

6

6

.801

.801

Network Effectiveness

12

8

.917

.871

After making the final measurements model for each latent construct through CFA and
testing the reliability of measurement, the next step is building a covariance structure model to
test the hypotheses of the study.
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4.5 Covariance Structure Model
After validating the measurement models for each latent construct, Covariance structure
model was used to evaluate causal relationships between our exogenous and endogenous
variables and confounding factors. Covariance structure model can simultaneously test study
hypotheses and estimate latent variables from observed variables (Wan, 2002). The covariance
structure model does not only illustrate the significance of the hypothesis paths, but also
indicates the explanatory power of the model by calculating the R2 value for the endogenous
latent construct. R2 indicates the total variation in the endogenous variable that is accounted by
the exogenous variables (Kaplan, 2000; Bates, 2005)
According to results of confirmatory factor analyses, the generic covariance structure
model, presented in Figure 11, was revised. The new generic model is presented in Figure 23.
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Figure 23. First Revised Generic Covariance Model
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In this generic covariance structure model, single arrowed lines between variables
represent hypothesized causal relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables.
Single arrowed lines between indicators and variables represent the predictive capability of each
indicator for each latent construct. Insignificant paths in the model are shown with red colored
arrows. Table 31 introduces coefficient weights between variables and also factor loadings
between variables and their predictors in detail.
In the initial covariance model, factor loadings between all indicators and their latent
constructs are statistically significant. This result verifies the results of confirmatory factor
analyses for each latent construct. The regression weights between the endogenous variable of
network effectiveness, and exogenous variables of inter-organizational trust, goal convergence,
co-producer network leadership style, facilitator network leadership style, OC5 (group loyalty)
and OC6 (competition) are statistically significant. P values of these variables are lower than .05
and critical values are higher than 1.96. A higher regression weight represents a stronger
relationship with network effectiveness. Therefore inter-organizational trust (.326) goal
convergence (271) and co-producer leadership styles (.229) are the strongest exogenous variables
on network effectiveness.
Regression weights between endogenous variable of network effectiveness and
exogenous variables of commissioner network leadership style, OC1 (defensiveness), OC2
(organizational secrecy perceptions), OC3 (strict hierarchy), and OC4 (sense of isolation) are not
statistically significant. Except OC5, the relationships have significantly low regression weights
(.066, -.057, -.034, 052, .023 respectively) high P values (.254, .281, .529, .326, .663
respectively), and inadequate critical rates (1.142, -1.079, .630, 981, .436 respectively). Among
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the three control variables POP (population) and TRL (terror risk level) have low regression
weights (.032, -.050), high P values (.546, .347) and inadequate critical rates that show the
insignificant relationship between network effectiveness.
Table 31 Parameter Estimates of Covariance Structure Model
Generic Model
Indicator

URW SRW

SE

CR

Revised Model
P URW SRW SE

CR

P

N. Effectiveness <--- I. Trust

.304

.326

.054

5.638 *** .311 .304 .085 3.651 ***

N. Effectiveness <--- Comm. L.

.057

.066

.050

1.142 .254

N. Effectiveness <--- Co-pr. L.

.185 .229

.048

3.879 *** .235 .238 .081 2.892 .004

N. Effectiveness<---Facilitator L. -.095 -.126

.042

-2.285 .022 -.094 -.119 .046 -2.057 .040

N. Effectiveness <--- Goal C.

.315 .271

.070

4.465 *** .441 .357 .098 4.487 ***

N. Effectiveness <---OC1

-.043 -.057 .040

.281
1.079

N. Effectiveness <--- OC2

.030

.034

.048

.630

.529

N. Effectiveness <--- OC3

.044

.052

.045

.982

.326

N. Effectiveness <--- OC4

-.022 -.023 .050

-.436 .663

N. Effectiveness <---OC5

.111

2.558 .011

N. Effectiveness <--- OC6

-.111 -.134 .044

.012 -.133 -.153 .062 -2.163 .031
2.517

N. Effectiveness <--- POP

.017

.604

N. Effectiveness <--- TRL

-.025 -.050 .026

-.943 .346

N. Effectiveness <--- OCRL

-.071 -.108 .035

-2.033 .042 -.084 -.121 .036 -2.350 .019

NE2 <--- N. Effectiveness

.469

.412

.067

7.044 *** .465 .425 .063 7.395 ***

NE3 <--- N. Effectiveness

.529

.397

.078

6.764 *** .529 .414 .074 7.173 ***

NE4 <--- N. Effectiveness

.619

.509

.069

8.948 *** .619 .529 .065 9.502 ***

NE5 <--- N. Effectiveness

.563

.488

.066

8.518 *** .564 .508 .062 9.064 ***

NE6 <--- N. Effectiveness

.948

.760

.065

14.654 *** .948 .776 .061 15.634 ***

NE7 <--- N. Effectiveness

1.000 .859

.137

.032

.043

.028

.546

1.000 .871
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Generic Model
Indicator

URW SRW

SE

CR

Revised Model
P URW SRW SE

CR

P

NE9 <--- N. Effectiveness

.865

.774

.059

14.740 *** .865 .789 .055 15.744 ***

NE12 <--- N. Effectiveness

.888

.773

.060

14.735 *** .886 .787 .056 15.698 ***

T1 <--- I. Trust

.915

.663

.074

12.334 *** .923 .655 .077 12.026 ***

T2 <--- I. Trust

.975

.747

.078

12.483 *** .951 .717 .081 11.810 ***

T3 <--- I. Trust

1.150 .815

.081

14.245 *** 1.092 .764 .082 13.325 ***

T4 <--- I. Trust

1.050 .813

.066

15.941 *** 1.036 .793 .068 15.265 ***

T5 <--- I. Trust

.746

.537

.077

9.629 *** .695 .485 .082 8.492 ***

T6 <--- I. Trust

.846

.692

.065

12.980 *** 850 .682 .067 12.629 ***

T7 <--- I. Trust

.697

.534

.073

9.574 *** 703 .524 .076 9.278 ***

T8 <--- I. Trust

.880

.701

.066

13.351 *** .887 .700 .068 13.046 ***

T9 <--- I. Trust

1.000 .825

NL1 <--- Commissioner L.

.898

.659

.078

11.54
***
0

NL3 <--- Commissioner L.

.869

.681

.073

11.97
***
5

NL4 <--- Commissioner L.

1.000 .842

NL5 <--- Commissioner L.

.847

.771

.062

13.66
***
7

NL6 <--- Commissioner L.

.700

.518

.079

8.801 ***

NL7 <--- Co-producer L.

.866

.722

.069

12.58
*** .908 .743 .067 13.531 ***
9

NL10 <--- Co-producer L.

.862

.731

.068

12.75
*** .877 .731 .066 13.275 ***
6

NL11 <--- Co-producer L.

1.000 .867

NL12 <--- Co-producer L.

.720

.592

.071

10.17
*** .729 .589 .071 10.310 ***
2

NL13 <--- Facilitator L.

.955

.847

.060

15.808 *** .952 .845 .058 16.536 ***

NL14 <--- Facilitator L.

1.000 .962

NL15 <--- Facilitator L.

.267

.323

1.000 .818

1.000 .851

1.00 .963
.048
167

5.593 *** .266 .322 .047 5.605 ***

Generic Model
Indicator

URW SRW

SE

CR

Revised Model
P URW SRW SE

CR

P

NL16 <--- Facilitator L.

.527

.537

.055

9.668 *** .526 .336 .054 9.780 ***

NL17 <--- Facilitator L.

.482

.469

.058

8.321 *** .482 .470 .057 8.422 ***

GC1 <--- Goal Convergence

1.018 .783

.085

11.94
*** 1.023 .781 .077 13.248 ***
6

GC2 <--- Goal Convergence

1.000 .832

GC3 <--- Goal Convergence

.999

.605

.102

9.837 *** 1.011 .608 .098 10.278 ***

GC4 <--- Goal Convergence

.634

.383

.104

6.099 *** .669 .401 .102 6.536 ***

GC5 <--- Goal Convergence

.660

.493

.083

7.981 *** .683 .506 .081 8.439 ***

1.000 .825

Facilitator L. <--> I. Trust

-.149 -.260 .031 -4.768 ***

Co-producer L. <--> I. Trust

.292 .636 .039 7.510 ***

Goal C. <--> OC6

.271 .626 .033 8.230 ***

e3 <--> e4

.295

.669

.032

9.185 *** .294 .668 .032 9.179 ***

e1 <--> e2

.171

.320

.033

5.148 *** .172 .322 .033 5.167 ***

e7 <--> e8

.092

.425

.019

4.910 *** .093 .428 .019 4.968 ***

d3 <--> d2

.098

.285

.028

3.487 *** .131 .346 .028 4.705 ***

d5 <--> d3

.124 .242 .031 3.994 ***

d9 <--> d2

-.092 -.320 .022

*** -.088 -.304 .021 -4.152 ***
4.229

d9 <--> d3

-.082 -.303 .022

*** -.059 -.206 .021 -2.856 .004
3.776

d22 <--> d23 (d17 <--> d18)

.227

.409

.036

6.321 *** .227 .214 .036 6.334 ***

d26 <--> d27 (d21<--> d22)

.223

.358

.042

5.317 *** .214 .346 .041 5.209 ***

Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio
Similar to confirmatory factor analysis, covariance structure modelling also uses the
three-step method to validate the model. In the first step insignificant exogenous and control
variables should be excluded from the generic model. Therefore, insignificant variables:
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commissioner network leadership style, OC1, OC2, OC3, OC4, POP and TRL were excluded
from the covariance structure model. When these variables were excluded, critical value of OC5
decreased to 1.802, which is less than the threshold of 1.876, and its P value increased to .072,
which indicates statistically insignificant variable. Therefore OC5 was also removed from the
revised covariance structure model.
Table 32 Goodness of Fit Statistics of Covariance Structure Model
Shorthand

Criteria

Fit Index

χ2

Smaller the better

Chi-square / Degree of Freedom

χ2/df

≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4

Tucker Lewis Index

TLI

.90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable

Chi-Square

Generic
Model

2703.043

Final
Revised
Model
884.666

2.900

1.847

.710

.909

.079

.053

.727

.917

113

183

≥ .95 ; good
Root Mean Square Error of

RMSEA

05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable
≤ .05; good

Approximation
Comparative Fit Index

CFI

90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable
≥ .95 ; good

Hoelter's Critical N

Hoelter

75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable

Index

≥ 200 ; good

For the second step, goodness of fit statistics was evaluated. Table 32 indicates the
goodness of fit statistics for the initial and final revised covariance structure model. Although
excluding insignificant exogenous and control variables substantially increased model fit,
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goodness of fit statistics are not enough to consider a valid covariance model. No criteria were
met to consider a valid measurement model for obtained data. The model should be respecified
to achieve good model fit.
For the third step, modification index was examined to make necessary revisions.
According to the modification indices, inter-organizational trust and co-producer network
leadership style, inter-organizational trust and facilitator leadership style, goal convergence and
OC6, and error terms of d3 and d5 were correlated to each other. After the respecifiation, all
selected criteria were met to conclude a valid covariance structure model. Figure 24 presents the
final-revised covariance structure model.
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Figure 24. Final Revised Covariance Structure Model
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All factor loadings in the final-revised covariance structure model are statistically
significant at .05 level, varying from the lowest .322 to the highest .963. Inter-organizational
trust, goal convergence, co-producer network leadership style, and OC6 are statistically
significant hypothesized exogenous variables. The only significant control variable is the risk
levels of network jurisdictions in terms of organized crime.
The strongest impact on network effectiveness comes from latent constructs of goal
convergence and inter-organizational trust. More specifically, goal convergence is positively
correlated with network effectiveness with a standardized regression weight of .357 (p≤.001).
Inter-organizational trust is positively correlated with network effectiveness with a standardized
regression weight of .304 (p≤.001). Co-producer style of network leadership has also significant
prediction power on network effectiveness. Co-producer leadership is positively correlated with
network effectiveness with standardized regression weight of .227 (p=.006). These three positive
correlation coefficient paths mean that growth in these variables would cause an increase in
network effectiveness. On the other hand, facilitator style of network leadership is negatively
correlated with network effectiveness with standardized regression weight of -.119 (p= .040) and
high competition (OC6) is negatively correlated with network effectiveness with standardized
regression weight of -.153 (p=.031). These two negative correlation coefficients paths indicate
that growth in these variables would cause a decrease in network effectiveness.
The final covariance structure model also indicates some correlation relationships
between some exogenous variables. Inter-organizational trust is positively correlated with co172

producer style of network leadership with a correlation coefficient of .636. Inter-organizational
trust is negatively correlated with facilitator style of network leadership with a correlation
efficient of -.260. Finally, Goal Convergence is positively correlated with OC 6 (strict
competition) with a correlation coefficient of .626.
The overall model identifies that four of six exogenous latent variables (interorganizational trust, goal convergence, co-producer style of network leadership, and facilitator
style of network leadership), and one exogenous observable variables ( high competition), along
with the control variable of risk level of organized crime (OCRL) account for 37 % of variation
in network effectiveness.
4.6 Hypotheses Testing
This study aims to analyze the relationships between inter-organizational trust, network
leadership style, goal convergence, organizational culture and network effectiveness in public
security networks. Moreover, the impacts of control variables that are population of the
jurisdictions in which public security networks perform, the risk level of jurisdictions in terms of
terrorism, and risk level of jurisdiction in terms of organized crime were analyzed. Based on the
theoretical framework and literature review, the following hypotheses were tested in this study
through the results provided in the findings section:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between inter-organizational trust and
network effectiveness in public security networks.
The first hypothesis addresses a positive relationship between inter-organizational trust
and network effectiveness. The results of the analysis supported this hypothesis. With a
standardized regression coefficient of .304, inter-organizational trust is the one of the two most
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significant exogenous variable of the study, determining network effectiveness in a public
security network. The unstandardized regression weight of .311 indicates that one raw unit
increase in inter-organizational trust accounts for a .311 decrease in network effectiveness.
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between network leadership style and network
effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 2a: Top down leadership style (the commissioner role) will achieve the highest
network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 2b: The co-producer style of leadership will achieve the highest network
effectiveness in public security networks
Hypothesis 2c: Bottom up leadership style (the facilitator role) will achieve the highest
network effectiveness in public security networks
The second hypothesis addresses a relationship between network leadership styles and
network effectiveness. This hypothesis was tested with three alternative sub hypotheses. This set
of hypotheses aims to find the most appropriate leadership style to achieve the highest network
effectiveness in a public security network. The results of the analysis supported the association
between network leadership style and network effectiveness. The results indicate that coproducer style has positive impact on network effectiveness, whereas facilitator leadership style
negatively influences network effectiveness. The study did not find a relationship between
commissioner style and the endogenous variable.
More specifically, the covariance structure model found no statistical relationship at p ≤
.05 about Hypothesis 2a, suggesting a positive relationship between top down leadership style
(the commissioner role) and network effectiveness (β= 0.066). However, the study result
supports Hypothesis 2b, suggesting a positive relationship between co-producer style of
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leadership and network effectiveness. The unstandardized regression weight of .235 represents
that for a one-raw-unit increment on co-producer style of network leadership style leads to an
increase of .235 in network effectiveness. According to analysis results, facilitator style of
network leadership style has a negative impact on network effectiveness; therefore, Hypothesis
2c was not supported. The unstandardized regression weight of -.94 indicate that one-raw-unit
increase in facilitator network leadership style accounts for a .94 decrease in network
effectiveness.
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the organizational goal
convergence and network effectiveness in public security networks.
The results of the final-revised covariance structure model show that goal convergence
has a significant and positive relationship with network effectiveness with a standardized
regression weight of .357 at p ≤ .05. Goal converge is the most important variable to influence
network effectiveness. The unstandardized regression weight of .441 indicates that a one-rawunit increase on goal convergence leads to a .441 increase in network effectiveness. Therefore,
the hypothesis was supported.
Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship between the nature of organizational culture in the
public security and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4a: There is a negative relationship between the level of defensiveness in the
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks
Hypothesis 4b: There is a negative relationship between the level of perception of the
organizational secrecy in the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security
networks
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Hypothesis 4c: There is a negative relationship between the level of hierarchy in the
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4d: There is a negative relationship between the level of sense of isolation
among employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security
networks.
Hypothesis 4e: There is a negative relationship between the level of group loyalty among
employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4f: There is a negative relationship between the level of competition among
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks.
Hypothesis 4 addresses the relationship between the nature of organizational culture in
the public security sector and network effectiveness. In order to test this hypothesis, six subhypotheses were examined. Common cultural attributes of public security organizations such as
hierarchy, isolation, secrecy, self-protection, competition, and group loyalty were tested with
specific sub hypotheses. The study results partially supported the Hypotheses 4. Although
descriptive statistics supports the negative impacts for all these cultural attributes of public
security organizations on network effectiveness, the covariance structure model could not find
statistically strong relationships for the Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d and 4e. The Hypothesis 4f was
supported by the covariance structure model.
When we examine the sub-hypotheses in detail, Hypotheses 4a assumed a negative
relationship between the level of defensiveness in member organizations and network
effectiveness. However, the relationship between defensiveness and network effectiveness was
not found to be significant at .05 significance level (β= -0.057). Although the direction of the
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association was negative as assumed, null hypothesis was failed to reject because of a weak
relationship. Hypotheses 4b predicted a negative relationship between the level of perception of
the organizational secrecy in member organizations and network effectiveness. The revised
covariance structure model did not find any statistically significant evidence in the relationship at
.05 significance level with the standardized regression weight of .034. Null hypothesis was also
failed to reject for the hypotheses 4c , assuming a negative association between the level of
hierarchy in member organizations and network effectiveness (β= .052). Similarly, the
hypotheses 4d, assuming a negative relationship between the level of sense of isolation among
employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness, was not supported by the
analysis (β= -.023)
Although a statistically insignificant relationship was found for the hypotheses 4e revised
covariance structure model, the relationship was relatively stronger compared the first four
variables. The hypotheses assumed a negative relationship between the level of group loyalty
among employees of member organizations and network effectiveness, but the first covariance
structure model indicates a positive relationship.The last sub hypothesis, which suggests a
negative relationship between level of competition among member organizations and network
effectiveness, was supported by the analysis with a standardized regression weight of -.153. The
unstandardized regression weight of -.133 indicates that a one-raw-unit increment on competition
accounts for a .133 decrease in network effectiveness. Table 33 shows the summary of
hypothesis testing results.
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Table 33 Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results
Hypotheses

H1

Results

There is a positive relationship between inter-organizational
trust and network effectiveness in public security networks.

Supported

H2

There is a relationship between network leadership style and
network effectiveness in public security networks.

Supported

H2a

Top down leadership style (the commissioner role) will achieve
the highest network effectiveness in public security networks

Not Supported

H2b:

The co-producer style of leadership will achieve the highest
network effectiveness in public security networks

H2c

Bottom up leadership style (the facilitator role) will achieve the
highest network effectiveness in public security networks.

H3

There is a positive relationship between the organizational
goal convergence and network effectiveness in public security
networks

H4

H4a

There is a relationship between the nature of organizational
culture in the public security and network effectiveness in
public security networks.
There is a negative relationship between the level of
defensiveness in the member organizations and network
effectiveness in public security networks

Supported
Not Supported
(Negative
Relationship Found)

Supported

Partially Supported

Not Supported

H4b

There is a negative relationship between the level of perception
of the organizational secrecy in the member organizations and
network effectiveness in public security networks

Not Supported

H4c

There is a negative relationship between the level of hierarchy
in the member organizations and network effectiveness in public
security networks

Not Supported

H4d

There is a negative relationship between the level of sense of
isolation among employees of the member organizations and
network effectiveness in public security networks.

Not Supported
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Hypotheses

H4e

H4f

Results

There is a negative relationship between the level of group
loyalty among employees of the member organizations and
network effectiveness in public security networks.

Not Supported

There is a negative relationship between the level of
competition among member organizations and network
effectiveness in public security networks.

Supported

Consequently, the statistical analysis results supported three of the four main hypotheses.
The fourth main hypothesis, which is related to organizational culture, is partially supported. The
study found that inter-organizational trust and goal convergence have a positive relationship with
network effectiveness. Although facilitator leadership is found to be the most common
leadership style in Turkish public security networks, it is found as inappropriate to achieve
higher network effectiveness. According to the results, the co-producer network leadership is the
most convenient leadership style in terms of network effectiveness. While the results of the
descriptive statistics confirm that six specific features of organizational culture in the public
security sector have negative influence on network effectiveness, the hypothesis testing with the
covariance structure model only support the negative impact of competition among partner
organization. The next chapter will discuss the findings of the statistical analysis.
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CHAPTER 5- DISCUSSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
In the light of study findings, this section focuses in detail on discussions on study
variables and covariance structure model, theoretical methodological, managerial, and policy
implications, limitations of the study, and possible future research topics.
5.1 Discussions
5.1.1 Network Effectiveness
Network effectiveness is defined by Provan and Kenis (2008) “as the attainment of
positive network level outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual
organizational participants acting independently” (p. 230). Determining appropriate performance
evaluation measures in networks is more challenging compared to single organizations (Page,
2004). Each network has special performance evaluation measures that are more suitable to the
field in which a network works, and the purpose of the network (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007)
Network effectiveness in public security networks is the endogenous variable of the study
that originally consists of 12 indicators: Regular communication among participants; long term
relations, the amount of shared information, information using and collecting capacity, success
in joint operations, success in preventing terror and organized crime cases, success in solving
terror and organized crime cases, and success in capturing and eliminating terrorists and
members of organized crime gangs. Among these indicators: success in preventing terror attacks
and success in preventing organized crime incidents; success in solving terror cases and success
in solving organized crime cases; and success in capturing or eliminating terrorists and success
in capturing or eliminating members of organized crime gangs were highly correlated. High
correlation in these indicators can be justifiable, since they were addressing the same aspects of
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similar problems. In confirmatory factor analysis, one of the highly correlated variables should
be removed from the measurement model to prevent biased estimates of the parameters (Wan,
2002). Thus, three indicators, which are success in preventing organized crime incidents, success
in solving organized crime cases, and success in capturing or eliminating the terrorists, were
excluded from the model.
In the generic measurement model all indicators were found as statistically significant at
.05 significance level. However, the factor loading of the indicator of regular communication
among participants was lower than the factor loading threshold criterion of .40. This indicator
was also excluded from the model to get better model fit. After examining the modification
indices, three pairs of error terms in the model were correlated with each other to increase model
fit.
The revised measurement model of network effectiveness consists of 8 indicators. Factor
loading of indicators are ranging from .407 to .871. The highest factor loading is produced by the
success in preventing terror attacks with a regression coefficient value of .871 followed by the
indicators of success in solving terror cases and success in capturing or eliminating members of
organized crime gangs which have standardized regression weights of .789 and .787
respectively. These scores make them the most important indicators of the construct. The
Cronbach’s Alpha score of the revised model is .871. Given factor loadings, Cronbach’s Alpha
score and goodness of fit statistics verify a valid and reliable latent construct for the network
effectiveness.
Among three control variables, risk level of terrorism has low negative relationships with
three indicators of network effectiveness, and risk level of organized crime has again a low
negative relationship with seven indicators. Negative directions in correlations show that as
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jurisdictions’ risk level increase, network effectiveness decreases. The control variable of
population of the jurisdictions failed to demonstrate any significant relationship with network
effectiveness.
5.1.2 Inter-Organizational Trust
Inter-organizational trust is the first exogenous latent variable of the study. It was
designed to measure the level of trust among organizations in public security networks. Nine
indicators of the variables which are open communication among partner agencies, perception
about reliability, honesty, mutual understanding, keeping commitment in collaborative process,
mutual acceptance, belief on capability, mutual respect among members, and sense of fairness,
came from different studies in literature (Vangen &Huxham, 2003; Ostrom & Ahn, 2002;
Ferguson & Stoudand, 1999; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). The survey questions were previously
used by different studies (Wang & Kapucu; 2006; Kapucu, 2008; Garayev, 2011; Kapucu,
Garayev & Wang, 2013).
No indicators were excluded from the measurement model because of high correlation.
All indicators were found statistically significant at .05 significance level. Since all standardized
regression weights of the indicators were higher than .40 (factor loading threshold) all of them
were kept in the model. Modification indices were examined to make respecifiation and
according to those scores, three error terms were correlated. In revised model factor loadings are
between .485 and .818.Cronbach’s alpha score for inter-organizational trust was .896 which
indicates a very good level of reliability. The results of confirmatory factor analysis show that
indicator sense of fairness has the highest factor loading (.818). Mutual understanding has the
second highest factor loadings (.793), and Honesty takes the third place in terms of regression
weight rankings (.764). While five indicators of inter-organizational trust are negatively
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correlated with control variable of organized crime, only two indicators have significant negative
correlation with terrorism risk level of network jurisdiction. Negative directions in correlations
reveal that as jurisdictions’ risk level increase, inter-organizational trust in networks decreases.
No significant correlation was detected between population and indicators of inter organizational
trust.
5.1.3 Network Leadership Styles
In order to compare the impact of three alternative styles of network leadership on
network effectiveness, three latent constructs, which are commissioner style, co-producer style,
and facilitator style, were built for the study. In the generic measurement model each leadership
style was measured with six indicators. These indicators were taken from the paper written by
Span et al. (2009).
According to the indicators of commissioner network leadership style, network goals and
network vision are formulated solely by governors. Governors act as an executor and steer
network activities. Decisions in the network are made solely by the governor and they take full
responsibility for public security network activities. The descriptive statistics demonstrated that
the commissioner style is the least common leadership style for Turkish public security
networks. The statements for this construct were mostly not supported. This is mainly because
governors have very limited power on military forces and intelligence service departments. Their
power on the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard is even restricted, although they are a kind of
law enforcement agency. Therefore, managing public security networks with commissioner
leadership style is not very possible for governors.
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Among these six indicators for commissioner style, the first two indicators were highly
correlated with each other. This is a justifiable situation, being goals of the network and visions
of the network are similar concepts. Therefore, the second indicator related to vision was
excluded from the model. After this revision, the model had a perfect model fit, thus any other
revision was not needed to validate the model. All other indicators were statistically significant,
having factor loadings between .518 and .841. Indicators related to steering network activities
and decision making had the highest standardized regression weights (.841, .771), specifying that
they are the most important indicators of the commissioner leadership style. Even though, the
Cronbach’s Alpha score decreased from .856 to .815 after revision, this score still demonstrates a
good reliability of measurement. Organized crime risk level was negatively correlated with four
indicators of commissioner leadership style and three indicators were negatively correlated with
terror risk level. No significant correlation was found between population and the indicators in
this construct.
According to the indicators of co-producer network leadership style, network goals and
network vision are formulated by all partners jointly. Governors act as a partner in the network
instead of a hierarchical superior. Network activities are steered jointly and decisions in the
network are made by all partners jointly. Finally, all partners are jointly responsible for network
activities. According to the frequency distribution of the responses, co-producer style is also not
a very common leadership style of province governors for managing public security networks.
Although the responses to the statements get higher agreement responses compared to statements
of commissioner leadership style, disagreement responses usually exceeded agreement responses
except the indicator related to steering network activities.
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Similar to the commissioner leadership style, the first two indicators were highly
correlated with each other. They are related to goals of the network and vision of the network.
This was an expectable result, after finding a similar high correlation between goals and vision in
commissioner leadership style. The second indicator, related to vision, was also removed from
this model. Another significant point in correlation analysis is related to the third indicator,
which says governors act as a partner in the network instead of a hierarchical superior. This
indicator had only one significant correlation with other indicators in this construct. In addition,
the direction of this correlation was negative. This could be regarded as a signal of low factor
loading in confirmatory factor analysis.
The results of confirmatory factor analysis confirmed this signal, finding a low factor
regression weight with a P value of .106 that indicates an insignificant indicator. After excluding
this indicator, the co-producer leadership style had a perfect model fit. Factor loadings of the
indicators in the revised measurement model differed from the lowest .589 to the highest .851.
Regression weights demonstrated that decision making is the most important indicator of this
latent construct. Goodness of fit statistics, high factor loadings and Cronbach’s Alpha score
(.814) demonstrated the validity and reliability of the conceptualization of this latent variable of
co-producer network leadership style. All indicators of co-producer leadership style except NL9
had statistically significant negative correlation with organized crime risk level. This result
shows that as the risk level of organized crime risk increased, governors perform behaviors
related co-producer leadership style less. The results did not find any significant correlation
between indicators of co-producer leadership style and the control variables of population and
terror risk level.
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The third network leadership style is facilitator leadership. According to the original
indicators, under management of facilitator leadership in a network, each organization
formulates their own goals and visions separately. The governor acts as an initiator to facilitate
the collaboration and each organization steers their own activities in the network. Decisions in
the network are made by each organization and each partner is responsible for their own
activities.
According to the frequency distributions, the facilitator style is the most common
leadership style in Turkish public security networks. Responses for the statements of facilitator
style of leadership accumulate within agreement responses. Governors’ weak power on security
agencies, the strong relationship between the provincial branches of security organizations and
their headquarters, and the unwillingness of agencies to enter a deeper partnership in the network
may direct governors to choose characteristics of facilitator leadership style.
Correlation analysis did not demonstrate any high correlatioqn between indicators in this
construct leading to a multicollinearity problem. The generic measurement model of facilitator
network leadership style was examined through confirmatory factor analysis. Confirmatory
factor analysis demonstrated that the last indicator, which says each organization and each
partner is responsible for their own activities in the network, was found statistically insignificant
at .05 significance level. All other indicators were statically significant. Although factor loading
of the indicator that says the governor acts as an initiator to facilitate the collaboration was not
higher than .40, it was not removed from the model. Because this revision would decrease the
χ2/df value lower than 1.00 that leads poor model fit. All remaining indicators were ranging from
.470 to .963 were satisfactory. The highest factor loading is produced by the indicator related to
the vision of the network. According to the result of modification indices, two error terms are
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correlated with each other. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (.819) of the revised model, factor
loadings, and goodness of fit statistics demonstrate the validity and reliability of the
conceptualization for the facilitator leadership style. The results of correlation analyses showed
that any indicators of facilitator leadership did not have a significant correlation between three
control variables of the study.
5.1.4 Goal Convergence
The last exogenous latent variable of goal convergence was designed to measure “the
extent to which organizations have common goals and mission” (Kapucu, Garayev & Wang,
2013, p. 106). The generic measurement model originally consists of six measures, which are
difference in organizational priorities, multiplicity of differing organizational backgrounds,
diverging organizational goals, expectations and mission, and common points, were used to
measure goal convergence among member organizations in public security networks. The survey
questions were previously used by different studies (Wang & Kapucu; 2006; Kapucu, 2008;
Kapucu, Garayev & Wang, 2013).
The frequency distributions of the responses indicate that respondents think there is a low
level of organizational goal convergence in province public security networks. Most of the
respondents agree or strongly agree that organizations in the public security network have
different organizational priorities, goals, missions, and expectations, but they do not mostly agree
with that organizations have little in common. Most of the respondents also think that
collaboration in the network is challenging due to a multiplicity of differing organizational
backgrounds. As correlation analysis results did not demonstrate any high correlation between
indicators, no indicators were excluded from the measurement model because of
multicollinearity. All indicators were found statistically significant at .05 significance level, but
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the last indicator of missions were excluded from the model because of its factor loading (.394)
is lower than .40. According to the modification indices, one pair of error terms of indicators was
correlated with each other. The results of confirmatory factor analysis show that the indicator of
organizational backgrounds has the highest factor loading (.825), and the indicator of
organizational priorities takes the second place in terms of regression weight rankings (.781).
Among three control variables, three indicators were negatively correlated with control
variable of population and just one indicator was negatively correlated with terror risk level. Any
other statistically significant correlation was detected between indicators of goal convergence
and control variables.
5.1.5 Organizational Culture
Organizations in the public security sector have some unique cultural features that make
them different from other public agencies. This study focuses on six characteristics of security
agencies’ organizational culture that were argued in the literature (Mouton, 2002; Kappeler,
Sluder & Alpert, 1998; Fraser, 2004; Christensen & Crank, 2001; Luen & Al-Hawamdeh, 2001).
Defensiveness, organizational secrecy, strict hierarchy, sense of isolation among employees,
group loyalty and competition among agencies were measured by a single question in the survey
as separate characteristics of organizational culture in public security networks. Since
respondents were asked to evaluate a specific statement for each variable, organizational culture
is not a latent variable and confirmatory factor analysis was not used to validate a measurement
model.
Among the six questions, four questions directly asked respondents the influence of a
specific cultural attribute on collaboration in networks. In these four questions, respondents were
asked to evaluate the impact of organizational secrecy perceptions of network members, strict
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hierarchy, a sense of isolation among employees of member organizations, and competition
among agencies on network collaboration. The descriptive analysis of these questions shows that
all of these four cultural attributes have a negative effect on network collaboration. Other two
questions in the section were formulated to identify the level of defensiveness, and group loyalty.
Most of the respondents agree or strongly agree that defensiveness and group loyalty are existing
characteristics of member organizations in their network.
Among the six variables of organizational culture, defensiveness, strict hierarchy and
competition had a statistically significant negative correlation with the control variable of
population. Negative correlation revels that, as the population of the jurisdiction increases,
defensiveness, hierarchy in security organizations, and competition among members in networks
decreases. The analyses did not find any other significant correlation between the variables of
organizational culture and control variables.
5.1.6 Covariance Structure Model
Based on literature and the theoretical framework, the main research question of the study
is, “Which factors are important for effectiveness in public security networks?” In order to
address this question, the study aims to test the hypothesized relationships between exogenous
variables of inter-organizational trust, network leadership style, goal convergence, and specific
characteristics of organizational culture in the public security sector, and endogenous variable of
network effectiveness.
The first hypothesis addressed the research question of, “What is the role of interorganizational trust among partner agencies?” The analysis results find a positive relationship
between inter-organizational trust and network effectiveness. Regression weights of the
covariance structure analysis indicated that inter-organizational trust (β= 304) is the one of the
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most important variable along with goal convergence. Inter-organizational trust has a positive
correlation (.64) with co-producer network leadership style and negative correlation with
facilitator network leadership style (.26). The result is consistent with the literature that argues
that trust facilitates collaboration, lessens transaction costs, strengthen network ties, increase
information collecting and using capacity, and problem solving capacity (Agranoff, 2007;
Agranof & McGuire, 2001; Isett et al., 2011; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007).
The second hypothesis addressed the research question of, “Which kind of leadership
style will achieve the highest performance in public security networks?” There are different
arguments in network literature about the appropriate leadership style. While McGuire (2006),
Agranoff (2007), and Whetten (1978) found that the top down leadership (commissioner style)
provides higher collaboration in networks, Andrews, Boyne, Law, and Walker (2009) and
Korssen-van Raaij (2006) found that the bottom-up leadership (the facilitator style ) is more
appropriate for networks.
In order to find the most suitable leadership style for public security networks, three
alternative sub hypotheses were tested in this study. The study found that the co-producer
leadership style (β= 238) ensures higher network effectiveness, whereas facilitator leadership
style (β=-.119) decreases the network effectiveness. The study did not find a statistically
significant relationship between commissioner leadership style and network effectiveness at .05
significance level.
The different results found by different researches related to the appropriate leadership
style explained by Span et al. (2012) through different conditions in which examined networks
perform. They suggested that the commissioner style is more effective for simple and stable
public networks; and the facilitator style is more effective for complex and dynamic public
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networks, while the co-producer style is better for simple and dynamic public networks and
complex and stable public network. The results of the study are consistent with Span et al.’s
argument, since Turkish local public security networks have a complex but stable structure.
An interesting point in the results of the study is the contradiction between prevalence of
the leadership styles and their appropriateness in terms of network effectiveness. Although the
facilitator style is found to be the most common leadership style in public security networks, it is
found as inappropriate for network effectiveness. Facilitator style is preferred by the governors
because of their weak power on some member organizations such as military units and
intelligence departments. The unwillingness of organizations to work together and the high
dependence of member organizations to their headquarters in capital city Ankara make it
difficult for governors to implement commissioner style or co-producer style of network
leadership. The positive correlation (.64) between the co-producer style and inter-organizational
trust, and the negative correlation (-.26) between facilitator style and inter-organizational trust
can be interpreted that the level of trust is an important determiner of the preferred leadership
style for governors. However, this relationship can also be interpreted that the type of leadership
style may positively or negatively influence the level of trust between organizations in the
network.
The third hypothesis addresses the research question of, “What is the relative importance
of goal convergence in network effectiveness?” The study found that goal convergence is one of
the most important variables that have positive impact on network effectiveness. The result is
also consistent with the literature (Rivera, Soderstrom & Uzzi, 2010; Kapucu and Garayev;
2013). The study also found a positive correlation between goal convergence and competition
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among member organizations. This means that as the goals are more similar, the competition
between agencies is getting higher.
The fourth hypothesis addresses the research question of, “What is the relative
importance organizational culture in network effectiveness?” In order to address this research
question, six sub hypotheses were tested in the study. As mentioned before, four questions
directly asked respondents the impact of a specific cultural attribute on collaboration in their
public security network, and other two questions in the section were formulated to identify the
level of defensiveness and group loyalty The frequency distribution of responses and the result
of the covariance structure model are not consistent with each other for three questions which
directly ask the impact of organizational secrecy perceptions of the network members, strict
hierarchy in the organizations, and sense of isolation among employees of the member
organizations.
According to the frequency distributions of the statements in these four questions,
respondents think the examined cultural attributes make it difficult for collaboration in the public
security networks. The statements in this section were reported the highest percentage of
agreement responses. More specifically, 86.5 percent of the of the respondents agree or strongly
agree that collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to organizational
secrecy perceptions of the network members. 80 percent of respondents think that strict hierarchy
in member organizations make collaboration challenging in their security networks. 77 percent
of the respondents agree or strongly agree that collaboration is challenging in their networks
because of a sense of isolation among employees of the member organizations. And finally, 76.4
percent of the respondents think that collaboration is challenging due to competition among
organizations in their public security networks. However, the covariance structure model did not
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find a statistically significant relationship between organizational secrecy perceptions, strict
hierarchy, sense of isolation among employees of the member organizations, and network
effectiveness. Although frequency distributions support the hypotheses that argue a negative
relationship between these cultural attributes in the security sector and network effectiveness, the
results of the covariance structure model did not support the hypotheses which are based on
literature. On the other hand, competition among member organizations is found to be negatively
associated with network effectiveness as consistent with the literature.
With regards to two questions that identify the level of defensiveness and group loyalty,
69.9 percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree with the organizations involving the
public security network do not confront problems without becoming defensive, and 72.2 percent
of respondents think that when an employee of an organization in the network makes a mistake,
fellows feel responsibility to protect him/her. The covariance structure model did not find a
statistically significant relationship between defensiveness and network effectiveness; therefore,
the results were not be able to verify the hypothesis. The results of the covariance structure
model related to group loyalty contradicts with the hypothesis. While the hypothesis assumes a
negative relationship, the results indicate an insignificant positive relationship. This result can be
interpreted that respondents think that group loyalty in member organizations is a sign of group
loyalty in the network that may have positive impact on network effectiveness.
Among three control variables, the study only found a negative statistically significant
relationship between the organized crime risk levels of network jurisdictions between network
effectiveness. The standardized regression weight of -.153 indicate that one-raw-unit increase in
the risk level accounts for a .153 unit decrease in network effectiveness. Other control variables,
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population of the jurisdiction and terror risk level, were not found to be statistically associated
with network effectiveness.
5.2 Implications
This study examined the dynamics of network effectiveness in the public safety sector.
Local public security managers’ perceptions about network effectiveness were examined. In the
light of study results, the implications of the study can be discussed in theoretical,
methodological, managerial and policy context.
5.2.1 Theoretical Implications
The survey was designed to evaluate inter-organizational collaboration among local
public security network members in Turkey, and understand which factors are important for
network effectiveness in the public security networks. In this study, the network effectiveness
concept was examined in the context of the public security sector. Therefore different studies in
different sectors may indicate different consequences. In other words, the study contributes to the
literature on the idea of network effectiveness, especially in the public security field.
The network theory literature discusses that some significant factors, such as interorganizational goal convergence, network structure, network resources, leadership style, internal
and external legitimacy, trust, power differentiation, may contribute the network effectiveness
(Popp et al., 2013). The results of this study, which indicate a positive relationship between interorganizational trust, goal convergence and network effectiveness, are consistent with the
literature. Inter-organizational trust and goal convergence are found to be the most important
factors affecting network effectiveness.

194

The results are also consistent with the inter-organizational social capital perspective.
According to this perspective, social capital provides a more appropriate environment for
collaboration. It creates a justification for organizations to subordinate their priorities in favor of
organizational goals and also creates more flexible work practices. Finally, it provides a more
productive instrument to manage collective actions compared to hierarchical tools. Trust is
accepted as one of the two main components of social capital (Leanna and Van Burren 1999 &
Puntham, 1995). Social capital can be realized “through members' levels of collective goal
orientation and shared trust” (Leanna & van Burren, 1999, p. 540). The findings of the analysis
indicate the importance of inter-organizational trust and goal convergence on network
effectiveness, which were stressed as the two main mechanisms to realize social capital. The
positive relation between the co-producer leadership style and inter-organizational trust is also a
significant point in terms of social capital perspective. Therefore, co-producer leadership style is
found as the most suitable leadership style for enhanced trust and social capital.
The results confirmed that different leadership styles have different consequences with
regards to network effectiveness as well. The study has been the first study that compares the
impacts of three alternative leadership styles in public security networks. According to the
results, hierarchical methods which are represented by commissioner leadership style do not help
for better collaboration in the network. Although facilitator leadership is the most common
leadership style in the public security sector because of the specific difficulties to implement
other leadership styles in network settings, it is found inappropriate to achieve higher network
effectiveness. The co-producer network leadership is found as the most convenient leadership
style in terms of network effectiveness. An important point found in the study is the positive
correlation between inter-organizational trust and co-producer leadership style and negative
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correlation between the inter-organizational trust and facilitator leadership style. This study did
not focus on the causal relationship between the leadership style and inter-organizational trust.
Therefore, it cannot be firmly said which one leads to another. Further studies may examine the
causal relationship between trust and network leadership style
In terms of resource dependency theory, organizations in public security networks are
dependent upon each other to fight against terrorism and organized crime. However, the findings
show that they have different priorities and expectations which create a problematic situation for
network effectiveness. According to the results, network management should encourage
organizations to actively involve network activities by employing co-producer style behaviors.
Network leaders should remind the necessity of collaboration and the organizations’
interdependence to achieve their goals. Network leaders should embrace collaborative leadership
skills that focus on productive interaction among network members (McGuire & Silvia, 2009)
While the results of the descriptive statistics confirm that six specific features of
organizational culture in the public security sector have negative influence on network
effectiveness, the hypothesis testing with the covariance structure model only support the
negative impact of competition among partner organizations. Therefore, the covariance structure
model did not support literature, which argue that features of organizational cultures in the public
sector such as isolation, secrecy, hierarchy, group loyalty and defensiveness often prevent
healthy information sharing and collaboration (Fraser, 2004; Christensen & Crank, 2001; Luen &
Al-Hawamdeh, 2001; Glomseth, Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2007). The only organizational
culture attributes found as having negative impact on network effectiveness is competition
between organizations. However, the conflicted results obtained by descriptive statistics and
covariance structure model necessitate further research to examine the relationship between the
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nature of organizational culture in the public security and network effectiveness in public
security networks.
5.2.2 Methodological Implications
The first methodological implication is related to operationalization of the variables. In
terms of the reliability and validity of the latent constructs, the result of confirmatory factor
analysis verified that inter-organizational trust, commissioner network leadership style, coproducer network leadership style, facilitator leadership style, goal convergence and network
effectiveness are acceptable constructs. The survey questions can be used to measure the
constructs in other studies. Especially, the network effectiveness section of the survey is unique,
and it was developed in this study in the light of literature to evaluate the success of public
security networks. However, operationalization of the variables in organizational culture should
be revisited for potential problems.
The second implication is that perceptions of network managers can be used to evaluate
the overall characteristics of public security network. This study surveyed province and district
governors, deputy province governors, administrative senior inspectors and Interior Ministry
high and middle level bureaucrats who have worked as public security managers. Since they
have deep knowledge and experience related to public security networks, they are decent sources
of information to evaluate different aspects of networks. This method can be replicated in further
similar researches.
Finally, a self-reported online survey was used to collect data. The survey was built and
distributed through a web-based survey tool. The links of the survey questionnaire was
electronically mailed to the respondents. This is an easy, fast and low-cost method of information
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gathering method and provides efficient and effective opportunities for sectorial studies. Survey
questions in inter-organizational trust and goal convergence were taken from previously
conducted surveys. They were originally prepared in English. Other sections were prepared in
English as well by using existing literature. Then the survey questions were translated in to
Turkish. When making translation, cultural differences were considered, and functional
equivalence was targeted, rather than literal translation. In order provide reliability and validity
of the measurement, the Turkish version of the survey was reviewed by Turkish native speakers.
The reviewers of the translations were selected among professional managers of the Turkish
Interior Ministry who know the context of the study. When conducting a survey for other
countries using another language, these translation methods may be replicated to give
interpretive and actual meaning of the study constructs.
5.2.3 Managerial and Policy Implications
The study indicated the importance of the inter-organizational trust and goal convergence
in network effectiveness. Government and network managers should focus on establishing
relationships to promote trust and decrease the goal divergence between partner agencies. They
should try to increase open communication in the network. This can be possible to encourage
behaviors characterized by mutual understanding, acceptance and respect. When making
decisions, sense of fairness is an important aspect of establishing trustful relationships. Creating
such an environment would push network members to stay reliable and honest in network
relationships. In order to create such an environment, the education phase of officers of member
organizations should be focused. This set of behaviors should be identified as education
objectives in training of military, law enforcement and intelligence service officers.
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Central government should impose security agencies to work together and information
sharing. A set of criteria related to inter-organizational collaboration should be identified as a
performance measure for each agency. In addition to common objectives, unique criteria should
be determined for specific jurisdictions, because of their different security priorities and
problems. These criteria should be strictly observed and enforced by central government and
governors with an effective performance measurement system.
Another significant policy and managerial implication that can be derived is related to
network leadership style. The results indicate the facilitator leadership style is the most common
practice, because it is easier to implement in network settings compared to other leadership
styles. However, the study found that this is not suitable for network effectiveness. Facilitator
style does not help to encourage member organizations to work together. Each organization
focuses on their goals and their own actions. The network goals stay in the second row behind
organizational priorities. This situation prevents to produce better results in terms of network
effectiveness. The results also indicate that commissioner leadership style that uses hierarchical
tools in network management does not generate positive outcomes. Networks have unique
conditions that differ them from single organizations. The results confirmed that top-down
leadership is not an appropriate style to manage public security networks.
According to the study results, co-producer style yields higher network effectiveness.
The negative relationship between trust and facilitator style, and a positive relationship between
trust and co-producer style verify the negative impacts of facilitator style and positive
consequences of co-producer style. Encouraging joint relationships in formulating goals, vision,
making decisions, actions, and taking responsibility are more fit to the spirit of the network.
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Although governors have little tools to implement the co-producer style, they need to find ways
to create such an environment that co-producer leadership can be employed.
Governors should focus on three main tasks to build an effective network. First, they
should ensure an accountable system of public security in which member organizations fulfill
their obligations to the network. Effective monitoring of network members and their activities is
an important requirement of accountability. Secondly, governors need to manage conflicts
between organizations appropriately and constructively (Milward & Provan, 2006). They should
identify the boundaries of member organizations, network principles, and values (McGuire,
2002). Another requirement for co-producer leadership style is appropriately coordinating joint
actions. Governors should ensure continuous communication during the preparation phase and
operation phase of joint actions.
In the light of these consequences, central government should select governors between
candidates who have communication skills, and influence and negotiation skills. Government
should also aim to gain competencies in three types of leadership behaviors, which are: task
oriented behaviors, organization oriented behaviors and people oriented behaviors, in education
and training programs for governors (Van Wart, 2011). Competencies in task oriented behaviors
are “monitoring and assessing work, planning, clarifying roles and objectives, informing,
delegating, problem solving, and managing innovation and creativity”(p.347). Competencies in
organization oriented behaviors are “scanning the environment, strategic planning, articulating
the mission and vision of the organization, networking and partnering, performing general
management functions such as human resource management and budgeting, decision making,
and managing organizational change” (p. 392). Lastly, people oriented behaviors are important
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to build inter-organizational trust, mutual respect, continuous communication, manage conflicts
among member organization and motivate them for shared goals.
Finally, in order to promote governors to implement behaviors in co-producer leadership
styles, the central government should strengthen the governor’s authority and financial power on
military units and intelligence departments. Central government should provide opportunities for
governors to build local capacity in public security. The highly centralized structure in security
agencies leads local branches to follow their headquarters rather than province governors.
Organizations are more inclined to comply with orders from the capital city and omit the goals of
province public security networks. The enhancing dependency to province resources would push
organizations to work together.
5.3 Limitations
The first limitation is related to the respondents. The survey was distributed to the
professional public security network managers in Turkey who are current or previous province
and district governors. The study population is the most knowledgeable group in Turkey about
the study topic. However, participant agencies’ employees might have different perceptions than
the managers of the network. There is also a generalizability issue since the study was conducted
in the context of the Turkish local public security networks. Being all respondents were from
Turkey, the results may not be applicable to public security networks in other countries.
Second limitation is about the design. This study is a cross sectional survey based design.
Cross-sectional surveys collect data at one point in time and indicate snapshots of the population.
Cross sectional studies might be weak in terms of providing deeper understandings in complex
problems. Another limitation of the study is about data gathering method. Self-administered
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surveys might be weak to represent actual thoughts of individuals. Respondents may select more
favorable choices rather than their actual behaviors.
Finally, the study did not test the causal relationships between exogenous variables,
because of the design of the conceptual framework. Only correlations between exogenous
variables were examined and possible mediation or moderation relationships between exogenous
and endogenous variables were not focused.
5.4 Future Research
Future studies should examine the perceptions of participant agencies’ employees related
to latent construct of the study. The perceptions of the network manager may not entirely
represent the general perceptions in the network. The same survey used in this study should be
conducted to participant agencies’ employees. Future studies should also examine the study
constructs by using qualitative methods, which can overcome limitations of cross sectional
designs. Additional interviews with some of the survey respondents may be conducted to reach
better understandings about their perceptions.
Another suggestion is about the design of contextual framework. Future studies should
examine the mediation and moderation effects between variables. The causal relationship
between inter-organizational trust and leadership style should be examined. In addition, interorganizational trust may be designed as the endogenous variable and the impacts of network
success or network effectiveness on inter-organizational trust should be examined.
Finally, in order to increase the generalizability of the study findings, the study should be
replicated in other countries’ public security networks. Further studies should also replicate this
study in other sectors.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY
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This survey is conducted to examine local public security network managers’
perceptions about the network effectiveness. Because of increasing challenges about terrorism
and organized crime, governments establish various new organizational networks to fight against
different aspects of these problems. This enlargement generates a complex public security
network system involving law enforcement agencies, military units, and intelligence services.
Managing complex network arrangements is different from managing and leading a single public
organization. Governors have limited direct authority over military units and intelligence
services. This study will look at the dynamics of the network effectiveness in the public security
sector. The survey is designed to evaluate inter-organizational collaboration among local public
security networks members across Turkey, and understand which factors are important for an
effective collaboration in public safety networks. The survey takes about 15 minutes to complete.
Your responses are confidential, and will not be revealed without your consent; only aggregate
results will be made available. I appreciate your effort and time for participation.

Cihan Demirhan
Senior Administrative Inspector
PhD. Student at UCF
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Section 1: In this study, the term of ‘province public security network’ is used to refer a
province’s security structure, which works under the coordination of a governor, consisting
of law enforcement agencies, military units, intelligence departments, and other
organizations. Please identify a province public security network that you had opportunity
to observe closely, and rate each of the following statements in regard to this province
public security network.
Strongly

Neither Agree

Agree

Agree

5

4

nor Disagree
3

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

2

1

[ ] The organizations involving this province public security network have an open
communication.
[ ] The organizations in this public security network are reliable partners.
[ ] Honesty is the basis of inter-organizational collaboration in the public security network.
[ ] Inter-organizational relations in the network are characterized by mutual understanding.
[ ] The organizations in the network keep their commitment.
[ ] Mutual acceptance is the important part of inter-organizational collaboration in the
network.
[ ] There is a common belief across the network that each actor is capable of contributing to
the overall picture.
[ ] Inter-organizational collaboration is characterized by mutual respect in the network.
[ ] The organizations in the network collaborate with a sense of fairness towards each other.
Section 2: Please rate each of the following statements in regard to the province public
security network that you identified based on the scale provided by considering that
governors have limited direct authority over military units and intelligence services.
Strongly

Neither Agree

Agree

Agree

5

4

Nor Disagree
3

Strongly
Disagree
2

Disagree
1

[ ] Network goals are formulated solely by the governor in the network.
[ ] Public security network vision is formulated solely by the governor in the network.
[ ] The Governor acts as an executor.
[ ] Network activities are steered by the governor.
[ ] Decisions in the network are made solely by the governor.
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[ ] The governor takes full responsibility for the public security network activities.
[ ] Network goals are formulated by all partners jointly.
[ ] Network vision is formulated by all partners jointly.
[ ] The Governor acts as a partner in the network instead of a hierarchical superior.
[ ] Network activities are steered jointly.
[ ] Decisions in the network are made by all partners jointly.
[ ] All partners are jointly responsible for network activities.
[ ] Each organization is formulating their own goals separately in the network.
[ ] Each organization is formulating their own visions separately in the network.
[ ] The governor acts as an initiator to facilitate the collaboration.
[ ] Network activities are steered by each organization.
[ ] Decisions in the network are made by each organization.
[ ] Each partner is responsible for their own activities.

Section 3: Please rate each of the following statements in regard to the province public
security network consisting of law enforcement agencies, military units, intelligence
departments, and other organizations that you identified based on the scale provided:
(Organizational Culture)
Strongly

Neither Agree

Agree

Agree

5

4

Nor Disagree
3

Strongly
Disagree
2

Disagree
1

[ ] The organizations involving the public security network do not confront problems without
becoming defensive.
[ ] Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to organizational secrecy
perceptions of the network members.
[ ] Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to a strict hierarchy in the
organizations.
[ ] Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to a sense of isolation
among employees of the member organizations.
[ ] When an employee of an organization in the network makes a mistake, fellows feel
responsibility to protect him/her.
[ ] Collaboration in the public security is challenging due to competition among organizations.
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Section 4: Please rate each of the following statements in regard to the province public
security network consisting of law enforcement agencies, military units, intelligence
departments, and other organizations that you identified based on the scale provided.
Strongly
Agree
5

Agree
4

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
3

Disagree
2

Strongly
Disagree
1

[ ]

Organizations in the public security network have different organizational priorities.

[ ]

Collaboration in the public security is challenging due to a multiplicity of differing
organizational backgrounds.
There is a gap between organizational goals in the network.
Organizations working together have little in common.
Diverging organizational expectations is the reality of public security networks.
Organizations are hardly related in terms of their organizational missions.

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Section 5: Please rate each of the following statements in regard to the province public
security network consisting of law enforcement agencies, military units, intelligence
departments, and other organizations that you identified based on the scale provided.

Strongly
Agree
5
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Agree
4

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
3

Disagree
2

Strongly
Disagree
1

The organizations in the network periodically contact each other to discuss issues
pertaining to public security.
The organizations constantly develop long-term relationships among each other.
The organizations in the network constantly exchange information.
The public security network provides participant organizations to improve the ability of
collecting information against terrorist and criminal activities.
The public security network provides participant organizations to improve the ability of
using information against terrorist and criminal activities.
The public security network is successful in carrying out joint operations.
The public security network is successful in preventing terrorist attacks.
The public security network is successful in preventing organized crime activities
The public security network is successful in solving terror cases.
The public security network is successful in solving organized crime cases.
The public security network is successful in capturing or eliminating the terrorists.
The public security network is successful in capturing or eliminating members of
organized crime gangs.

Section 6:
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Are there additional elements that you think are important for an effective collaboration in public
security networks?
Section 7:
What is the population of this network jurisdiction?
[ ] Under 250,000 [ ] 250,000- 500,000 [ ] 500,000-1.000,000 [ ] 1.000,000- 2,000,000
[ ] Over 2,000,000
What is the risk level of the network jurisdiction in terms of terrorism?
[ ] Very Low [ ] Low [ ] Medium [ ] High

[ ] Very High

What is the risk level of network jurisdiction in terms of organized crime?
[ ] Very Low [ ] Low [ ] Medium [ ] High

[ ] Very High
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APPENDIX B (SURVEY IN TURKISH)
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Terör ve organize suç örgütleri kullandıkları yöntemleri sürekli olarak yenilemekte ve
geliştirmektedir. Bu durum, mücadele de farklı zorlukları ortaya çıkarmakta ve yeni kamu
birimlerinin kurulmasını zorunlu kılmaktadır. Bu zorunluluk, karmaşık bir kamu güvenliği
network yapısının ortaya çıkmasının temel nedenlerinden birisidir. Kolluk kuvvetleri, askeri
birlikler, istihbarat birimleri ve gerektiğinde networke dâhil olan diğer kuruluşlardan oluşan bu
güvenlik networku arasındaki işbirliğini yönetmek, hiyerarşik bir yapılanma içindeki her hangi
bir kamu kurumunu yönetmekten farklıdır. Vali ve kaymakamların özellikle askeri birlikler ve
istihbarat birimleri üzerindeki hiyerarşik yetkileri sınırlıdır. Bu anket, Türkiye’deki yerel
güvenlik networklerinde yer alan güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğini ve bu işbirliğin
artmasında hangi faktörlerin etkin olduğunu ölçmeyi hedeflemektedir. Anketi cevaplandırmanız
yaklaşık 15 dakika sürecek olup, vermiş olduğunuz cevaplar gizli kalacak, ilgilinin rızası dışında
hiç bir şekilde açıklanmayacaktır. Doldurulan anketlere ilişkin veriler yalnızca bir bütün olarak
bilimsel amaçlı olarak kullanılacaktır. Araştırmaya değerli bilgi ve görüşlerinizle yapacağınız
katkılar ve ayıracağınız zaman için teşekkürler.
Cihan Demirhan
Mülkiye Başmüfettişi
UCF Doktora Öğrencisi
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Bölüm 1: Bu çalışmada kullanılan il kamu güvenlik networku ifadesi ile il valisinin
koordinasyonu altında çalışan, kolluk kuvvetleri, askeri birlikler, istihbarat birimleri ve
gerektiğinde diğer kuruluşlarında katıldığı il güvelik sistemi kastedilmektedir. Lütfen
yakından gözlemleme imkânı bulduğunuz bir ilin kamu güvenlik networkunu belirleyerek,
bu il güvenlik networku açısından aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı cevap ölçeğini
kullanarak belirtiniz.
Kesinlikle
Katılıyorum
5

Katılıyorum
4

Emin
Değilim

Katılmıyorum

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum

3

2

1

[ ] Bu il kamu güvenlik networkünde, birlikte çalışan güvenlik kuruluşları arasında açık bir
iletişim mevcuttur.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, güvenilir ortaklardır.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğinde dürüstlük temel esastır.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki ilişkide karşılıklı anlayış hâkimdir.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasında karşılıklı kabul, networkteki işbirliğinin önemli
bir parçasıdır.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları networke karsı taahhütlerini yerine getirirler.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının her birinin network faaliyetlerine pozitif katkıda
bulunabilecek yeterlilikte olduğuna dair genel bir kanı mevcuttur.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğinde karşılıklı saygı hakimdir.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları birbirlerine karşı adil bir yaklaşım gözeterek işbirliği
yaparlar.

Bölüm 2: Lütfen belirlemiş olduğunuz il güvenlik networku açısından aşağıdaki ifadelere
ne derece katıldığınızı, valilerin özellikle askeri birlikler ve istihbarat birimleri üzerindeki
hiyerarşik yetkilerindeki kısıtları da göz önüne alarak, cevap ölçeğini kullanarak belirtiniz.
Kesinlikle
Katılıyorum
5
[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]

Katılıyorum
4

Emin
Değilim

Katılmıyorum

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum

3

2

1

Bu il kamu güvenliği networkünün amaçlarının belirlenmesinde vali müstakil belirleyicidir.
Bu il kamu güvenlik networkünün vizyonunun belirlenmesinde vali müstakil belirleyicidir.
Vali, networkün rutin isleyişine yönelik kararları bizzat uygulamaktadır.
Network faaliyetleri vali tarafından bizzat yönetilmektedir.
Networkte kararlar müstakil olarak vali tarafından alınmalıdır.

[ ] Vali, güvenlik networkunun faaliyetleri ile ilgi bütün sorumluğu üstlenmektedir.
[ ] Networkün amaçları, tüm katılımcı kuruluşlarca birlikte belirlenmektedir.
[ ] Networkun vizyonu, tüm katılımcı kuruluşlarca birlikte belirlenmektedir.
212

[ ] Vali, güvenlik networku içerisinde hiyerarşik üst gibi değil eşit söz hakkına sahip ortak gibi
hareket etmektedir.
[ ] Network faaliyetleri, bütün katılımcı kuruluşlarla birlikte yürütülmektedir.
[ ] Networkte kararlar bütün katılımcı kuruluşlarca hep birlikte alınmaktadır.
[ ] Bütün katılımcı kuruluşlar network faaliyetlerinden hep birlikte sorumludur.
[ ] Bu il kamu güvenliği networkündeki güvenlik kuruluşlarının her biri, kendi amaçlarını
networkten bağımız olarak belirlemektedir.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının her biri, kendi vizyonunu networkten bağımız olarak
belirlemektedir.
[ ] Vali yalnızca networkte yer alan tarafları bir araya getirerek işbirliğini kolaylaştırmaktadır.
[ ] Network faaliyetleri, networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının her birince müstakil olarak
yürütülmektedir.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, networku ilgilendiren konularda kararlarını kendileri
alırlar.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, her biri kendi yürüttüğü faaliyetlerden sorumludur.
Bölüm 3: Lütfen yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz, kolluk, askeri birlikler,
istihbarat birimleri ve diğer kuruluşlardan müteşekkil bu il güvenlik networku açısından
aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı cevap ölçeğini kullanarak belirtiniz.
Kesinlikle
Katılıyorum
5

Katılıyorum
4

Emin
Değilim

Katılmıyorum

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum

3

2

1

[ ] Bu il kamu güvenlik networkünde yer alan güvenlik kuruluşları, karşılaştıkları problemlerle
savunmacı bir yaklaşım göstermeksizin yüzleşmezler.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının kurumsal gizlilik anlayışları, networkte işbirliğini
zorlaştırmaktadır.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarındaki katı hiyerarşik yapı, networkte işbirliğini
zorlaştırmaktadır.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının çalışanlarının kendilerini kurum dışındaki insanlardan
izole etme eğilimleri, networkte işbirliğini zorlaştırmaktadır.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının bir çalışanı, kasten veya kusurlu olarak bir yanlış
yaptığında diğer kurum çalışanları arkadaşlarını koruma ihtiyacı hissederler.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki rekabet, networkteki işbirliğini
zorlaştırmaktadır.
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Bölüm 4: Lütfen yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz, kolluk, askeri birlikler,
istihbarat birimleri ve diğer kuruluşlardan müteşekkil bu il güvenlik networku açısından
aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı cevap ölçeğini kullanarak belirtiniz.
Kesinlikle
Katılıyorum
5

Katılıyorum
4

Emin
Değilim

Katılmıyorum

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum

3

2

1

[ ] Bu il kamu güvenlik networkündeki güvenlik kuruluşlarının farklı kurumsal öncelikleri
mevcuttur.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluslar arasındaki kurumsal anlayış farklılıkları, networkteki
işbirliğini zorlaştırmaktadır.
[ ] Bu networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının amaçları arasında önemli farklılıklar mevcuttur.
[ ] Bu networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının müşterek noktaları azdır.
[ ] Kurumsal beklentiler arasındaki ayrışma, bu güvenlik networkunun bir gerçeğidir.
[ ] Bu networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının kurumsal görevleri arasındaki ilişki zayıftır.
Bölüm 5: Lütfen yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz, kolluk, askeri birlikler,
istihbarat birimleri ve diğer kuruluşlardan müteşekkil bu il güvenlik networku açısından
aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı cevap ölçeğini kullanarak belirtiniz.
Kesinlikle
Katılıyorum
5

Katılıyorum
4

Emin
Değilim

Katılmıyorum

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum

3

2

1

[ ] Bu il kamu güvenlik networkünde birlikte çalışan güvenlik kuruluşları, periyodik
aralıklarda kamu güvenliğini ilgilendiren konularda iletişim halindedir.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, devamlı olarak birlikte çalışabilecekleri uzun sureli
projeler geliştirirler.
[ ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, düzenli olarak bilgi alışverişinde bulunurlar.
[ ] Networkun faaliyetleri, katılımcı güvenlik kuruluşlarının terör ve organize suç gruplarına
yönelik bilgi toplama kabiliyetlerini arttırabilmelerini sağlar.
[ ] Networkun faaliyetleri, katılımcı güvenlik kuruluşlarının terör ve organize suç gruplarına
yönelik elde ettikleri bilgileri kullanma kabiliyetlerinin gelişmesini sağlar.
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Bu network, ortak operasyonları gerçekleştirmekte başarılıdır.
Bu network, muhtemel terör saldırılarını önlemekte başarılıdır.
Bu network, muhtemel organize suç faaliyetlerini önlemekte başarılıdır.
Bu network, işlenmiş olan terör suçlarının faillerinin tespitinde başarılıdır.

[ ] Bu network, işlenmiş olan organize suçlarının faillerinin tespitinde başarılıdır.
[ ] Bu network, işlenmiş olan terör suçlarının faillerinin yakalanmasında başarılıdır.
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[ ] Bu network, işlenmiş olan organize suçlarının faillerinin yakalanmasında veya saf dışı
edilmesinde başarılıdır
Bölüm 6:
İl kamu güvenlik networklerinde yer alan güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğinin etkinliğine
ilişkin olarak, önemli olduğunu düşündüğünüz diğer faktörleri belirtiniz?
Bölüm 7:
Yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz bu ilin nüfusu ne kadardır?
[ ] 250.000’ den az [ ] 250.000- 500.000 [ ] 500.000-1.000.000 [ ] 1.000,000- 2.000.000
[ ] 2.000.000’dan fazla
Yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz bu ilin, terör olayları acısından risk seviyesini nasıl
değerlendirirsiniz?
[ ] Çok Az [ ] Az [ ] Orta

[ ] Yüksek

[ ] Çok Yüksek

Yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz bu ilin organize suç olaylarına acısından risk
seviyesini nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?
[ ] Çok Az [ ] Az [ ] Orta

[ ] Yüksek

[ ] Çok Yüksek
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Table 34 Correlation Matrix for Exogenous and Endogenous Variables with Control Variables
Population

T1

T2

T3

T4

T5

T6

T7

Terror Risk

Organized Crime
Risk

Correlation Coefficient

.091

-.107

-.130*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.114

.063

.024

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.015

-.146*

-.193**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.793

.011

.001

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.012

-.101

-.186**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.834

.077

.001

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.096

-.040

-.127*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.093

.488

.026

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.064

-.122*

-.111

Sig. (2-tailed)

.264

.033

.052

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.043

-.061

-.137*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.452

.289

.016

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.011

-.009

-.091

Sig. (2-tailed)

.852

.873

.111

N

305

305

305
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Population

T8

T9

NL1

NL2

NL3

NL4

NL5

NL6

Terror Risk

Organized Crime
Risk

Correlation Coefficient

.114*

-.019

-.032

Sig. (2-tailed)

.047

.738

.573

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.111

-.018

-.075

Sig. (2-tailed)

.052

.756

.190

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.076

-.128*

-.183**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.188

.026

.001

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.076

-.130*

-.187**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.188

.023

.001

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.010

-.055

-.142*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.856

.335

.013

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.048

-.037

-.103

Sig. (2-tailed)

.401

.517

.073

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.044

-.148**

-.184**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.440

.010

.001

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.008

-.069

-.086

Sig. (2-tailed)

.896

.232

.135

N

305

305

305
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Population

NL7

NL8

NL9

NL10

NL11

NL12

NL13

NL14

Terror Risk

Organized Crime
Risk

Correlation Coefficient

.028

-.040

-.166**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.621

.487

.004

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.056

-.012

-.128*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.332

.833

.026

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.075

-.003

.033

Sig. (2-tailed)

.192

.953

.566

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.018

-.008

-.126*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.755

.883

.028

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.076

-.078

-.132*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.188

.172

.021

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.008

-.005

-.123*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.892

.936

.032

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.042

-.013

.041

Sig. (2-tailed)

.461

.816

.478

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.008

.012

.045

Sig. (2-tailed)

.890

.829

.439

N

305

305

305
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Population

NL15

NL16

NL17

NL18

OC1

OC2

OC3

OC4

Terror Risk

Organized Crime
Risk

Correlation Coefficient

.032

-.045

-.021

Sig. (2-tailed)

.574

.435

.715

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.056

-.043

-.026

Sig. (2-tailed)

.326

.453

.650

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.004

-.083

-.007

Sig. (2-tailed)

.946

.148

.899

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.073

.076

-.020

Sig. (2-tailed)

.205

.184

.722

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.121*

-.043

.017

Sig. (2-tailed)

.035

.453

.765

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.087

-.022

.011

Sig. (2-tailed)

.132

.699

.847

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.116*

.024

.034

Sig. (2-tailed)

.043

.672

.556

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.056

.056

.047

Sig. (2-tailed)

.329

.326

.415

N

305

305

305
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Population

OC5

OC6

Terror Risk

Correlation Coefficient

-.101

.003

-.014

Sig. (2-tailed)

.080

.965

.805

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.126*

.078

-.002

Sig. (2-tailed)

.028

.173

.974

N

305

305

305

.005

-.011

Correlation Coefficient -.158**
GC1

GC2

GC3

GC4

Sig. (2-tailed)

.006

.926

.846

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.088

.087

.072

Sig. (2-tailed)

.126

.131

.210

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.121*

-.010

.027

Sig. (2-tailed)

.035

.859

.634

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.055

.003

.072

Sig. (2-tailed)

.335

.952

.209

N

305

305

305

-.006

-.020

Correlation Coefficient -.153**
GC5

GC6

Organized Crime
Risk

Sig. (2-tailed)

.008

.918

.721

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

-.044

-.127*

-.017

Sig. (2-tailed)

.445

.026

.773

N

305

305

305
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Population

NE1

NE2

NE3

NE4

NE5

NE6

NE7

NE8

Terror Risk

Organized Crime
Risk

Correlation Coefficient

-.070

-.027

-.055

Sig. (2-tailed)

.225

.643

.342

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.059

-.022

-.032

Sig. (2-tailed)

.308

.700

.582

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.051

.048

-.050

Sig. (2-tailed)

.378

.405

.387

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.052

.048

-.104

Sig. (2-tailed)

.361

.400

.069

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.032

.012

-.114*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.575

.841

.047

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.064

-.066

-.153**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.262

.251

.007

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.075

-.107

-.125*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.191

.061

.029

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.066

-.095

-.151**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.250

.099

.008

N

305

305

305
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Population

NE9

NE10

NE11

NE12

Terror Risk

Organized Crime
Risk

Correlation Coefficient

.027

-.108

-.147**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.634

.060

.010

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.014

-.119*

-.162**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.809

.038

.005

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.045

-.165**

-.140*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.432

.004

.014

N

305

305

305

Correlation Coefficient

.045

-.148**

-.165**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.433

.010

.004

N

305

305

305
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